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2. AJP-3.2, Edition A, Version 1, is effective upon receipt and supersedes AJP-3.2 which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for the destruction of documents.

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Edvardas MAŽEIKIS
Major General, LTUAF
Director, NATO Standardization Office
RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION
# RECORD OF RESERVATIONS BY NATIONS

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## RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

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<tr>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>Reservation 1:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The usage of the terms ‘end state’ and ‘operational level objectives’ is not clear in either case (para 103, line 2; para 0123, line 6; para 0124, line 5-6; para 0138, line 2-3; para 0305, line 5-6). DEU is going to implement AJP-3.2(A) in accordance with the following understanding:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. End State: (para 0103, line 2) End state is to be used in singular only. It is the NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO’s involvement (AJP-5 harmonized in accordance with Bi-SC letter, CPPSPL/7740-73/10-271642; 5000 FEF 0070/TT 6518/Ser: NU0008 dated 31.01.2011); (para 0124, line 5-6; para 0138, line 2) The end state is hence by definition strategic, there is no operational end state.</td>
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<td>2. Operational level objectives: (para 0123, line 6) Joint objectives do not exist in NATO terminology. The components have the detailed understanding of how they will play their part in achieving an operational level objective; (para 305, line 5-6) Operational objectives do not exist in NATO terminology.</td>
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<td>The terms ‘operational end state’, ‘strategic endstate’ and ‘joint objectives’ do not exist within NATO terminology and are not supported by DEU doctrine or policy. Thus these terms will not be implemented.</td>
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<td>Reservation 2:</td>
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<td>The sentence ‘NATO seeks to achieve its objectives through a comprehensive approach’ (para 0113, line 2-3) is a quotation of AJP-3 (2010). Latest NATO documents (e.g. AJP-01, AJP-5, AJP-3.4.4) are referring about ‘NATO’s contribution to a Comprehensive Approach (CA)’. This implies that NATO does not conduct CA, but contributes to CA. DEU follows this understanding and focuses on land force’s contribution to the comprehensive approach of the political strategic level.</td>
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The term ‘information operations’ does not exist as an activity (para 0172, line 3; para 0227, line 3; para 0273, line 5). ‘Information Operations’ is according to AJP-3.10 and the Final Decision on MC 0422/5 NATO Military Policy for Information Operation as of 19 Dec 2014 a staff function to analyse, plan, assess and integrate information activities. DEU doctrine/policy supports the following understanding: If the staff function ‘Information Operations’ (Info Ops) is meant, the correct term will be ‘Information Operations’ (capital letters) or better ‘Info Ops’. If any sort of an activity is meant, the correct term will be ‘information activity’.

Reservation 4:

With regard to the latest versions of AJP-3.10.1 and AJP-3.10 and as well to national doctrine DEU does not support the mentioned PSYOPS component command (para 0169). The term PSYOPS component command has been replaced by ‘PSYOPS Task Force (POTF)’ or rather ‘PSYOPS Support Element (PSE)’.

Reservation 5:

According to AAP-47 Edition A Version 2, para 0234, “Authors of AJPs must include a lexicon, i.e., a list of the terminology used in the document, whenever one is necessary for understanding and implementing the document.”

Since in AJP-3.2 new or not NATO-agreed terms and definitions have been introduced and existing terms and definitions have been modified, a lexicon is required and should be added in a revised version soon – also for the understanding and implementation of this doctrine.

Reservation 6:

Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP I) states:

“In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under the obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some cases or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.”

DEU as a High Contracting Party does not consider unmanned aircraft systems as “new means” as stated in Article 36 AP I. For that DEU does not agree with the wording of AJP-3.2 that prominently links
“unmanned aircraft systems” with “new means” (para 0133, figure without numbering, line 9-13).

Reservation 7:

AJP-3.2 describes cyber attacks as part of Land Operations (para 0172, line 6) or combat functions (para 0255, line 2-3). This is not inline with NATO’s cyber defence policy and paragraphs 72/73 of the Wales Summit Declaration 05 Sep 2014. Cyber defence [and not cyber attack] is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. Conducting own cyber attacks on computers, computer networks and other information system would contradict NATO policy.

Reservation 8:

The definition of “Intelligence” (para 0251, figure without number, definition “Intelligence”) does match the former definition described in AAP-06, but not the latest NATO approved definition described in NATO Terminology Management System (NTMS).

DEU implements the latest NATO approved definition according to NTMS as follows: “The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers.”

Reservation 9:

AJP-3.2 (para 0258, line 6-7) points to the moral and legal duty of NATO to protect non-combatants in warfare.

Art. 55 (1) AP I obliges High Contracting Parties: “Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.”

The civilian population and individual civilians [not: non-combatants] shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations (see Art. 51 AP I). Therefore in this context the word “non-combatant” is too restrictive and may not to be used.
Reservation 10:

AJP-3.2 (para 0263, line 3-5) describes the collective protection against CBRN attacks as a task for military engineering. This task remains from DEU view as a primarily task for CBRN defence.

Reservation 11:

The terminological categories introduced in Para. 108 to 111, governing the classification of individuals and groups of people, do not meet the requirements of Article 48 and 51 para 3 of AP I.

Term of “inactive hostile” raises cause for concern. This term is a foreign body in the terminology of International Humanitarian Law. It leaves open the meaning content of hostile. It may correlate to either combatant or civilian. The categorization of an inactive civilian who participated in/facilitated previous hostilities under Article 51 para. 3 AP I is a complex procedure, which requires a careful assessment of the underlying facts. The chosen wording leaves this unconsidered.

Particularly the categorization for enemy forces in Para. 111 meets concerns, because of its unspecific content. The blanket classification into categories, excludes the criteria for this assessment. In cases of persons, whose role as combatants is not clearly identifiable but whose behaviour suggests to be a direct participation in hostilities, it is imperative to precisely describe the reasons for the loss of the general protection under Article 51 para. 3 AP I.

USA

(1) Paragraph 0105 appears to confuse the application of the principles of a comprehensive approach with the mechanics of attaining a holistic view that includes a perspective of other participants. The comprehensive approach is enabled and a product of the application of its four principles. “Integrated approach” is not recognized in the Allied doctrine lexicon.

(2) AJP-3.2 should reflect the JFC in the same context as other AJPs publications and per AAP-15. Additionally, footnote 2 uses a description of “joint force commander” that is different from AJP-01. (See attached comment matrix, serial 2).

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Introduction

Purpose

01. AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations is the primary source of Allied land force doctrine. It provides philosophical guidance and principles needed to plan and conduct land operations within a joint and multinational framework. This edition provides both the capstone document for land operations and a guide to NATO doctrine relevant to land operations. It is the senior publication in the central trilogy of land operations doctrine. This publication, ATP-3.2.1 Land Tactics and ATP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Land Forces provide the core doctrine for land forces.

Audience

02. AJP-3.2 is written for the Land Component Commander or a Joint Force Commander operating in a land centric operation, their staff and subordinate commanders. It describes the context of operating in the land environment and guidance on how land forces of the alliance should operate to achieve success.

03. NATO forces will never operate in isolation – we will always be working with others. This publication therefore also serves to provide our partners with an understanding of how we operate.

Structure

04. This edition of AJP-3.2 provides no great changes to Alliance land doctrine. Rather, it seeks to present our doctrine in an easier layout:

- Chapter 1 describes the land environment and the way we approach its complexity.
- Chapter 2 describes the way we approach allied land operations – how armies are built and how they do their business.
- Chapter 3 is a guide to the NATO hierarchy of doctrine. It describes how allied operations are conducted and what doctrine is available to ensure interoperability between the allies.

Logic maps are provided in each section to help explain how the topics relate to each other. (Figure 1)
Importantly, AJP-3.2 introduces other allied doctrine applicable to land operations. Chapter 3 provides a guide to the thematic doctrine that shapes operations within particular campaign themes and the functional doctrine that provides detail to forces and staff of different branches.

Legal

The conduct of Allied military operations is governed by international law and the domestic law of the participating nations. Within this framework NATO sets out the parameters within which its military forces can operate. Legal considerations play a key role in the decision-making process and during an operation. This is particularly important at the operational level where campaigns are designed and directed. International law provides limitations for forces and individuals. Subjects that need to be considered include neutrality, use of weapons, targeting, war crimes, self-defence, immunity and environmental limitations.
Chapter 1 – The operational environment

Chapter 1 discusses the operational environment, the contribution of land forces to the multinational joint campaign and the nature of land combat in context. Furthermore, this chapter describes how land forces interact with others, examining the implications of operating in a joint and multinational environment. (Figure 1.1)

Figure 1.1 – Chapter 1 logic map

Section 1 – The operational environment for land operations and the comprehensive approach

The operational environment

0101. The operational environment generally consists of factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply military capabilities protect the force and complete the mission. It influences the completion of a single mission as well as an entire campaign and its constituent elements. It extends beyond the mere physical boundaries of a

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1 The operational environment is defined as: A composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6). It does not refer to the operational level of war.
defined area. The operational environment includes the sea, land, air and space, the enemy, neutral, friendly and other actors, facilities, weather, terrain, electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) CBRN\(^2\) threats and hazards, and the information environment.\(^3\)

0102. Alliance doctrine must take into account the ever-changing context in which armed forces are used. The strategic environment is increasingly dynamic and complex. The strategic drivers of change include globalization of society, political geometry, demographic and environmental change and the impact of technology.

0103. The environment relating to a crisis will be more than just a military battlefield. Desired end states will often require contributions from a variety of other agencies, Allies, partner nations and other non-NATO nations’ resources and forces. Therefore, Allied headquarters and their staffs have to understand how to facilitate such integration.

0104. Achieving the desired strategic objectives must be understood across the force during the planning and conduct of operations. Commanders at all levels must build and foster a shared comprehensive understanding of the operational environment.

0105. To achieve the strategic objective, the joint force commander\(^4\) and his staff must develop a shared understanding and a holistic view of the current operational environment in terms of the crisis’s background, the underlying causes and the specific dynamics. It allows a joint force commander to visualise the extent of the problem that is faced and how the environment might be shaped and altered to advantage, which in turn shapes decision-making. A better view of the operational environment will be gained by sharing the views of other agencies – for example international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the private sector etc.

0106. The land environment is unique in that it is where people live. Allied land operations have to deal with the complexity of an environment characterized by the presence of people and their infrastructure. Crises are characterized by complex combinations of historical, political, military, social, religious, cultural and economic issues. The operational environment can be visualised and assessed through political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructural aspects (PMESII\(^5\)).

0107. Understanding the operational environment helps the joint force commander to better identify the problem, anticipate potential outcomes and understand the results of various friendly, opposing, and neutral actions and how these actions affect achieving the end state. The commander must fully understand allocated forces, their unique capabilities and cultures, and the caveats that might constrain their employment. The commander

\(^2\) CBRN – chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear.

\(^3\) The information environment is defined as: The virtual and physical space in which information is received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems. (MC 422/4 and Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.10).

\(^4\) The term joint force commander is used in AJP-3.2 to describe the person commanding the Alliance campaign at the operational level. Depending on the model used in any particular operation, this may be a Joint Force Commander, a Joint Task Force Commander or an enhanced land component headquarters.

\(^5\) The MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the Use of Effects in Operations.
must then be able to describe both the current state of the operational environment and how the operational environment should look when operations conclude (desired end state) to visualize an approach to solving the problem.

0108. **Range of actors.** Land force commanders at all levels will encounter a wide range of individuals and groups within the operational environment.⁶ These actors may very well have a significant influence on the successful outcome of the campaign. These actors cannot be simply divided into classifications of friend or foe. Indeed, many will shift from one classification to another during the campaign. Instead, these actors will sit along a range of positions in relation to their support of the campaign (Figure 1.2). The commander must understand the following:

- where each individual or group that impacts the campaign sits along this range in relation to their support;
- how they may influence the tactical and operational outcomes; and
- if, and how, actors may be brought to support the campaign.

![Range of actors in the land operational environment](image)

**Figure 1.2 – The range of actors in the land operational environment**

0109. **Unknown actors.** Some actors in the environment will be unknown in terms of their support for the campaign. These actors – particularly those who are indigenous to the operational environment – will support the campaign if they consider the objectives and end states, and the means to achieve them, as legitimate or support their own agendas.

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⁶ A variety of means may be used to describe the range of actors that will influence the campaign. The key issue here is for a commander to understand that this range exists and how it may be shaped. More descriptions may be found in STANAG 1241.
Their perception of legitimacy will depend upon their culture and societal expectations. The commander will have to understand their perceptions and agendas to build support for, and protect, the campaign. This must be done in terms of how the campaign is prosecuted at all levels and the messages that are issued in support of the campaign through the strategic narrative.

0110. **Independent actors.** Some organizations within the operational environment will operate completely independently from military forces, even if their ultimate goals align with those of the campaign. Such groups will avoid interaction with military forces and seek distance from allied forces. Commanders must be aware of any such organizations within their areas of operation and how they may affect the outcome of the campaign.

0111. **Enemy forces.** Enemy forces may be generally classified as either regular or irregular. Figure 1.3 summarises the differences between these classifications.

a. **Regular enemy forces** are generally described as definable, recognisable military forces that are connected to a state authority. Their operational and tactical objectives tend to focus on controlling terrain and population centres and are directly connected to the strategic aims of a state authority.

b. **Irregular forces** are generally described as non-aligned forces that resort to violence as a means of achieving objectives for their particular group. This classification includes insurgents, organised criminal elements, illegal militias and similar groups. Irregular forces have varying tactical capabilities and act to gain immediate higher level or strategic effect. They generally do not engage in positional warfare as conventional forces do, but use their asymmetric characteristics as an advantage, such as blending in with civil populations. Their general aims seek to undermine the legitimacy and popular support of their enemies and their governments. They may not be physically or conceptually constrained by national borders or legal conventions. They may seek to wear them and their support down over time. Other irregular forces (such as organised criminal elements) may simply seek to maintain a dysfunctional social order so that they may continue to operate outside of government control. Irregular forces generally have a good understanding of the need to build legitimacy and support amongst civil populations. Apart from intimidation, irregular forces will also engage in propaganda, psychological operations and social support programmes including hospitals and schools. This will give them a tactical advantage but strategically undermine their claims to legitimacy and thus popular support.
### Comparing regular and irregular forces’ objectives and means

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Irregular</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Positional warfare</td>
<td>• Limited tactical capabilities and link engagements directly to strategic aims</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Recognisable tactical and operational objectives that build to a strategic objective</td>
<td>• Contest over legitimacy and control and influence over populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contest over terrain control and physical advantages</td>
<td>• Focus on messages and will seek to intimidate and influence civil populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focus on manoeuvre forces</td>
<td>• Non-state forces but may be connected to state power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advanced weapon systems</td>
<td>• Does not conform to law of armed conflict or accepted norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Normally state-based forces</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Identifiable</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Follows generally agreed forms and rules</td>
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Figure 1.3 – Comparing regular and irregular forces

0112. **Hybrid threats.** In some cases, enemy forces may combine both characteristics to form a hybrid type of threat. In such cases, an enemy force may combine both conventional forces and irregular forces in a complementary fashion, through tactical and operational level plans. In other cases, a single enemy force may adopt within itself a combination of conventional and irregular characteristics. They may use advanced weapon systems in irregular tactics or they may shift between irregular and conventional tactics depending upon the situation at hand. For example, they may adopt positional defence and once engaged rapidly break contact, blend in with a civil population and adopt guerrilla tactics.

**The comprehensive approach**

0113. Due to the complexity of the operational environment and the presence of multiple actors and agencies, NATO seeks to achieve its objectives through a comprehensive...
approach\textsuperscript{7}. This requires effective coordination and cooperation among national governmental departments and agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), local authorities and the private sector. There is a great range of actors and bystanders within the joint operations area (JOA) and possibly beyond, who will be involved in, or will influence, the conduct of operations. As the land environment tends to be where the people are, it is a particular challenge in land operations to interface with this wide range of actors – working towards, across or against alliance aims.

0114. The comprehensive approach should be understood across all levels of command to ensure its principles are embraced universally. This will entail significant liaison and mutual understanding with other agencies and departments in the JOA. This will be particularly, but not exclusively, true of the land component who will need to liaise with other government departments, international organisations (IOs), and NGOs (where possible), the host nation and other interested parties (media, local businesses, etc). Many of these organizations will be represented at the various levels of command and will play a fundamental role in the environmental estimate.

0115. Formal government machinery may exist at the national strategic level for inter-agency interaction, but at the operational and tactical levels allied or coalition inter-agency structures are usually less formal, relying more on mutual understanding and cooperation. Since it is the land component at the tactical level that deals most with other agencies on the ground through a comprehensive approach, it is important that commanders at all levels within the land force generally have a sound understanding of a comprehensive approach to planning, and in particular, the part played by land forces within that campaign.

Section 2 – Conflict and campaign themes

0116. Traditionally the Alliance has referred to a spectrum of conflict\textsuperscript{8} ranging from stable peace to general war. This implied that there are discrete types of conflict with traditional ‘war’ against near-peers as the professional benchmark. However, history shows that discrete operational themes actually overlap, merge and change over time as the nature of the conflict changes. Conflict should, therefore, be seen as a blurring of the distinctions

\textsuperscript{7} For more see AJP-3(B) Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations. It should be noted that this philosophy is closely related and compatible with concepts such as ‘unified’ and ‘integrated’ approaches.

\textsuperscript{8} Spectrum of conflict is defined as: the full range of prevailing violence from stable peace to general war using violence as a discriminator on an ascending scale. (Proposed new Definition)
between adversaries and the way they use force to achieve political goals. Conflicts will often blend the lethality traditionally associated with state-on-state conflict with the protracted nature of irregular warfare. The construct of campaign themes, using the level of violence as the primary discriminator, assists commanders to visualise their task and develop their approach (Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4 – Campaign themes and their effect on activities

0117. Predominant campaign themes are:

- combat;
- security (operations to enable stabilization, including counter insurgency as probably the most demanding variant);
- peace support; and
- peacetime military engagement.

In general, their respective position on the spectrum of conflict reflects the prevailing levels of violence and, therefore, guides the operational design and force structures. These positions are not fixed on the spectrum of conflict, but are indicators of the overall
level and intensity of violence. Commanders at the tactical level will still need to be prepared for violence – even at the more peaceful end of this spectrum.

0118. The character of the campaign themes demands different intellectual approaches. They will require flexibility in force structures, size, governance and postures and different rules of engagement. At the tactical level, the same range of tactical activities (offensive, defensive, stabilising and enabling) will occur simultaneously but in different proportions to reflect the nature of the campaign. Although the overarching campaign theme for any crisis will be set, those proportions may change day to day. Those military activities may appear concurrently, or in close sequence and in close proximity.

Section 3 – Joint approach to operations and the operational level of war

0119. NATO recognizes that military success relies on a joint effort, usually with components and other force elements brought together under a unified command structure and a single campaign plan. Few modern operations are carried out, let alone successfully completed, by one component alone. A holistic understanding is required of the mutually supporting capabilities.

0120. Allied Joint doctrine describes the way in which forces and commands are generated for an Allied operation. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-1, Allied Joint Doctrine and AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations detail how the Alliance establishes a joint operation and the alternative models for selecting headquarters from the NATO command structure or force structure. The size of the operation, the campaign theme and the predominant environment will influence that selection.

0121. A joint task force (JTF) construct consists of three layers:

- JTF headquarters;
- subordinated component command headquarters; and
- forces assigned for the operation, including the joint logistics support group.

A fully-developed JTF will usually have maritime, land, air and special operations components. A land centric operation may use an enhanced land component command headquarters to command at the operational level.

0122. A campaign is a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. These operations normally involve maritime, land, air, space and special operations forces. Joint force commanders use campaign plans to focus operational activity to achieve strategic objectives (the ends). They design a sequence of actions to achieve success (the ways) and apply resources to accomplish this sequence (the

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9 For a complete discussion, see Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 3.2.1, Allied Land Tactics.
They coordinate, and when possible integrate, the actions of available military and non-military forces to achieve synergy at the operational level.

0123. A campaign plan is inherently joint. Campaign plans are developed by the operational headquarters, in collaboration with component staffs. Land, air, maritime and special operations component commanders will develop supporting plans to the joint force commander’s campaign plans. Collaboration between joint and component commanders and staff is essential. Only components have a detailed understanding of how they will play their part in achieving a joint objective, their impact on other components and their impact on the joint plan as a whole. Planning is therefore conducted in parallel and there is a significant requirement for liaison between the joint headquarters and other component headquarters. Synchronisation during execution is achieved through liaison teams and the joint coordination process. Land forces within a JTF are normally grouped within a land component, although some forces may be allocated to other components for specific tasks. Amphibious forces, when established ashore, are normally assigned to the land component.

0124. The operational level is defined as: the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. The operational level provides the vital link between strategic objectives and tactically employing forces. It ensures tactics support the strategic objectives. Without this link, it is unlikely that tactical actions will achieve the strategic endstate. Therefore, the commander decides on how he generates tactical activity to deliver those strategic objectives. This is described as ‘operational art’ and is defined as: the employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles.

0125. AJP-1 Allied Joint Doctrine describes the Joint Functions. They provide a description of all the activities that contribute towards the joint operation. They are designed to be a descriptive aide memoire or framework upon which the operation is visualised and planned by the commander and staff. They are Command and Control, Manoeuvre, Intelligence, Protection, Fires, Sustainment, Information Activities and CIMIC. Together they represent all that is happening at the joint level.

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10 Possibly a NATO Force Structure Joint Headquarters (JHQ).
11 For further information on the stages of a joint operation, see AJP-3 Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations and for planning procedures at the joint/component interface see AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational level planning.
12 Practices for the command of land components and land contingents are described in ATP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.
13 AAP 6.
14 Ibid.
15 Civil-military cooperation.
Section 4 – Nature of land operations and the contribution to the joint campaign

Nature of land operations

0126. Land operations cover all the activities planned and conducted by the land component commander (LCC). Land forces operate in an environment that is highly complex, dynamic and adversarial. Operations, including those focused on combat, occur among, or between, complex human organizations and it is difficult to predict its outcome with certainty. It is essentially unpredictable. The enduring nature of land operations is aptly captured in the following quote from Clausewitz:

‘War moves in an atmosphere composed of danger, physical effort, uncertainty and chance. Everything in war is simple, but even the simplest thing is difficult, and these difficulties, largely unforeseen or unpredictable, accumulate and produce a friction, a retarding brake on the absolute extension and discharge of violence. These difficulties consist of ‘danger’, ‘bodily exertion’, ‘information’ or the lack of it, and innumerable other small and incalculable circumstances and uncertainties originated by chance. These are some of the inevitable things that always prevent war in reality from ever approaching war on paper and in plans.’\textsuperscript{16}

0127. Land operations are fundamentally human interactions – human behaviour explains the nature of combat better than numbers or the interplay of technology, although both can be critical. Furthermore, warfare tends to be evolutionary – armed forces learn from previous experience.

0128. Land force operations may often take place over a long duration. To reach, seize and hold specific areas and control and protect the population, land operations are designed to achieve a continuous effect over a long period of time.

0129. The wide range of military and civilian activities and capabilities, combined with the demands for coordination, make command and control of the land operation a highly complex task. The scale of the command and control task poses a particular challenge to land force commanders. It originates from:

- the number of soldiers, units and independent weapon systems involved;
- their interaction with their adversaries;
- their dependence on the terrain;
- their contact with the local people;
- their mutual interdependence; and
- the inherent risk of error and friction.

\textsuperscript{16} Clausewitz \textit{On War}
0130. The size of land operations and the unforeseeable factors which may affect them place limits on the detail with which they can be planned. Flexibility, adjustment and adaptability should be imperative.

0131. Having to operate outside their own country in landscapes characterized by unfamiliar terrain features, vegetation, climate and weather conditions can put an extreme strain on personnel and take its toll on their physical and mental strength as well as their health. Such conditions put heavy demands on weapons and equipment, often rendering them more difficult to operate. It can also limit, or even rule out, using some of them.

0132. The complexity of land combat stems from the large number of soldiers and weapons platforms involved, and their interaction with the enemy, environment, non-combatants and each other. Land operations are thus fundamentally different from naval and air combat. The command and organization of land forces are also, therefore, critically different from those in other environments. To cope with the unpredictable nature of land combat the following broad guidelines can be deducted.

a. **Abide by principles, not prescription.** In land combat there should be no prescription, except for the most basic of drills and procedures, terms, military symbols and control measures. Therefore doctrine for land operations is framed as guidance and principles aimed at gaining understanding, rather than as direction and rules.\(^\text{17}\)

b. **Understand and overcome complexity.** Commanders should continuously seek to understand how to succeed in a complex and seemingly chaotic environment, in which actions do not necessarily create intended effects with any certainty. This factor affects both the nature of land combat and the business of soldiering. Complexity should not be overwhelming, but can be managed by adopting simple plans that focus efforts to concentrate on the essentials.

c. **Take calculated risks.** Since friction and risk are inherent in land combat, calculated risks should be taken. Moreover, history shows that there is seldom a large success without some risk taking. However, overall risk can be reduced and should be managed. Although its consequences can sometimes be predicted and accommodated, it can never be entirely avoided.

d. **Act pragmatically.** The unpredictability of combat suggests that some courses of action should work, but at times they simply will not. Pragmatism, a function of experience and good sense, is required to achieve practical results in complex and unpredictable situations.

0133. **Symmetry and asymmetry.** An asymmetric threat is defined as: a threat emanating from the potential use of dissimilar means or methods to circumvent or negate an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses to obtain a disproportionate result (AAP-6). Land combat is rarely symmetrical. Adversaries normally differ in some regard, and sometimes significantly so. Asymmetry may evolve from differences of intent, doctrine, symmetry, asymmetry.
composition of forces, culture, technology and size. Adversaries tend to develop means that benefit their own advantages and undermine their opponents’. Technological edge, cunning and deception are expected and should be encouraged. Non-conventional, low technology or CBRN responses to conventional forces are more recent examples – described colloquially as ‘asymmetric warfare’. We should focus on the extent and nature of this inevitable asymmetry. Asymmetry has aspects for not only the enemy commander but also for our land commanders – each force is asymmetrical in relation to the other. Therefore, a land force commander must understand asymmetry – and the advantages that friendly forces have over the enemy and how best to employ those advantages to achieve desired objectives.

Land forces’ contribution to the joint campaign

0134. The role of the land forces’ normally includes the holding of terrain, destroying adversary forces, occupying territory, and regaining lost territory. They conduct simultaneously various types of tactical activities, utilizing fires and manoeuvre to apply overwhelming combat power, to achieve decisive results, protect the force, minimize civilians casualties, and facilitate future operations. A wide variety of missions may be executed, ranging from security tasks in support of stabilization activities and reconstruction efforts to major combat operations. Furthermore, the impact of physical presence and interaction achieved through close proximity of land forces should not be underestimated. Land forces require substantial logistic supply, which normally requires combinations of sealift, airlift, and ground transport. Land operations are complex – there are numerous actors and a large number of land force responsibilities to coordinate. Rarely will land, air, naval or special forces alone be capable of achieving the endstate. Only effective mutual support in joint operations will achieve operational success. Land forces do however, usually remain the decisive instrument by which an alliance or coalition can ultimately impose its will forcibly on any adversary.

0135. Characteristics of land forces. The key characteristics of land forces are as follows.

a. **Land forces are invariably required to defeat other land forces.** Although maritime, air and special operations’ forces can do substantial damage to land
forces, adaptive enemies can adopt techniques to survive their attacks. Therefore, it usually needs either direct engagement by land forces or the threat of using land forces to achieve an overall defeat of the enemy.

b. **Land forces can seize and secure terrain objectives.** Remotely delivered firepower, even on a massive scale, has rarely proved capable of ejecting determined troops from the terrain they occupy. Such terrain may be a strategic or operational objective in its own right, and forces physically occupying the area is the only certain means of achieving long-term security of that area. This is especially true of urban areas and other infrastructure.

c. **Land forces can seize and secure other critical objectives.** Land forces can bring combat operations to their conclusion by seizing and securing critical enemy’s capabilities, such as command and control or CBRN capabilities, for example, mobile rocket systems or high value targets.

d. **Land forces have the greatest influence on civil populations.** Human interaction, supported by the range of stability tasks, is the most reliable way of creating influence, which is critical for longer-term stability. Well-trained and educated soldiers, deployed amongst the population, can have a major impact on that population. This is important for long-term stability.

e. **Land forces enable other agencies to operate.** Land forces enable other friendly agencies to operate. Long-term stability is likely to depend on other governmental and non-governmental agencies dealing with issues such as stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian disaster, and socio-political tensions. These agencies can only work in an environment in which land forces have achieved and maintain a reasonably secure environment.

f. **Land forces represent strong evidence of political commitment.** Committing land forces is potentially costly, both financially and in human lives, and represents considerable political risk. Deploying land forces is therefore a very strong political signal stating a nation’s or Alliance’s will to the international community and other parties.

g. **Land forces contribute greatly to the deterrent effect of the joint force.** The delivery of deterrent effects is the responsibility of the joint force. It will often be the land force, through its ability to maintain a presence in the proximity of a target audience that will maintain the effect.

### Section 5 – Land component command and the levels of conflict

0136. Strategy, including military strategy (the decision to deploy forces, how many and in what capacity) belongs to national governments and Allied political authorities. They articulate strategic objectives to be achieved (Figure 1.5). These strategic objectives should be crafted following senior military advisers advice to make sure that they can be achieved using the tactical capabilities of the deployed military forces.
Figure 1.5 – Land component command and the levels of conflict

0137. The land component commander will be responsible for planning and execute tactical level operations. He does this using allocated land forces and capabilities temporarily allocated from other components.

0138. Once decided by political authorities, the military-related strategic objectives are passed to military planning authorities. They then translate them into an operational end state and constituent operational-level objectives.

0139. Operational-level objectives are translated into tactical-level plans through the operations planning process by the joint force commander and the component commands. Planning is done in a collaborative manner with advice from the component commanders and their staff to ensure that their capabilities can fulfill the tactical objectives. This also ensures that tactical-level commanders understand the operational level context in which their actions are to occur.

0140. For land component commanders and their subordinates, it must be understood that an action at the tactical level may have significant impacts at the operational and strategic levels. This is particularly true for campaigns that are closely related to maintaining the support of a host nation population. Even for land force contingents that are relatively...
small, their employment will have a political (strategic) context in relation to the nation that provides it. As a result, land force commanders and their subordinates will have to keep these strategic concerns in mind when planning tactical activities.

0141. **The operational level is defined not by what it is, but by what it does.** It seeks to ensure tactical actions link to achieve strategic objectives. Therefore, the land component commander and supporting staff should have a deep understanding of the operational art and their role in tying together the tactical to strategic levels. They will be expected to contribute to campaign design and understand the roles and capabilities of other components. Figure 1.5 shows this relationship.

0142. The land component will undoubtedly contain a variety of national contributions, including potentially some from outside of NATO. The contributions will potentially arrive with differing capabilities, cultures, expectations and caveats that may limit how they are used. Interoperability must become a concern for the commander. Interoperability is more than simply technical compatibility. It must include a mutual understanding of the environment, what is to be achieved and how it is to be achieved. Interoperability may be enhanced by:

- using common doctrine;
- conducting combined training; using a common language;
- Careful consideration of anti-fratricide tactics, techniques and procedures.
- collaborative planning, thorough back-briefing and rehearsals.

Section 6 – Interaction with air and space power, maritime power and other components and enablers

Support relationships – supported and supporting

0143. During the conduct of operations, the joint force commander details the relationship between the various components. This relationship will normally take the form of supported and supporting responsibilities in which one component will be allocated the lead role and thus be supported by the capabilities of the other components, (termed supporting). The joint force commander may direct a change in the relationships as the situation demands, and often depending upon the phase of the campaign.

0144. Supporting/supported relationships provide the framework for integrating component operations. At the component level, this relationship allows the supported commander to set requirements and gives the supporting commander flexibility to determine methods and tactics. The degree, type, and priority of support must be established and agreed upon. The higher commander must clearly define support relationship parameters. Coordinating and de-conflicting between components are always critical concerns for commanders before and during an operation. This will ensure that the proper capabilities are provided at the correct place and time. It will also maintain the desired tempo of the operation.
Interacting with air and space power

0145. **The role of air and space power in the joint campaign.** Air and space power will provide key capabilities for prosecuting the joint campaign. They may be allocated objectives to achieve on their own, but in many cases air power will be placed in a supporting relationship to the land component.

0146. **Air/land interaction.** Perhaps the most important (for land forces) interaction among air, land and maritime forces, is that between the land and air components. It is likely that both maritime and land forces assigned to operations will include their own organic air capabilities that individual component commanders may make available for joint air operations. Gaining, maintaining and exploiting control of the air is critical to success in most land operations. Primary coordination between the land component command and the air component commander starts with the former’s battlefield coordination element in the combined air operations centre (CAOC) and the air operations coordination centre (AOCC) liaison at the land component commander’s headquarters. Tactical air control parties (TACP) provide direct support to the ground forces and are staffed with air liaison officers and/or forward air controllers (FACs). Understanding how air and land capabilities interact should therefore be common to both land and air forces.

0147. **Joint air operations.** Providing air power is inherently joint in nature and is fundamental to success in joint operations. Exploiting its enduring characteristics of speed, reach and ubiquity provide flexibility and surprise throughout the spectrum of conflict. To use the strength of unified air action and ensure its capabilities, joint air power is used as the situation demands. Joint air assets normally employ the operational principle of centralised control, decentralised execution and every air task should be linked by the operational level to the aim of the overall strategy (strategy-to-task). Unmanned aerial systems should be placed on the air tasking order (ATO) to coordinate its activity and minimise fratricide risk and their organic assets.

0148. **Core air and space power activities.** Air and space power is used to achieve strategic, operational and tactical level objectives. Figure 1.6 lists the basic and enduring operational air and space power activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air and space power activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter-air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1-16 Edition A Version 1
Air power contribution to land operations | Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities. | Electronic warfare
---|---|---
Air power contribution to maritime operations | Special air operations | Navigation and positioning
Geographic support | Meteorological support | Personnel recovery
Combat service support |  |

**Figure 1.6 – Air and space activities**

These activities must be understood when planning and conducting operations. The following paragraphs identify some of those activities that impact to a greater degree on the land environment.18

**0149. Counter-air.** The purpose of counter-air operations is to achieve the desired level of control of the air, through destruction, degradation or disruption of enemy aircraft and missiles. This gives friendly forces greater freedom of action while minimising their vulnerability to detection and attack. Counter-air operations include all actions, taken by any component, to gain and maintain control of the air using various integrated weapons systems and sensors to counter threats, including manned or unmanned aircraft, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

**0150. Air power contribution to land operations.** Air power contributes to land operations19 by helping to gain and maintain a desired degree of control of the area of operations by targeting fielded enemy ground forces and the infrastructure directly supporting them. The conduct of these air operations is dependent on overall campaign strategy and the specific circumstances of the conflict.20 Air power offers the advantage of finding, fixing and engaging enemy surface forces across the area of operations. However, the synergy of air forces/capabilities and surface forces, operating as an integrated joint force, can often be overwhelming in cases where a single component cannot be decisive by itself. Such air operations generally fall under the mission types referred to as air interdiction and close air support.

**0151. Air lift.**21 To allow a joint force commander and the LCC to move and sustain forces anywhere in the world and across the entire range of operations, rapid and global reaching air transportation capabilities are required. It provides rapid and flexible mobility options to land forces to quickly respond to various crisis situations worldwide. Airlift operations, typically classified as inter- or intra-theatre, can deliver forces with minimum

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18 Further detail can be found in AJP-3.3(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations*.

19 See AJP-3.3.2, *Air Interdiction and Close Air Support* for further details.

20 Such factors include enemy disposition, phase of the operation, whether ground combat is also occurring, our degree of control of the air and the need to support, or be supported by, surface forces.

21 Air lift is also known as air transport.
delay and is often a crucial capability for operational and tactical commanders within a theatre or joint operations area.

0152. **Airborne operations.** Airborne operations provide air-delivered combat power to seize ground or installations through the airdrop or air-landing of land forces directly onto an objective. The significance of airborne operations may be operational or strategic within the joint campaign plan. However, they generally pose high risks, though the potential gains make them a valuable element of the air power inventory.

0153. **Space contribution to land operations.** Space operations play a vital role in land operations through its space force enhancement mission area. There are five force enhancement functions: ISR; integrated ballistic missile tactical warning and attack assessment; environmental monitoring; communications; and position, velocity, time, and navigation. These areas provide significant advantage by reducing confusion inherent in combat situations and by improving the accuracy and lethality of various weapon systems. These capabilities are integrated into land operations either transparently to the user or though coordination with the provider. The JFC is responsible for coordinating space operations, but may designate a space coordinating authority to facilitate unity of effort with member-nation space operations and any component commander’s space capabilities.

0154. Land forces support air force operations by:

- coordinating and arranging relevant ground forces in space and time (primarily air defence artillery forces, but also airfields and combat service support forces);
- providing these forces and facilities/installations direct protection if they need it;
- conducting SEAD\(^{22}\) operations within the range of their assets by delivering artillery fire, deploying air manoeuvre or other specially trained forces as well as conducting electronic warfare;
- conducting offensive operations to seize terrain, which allows own defence artillery forces and missile defence forces to engage adversary air assets at an earlier point in time;
- seizing and guarding areas for forward operating bases and airfields; and
- conducting land operations which forces the enemy forces into responding in a way that makes them susceptible to air strikes.

\(^{22}\) SEAD – suppression of the enemy air defence.
Interaction with maritime power

0155. Over two thirds of the world’s population live within 200 km of the sea. Eighty-five percent of the member states of the UN have a coast, and are accessible to operations mounted from the sea. Land forces may rely on naval power to be able to operate overseas.

0156. **The role of the maritime component in the Joint campaign.** The principal characteristics of maritime operations are poise, readiness, flexibility, self-sustainment and mobility. The ability to poise at sea for extended periods as an act of coercion, and the subsequent translation of this into direct action against targets ashore, is a capability that is unique to maritime forces. The major categories of maritime operations are power projection, sea control and other tasks such as deterrence, demonstrations of presence, intelligence collection and maritime counter terrorism.

0157. **Amphibious operations.** When operating in, or near, the littoral, amphibious forces may be used to set the conditions for follow-on land forces or may act on their own. Land forces may be supported by a range of amphibious tactical activities or may be involved in amphibious operations, particularly in the larger ones.

0158. **Sea-based joint fires.** Maritime-based aircraft can contribute to the full range of air operations described in Section 2. In some campaigns, maritime-based aircraft may be the only air support available, such as during the 1982 Falklands Conflict. In such cases, protecting aircraft carriers became a significant priority for the joint force commander. Submarines and surface ships armed with land attack missiles and/or naval surface fires contribute to attacks on important and/or time-critical land targets. This is termed as naval fire support. Naval systems can provide fire support to all operations within range of the sea. This may

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23 For more information, see AJP-3.1, *Allied Joint Maritime Operations.*

24 ATP-8(B).

25 A coastal region consisting of the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore, and the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. (AJP-3.1)
be especially important in the early stages of a campaign before ground forces have fully deployed.

0159. **Other support to joint operations.** Maritime platforms can contribute significant intelligence, area surveillance and communications capabilities to the joint force. They can also provide air defence over littoral areas, including against theatre ballistic missiles. It is also possible to provide logistic support for land forces from the sea, thus reducing the logistic footprint required ashore. Maritime forces can assist in protecting joint forces or territory by providing a sea-based defensive barrier, or by defending against enemy manoeuvre from the sea. Maritime platforms may also be used as command and control locations by joint or land headquarters at all stages of a joint operation. When operating in littoral environments, including confined and shallow water, maritime units may be threatened by sea mines, torpedoes, fast attack craft, air manoeuvre operations, midget submarines, shore batteries or other asymmetric attack. Land forces ashore can enhance the protection of inshore maritime units by securing potential firing or launching points and the destruction or capture of enemy coastal artillery, torpedoes or missile batteries.

0160. Land forces provide direct support for naval force operations by:

- neutralizing the threat to naval forces from the shore;
- seizing and guarding infrastructure required by naval forces ashore;
- providing landing forces for amphibious operations;
- providing fire support by delivering artillery and helicopter fire;
- employing air defence artillery forces to help counter the airborne threat; and
- engaging in electronic warfare in support of amphibious operations.

**Interacting with other components and enablers**

0161. **Special operations forces.** Special operations may be described as military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces using operational tactics, techniques and modes of operating not standard to conventional forces. These activities are conducted across the spectrum of conflict independently, integrated with, or in coordination with, operations of conventional forces to achieve political, military, informational and economic objectives. Politico-military considerations may require low prominence, covert or discreet techniques, and accepting a degree of physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations. Integrating conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) not only create unique capabilities but may be necessary to achieve objectives not otherwise attainable. Integration and interoperability enable the joint force commander to take advantage of conventional force and SOF core competencies and systems. Effectively integrating

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26 For more information see AJP-3.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.*
conventional forces and SOF can produce a greater effect at a higher tempo with less potential for fratricide than if operating separately.

0162. **Command status.** In general, supporting/supported relationships (as described above) provide a sound means for integrating conventional force/SOF operations. This relationship allows the supported commander (be it a SOF or a conventional force commander) to set requirements and allows the supporting commander the flexibility to determine methods and tactics. Details regarding the type of support and priorities must be established and agreed upon. Coordinating and de-conflicting with conventional forces are always critical concerns for SOF commanders before conventional forces arrive. Effective coordination is vital when transitioning from advance force operations involving SOF to follow-on operations including conventional forces. This ensures that the timing and tempo of the overall campaign is maintained.

0163. **Authorities.** When operating within another commander’s area of operations, a commander must comply with that commander’s authority. Targeting fires, force tracking, and terrain management must follow the direction provided by the area of operations’ commander. SOF units operating within an area of operations must keep its commander apprised of SOF locations and recognize that the area of operations commander retains authority for establishing fire support coordination measures and clearing fires.

0164. **Strategic communications.**²⁷ NATO strategic communications (StratCom) is a political-military process to ensure that NATO communications and information activities²⁸ and disciplines are coherent, mutually reinforcing, and advances NATO’s aims. It closes the gap between Alliance actions and messages. Information activities have potential strategic-level effects. For this reason, information activities, planned and conducted at all levels, must reinforce relevant StratCom objectives and the overall narrative. Commanders at the operational and tactical level ensure through the ‘Info Ops’ function that all military information activities are properly coordinated as well as integrated into the operations planning process. Information activities must also support the overall StratCom approach.

0165. NATO StratCom guidance seeks to harmonise all information and communication activities. NATO Info Ops support StratCom by planning and coordinating information activities on the operational and tactical levels in line with the commander’s operational objectives. Synchronizing the effects and messaging occurs through regularly conducting coordination boards and working groups. This ensures that the communication disciplines are effectively harmonized and mutually reinforcing.

0166. While information objectives may be accomplished through lethal or non-lethal means, there is likely to be an increased focus on non-lethal activity. A large element of

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²⁷ NATO policy defines StratCom as the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities - Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (Info Ops) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate - in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.

²⁸ Information activities are defined as actions designed to affect information and/or information systems. They can be performed by any actor and include protection measures.
information operations is non-lethal. Recent operations have shown its significance by increasing the commander’s choice of means, by which effects can be created or generated at all stages of a crisis to achieve objectives.

0167. **Joint enabling and operations support activities.** In addition to maritime, land, air, space and special operations, joint doctrine identifies other activities that enable or support the campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other activities enabling and supporting the campaign</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>military engineering&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>military police activities</td>
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<td>CIS&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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**Figure 1.7 – Joint enabling and support activities**

0168. **All of these affect land operations.** In some cases, land forces will execute these activities using their own units, but in others, the land component commander and subordinates contribute to activities that are only executed at the joint or joint task force headquarters' level (for example psychological operations (PSYOPS) would be provided by the PSYOPS component command). It is essential that land operations are fully integrated with these joint activities.

0169. **Civil-military cooperation**<sup>32</sup> (CIMIC) is defined as: the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.<sup>33</sup> Given that the land component operates amongst civil populations, CIMIC capabilities play a key information activity for the land component commander. It has three components:

- liaison between military and civilian authorities;
- gaining civil support for military operations; and
- coordinating military support for civil interests.

0170. Cyberspace is a complex and dynamic environment, interdependent with the electromagnetic spectrum, and is key to all military operations on land, sea, air and space. It is far more than just the Internet. Cyberspace is pervasive, incorporating for example,

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<sup>29</sup> Includes explosive ordnance disposal and environmental protection.

<sup>30</sup> Communications and information systems.

<sup>31</sup> Including civil-military cooperation.

<sup>32</sup> For more information see AJP-3.4.9, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*.

<sup>33</sup> AAP-6?
aircraft flight control systems, medical life-support systems and national electricity distribution systems. Cyberspace is also geographically less constrained than other environments. So, distance and reach must be viewed differently. Access to cyberspace is possible via many means, most often through computer terminals, laptops, tablets and mobile phones. Connectivity may be achieved via wireless connections or physical cables. Cyberspace is dependent upon physical assets – power sources, cables, networks, datacentres, as well as the people who operate and manage them. Most of the network and its nodes are based on land.

0171. Cyberspace is integral to all military operations. Cyber activity can have effect in the physical and virtual worlds, with speed and reach at the point of delivery. Cyber activity contributes, or is supported by, information operations, information assurance, information management, information exploitation, physical attack and electronic attack. Cyberspace has interdependence with the electromagnetic spectrum and space. Land operations will seek to exploit cyber activity that can manage, defend, exploit and attack computers, computer networks and any other information system and the software and data resident on them. Cyber activity must be integrated and coordinated with other military activities on land. Mission command and the manoeuvrist approach should be applied to cyber activity.
Chapter 2 – The fundamentals of land operations

Chapter 2 describes the fundamentals of land operations. It considers success and end states, including the limitations on applying armed force. Operating within the context of the principles of joint and multinational operations and operational art, the chapter then lays out the foundation of the allied approach to land operations, the manoeuvrist approach. It then describes how combining fighting power and combat functions generates combat power, which in turn delivers core functions. Combat power and core functions are then turned into tasks to subordinate units through the estimate process, leading to planning and resulting in an operations order (OPORD) that assigns simultaneous offense, defence, stability and enabling tasks to subordinate units to execute. (Figure 2.1)

**Fundamentals of land operations**

Informed and guided by the context of land operations (chapter 1)

- **End state**

Underlying all land operations are the manoeuvrist approach with mission command

- Which direct fighting power through the combat functions to generate combat power

prosecutes the core functions and tactical activities

The estimate + planning = OPORD that converts combat power and core functions into tasks to subordinates - simultaneous offense, defense, stability and enabling functions

**Figure 2.1 – Chapter 2 logic map**
## Conceptual frameworks

0201. Chapter 2 develops understanding of the complex operational land environment through a number of frameworks. They allow us to breakdown, analyse and organise all the factors that need to be coordinated and delivered to achieve assigned objectives. They can be used at every level of command. The capabilities of a military force may be conceptually viewed and applied through four frameworks: the framework of fighting power; a geographic framework; a functional framework; and, an operational framework. Together they allow a commander to visualise employing a force’s capability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual frameworks – how?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fighting power</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arranging resources, troops and C2</td>
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### Fighting power

The framework of fighting power is based on the three constituent elements of a military capability: physical; intellectual; and moral. It answers the question of what capability is to be applied through the other three frameworks. Based on the objective to be attained, various situational factors and potential limitations, a commander must decide what capabilities are best to be employed. This is particularly important in a coalition when two seemingly similar forces from different nations, may have distinctly different capabilities.
**Geographic framework.** The geographic framework describes the ‘where and when’ of employing military capability. It includes relationships in time and space by describing actions as deep, close and rear, and by describing areas of operation and their geographical natures (linear; non-linear; contiguous; non-contiguous). The geographical framework also describes the command and control relationships of the assigned forces.

**Functional framework.** The functional framework describes the ‘how’ of the applying military capabilities in that it details the means of applying fighting power. The framework does this through:

- the various combat functions;
- core functions; and
- the full range of tactical activities (offensive, defensive, stability and enabling).

At the tactical level, commanders exercise their judgement to ensure the correct balance across the various aspects of the functional framework to achieve the desired objectives and to reflect the campaign theme (nature of the campaign or major operation) at hand.

**Operations framework.** The operations, or effects, framework provides the why (purpose) of tactical operations, in that it describes the effects to be achieved by tactical activities, to ultimately achieve the desired objectives. Tactical activities are selected and designed so as to be shaping, decisive or sustaining. Also, in line with the manoeuvrist approach, they may be planned to have the following effects on the target: dislocation; pre-emption; or disruption. See Allied Tactical Publication-3.2.1, *Allied Land Tactics*, for full details.

**Figure 2.1 – Conceptual frameworks**

0202. These frameworks are used to visualise, plan, organize and coordinate applying combat power to reach operational objectives. They provide commanders with a conceptual visualisation for applying scarce resources to best achieve the desired effects within the area of operations. It must be stressed that operations involve much more than opposing military forces and applying physical forces. Although there will remain a need for combat operations that only military forces are capable of conducting, objectives will be met within a campaign through a wide array of activities – offensive, defensive, stability and enabling – and involving inter-agency interaction, that is, the coordination of both military and non-military elements. It will often fall to the military commander to help formulate these complementary military and non-military activities within the conceptual frameworks.

0203. These frameworks are used to help commanders and staff approach complex problems from a simple perspective. They are described in more detail in the appropriate Allied publications. At the conceptual and philosophical level covered in this document, fighting power and the functional framework are explained in Section 4. ATP 3.2.1 covers geographic and operations frameworks in more detail.
Section 1 – Success and end states

0204. Armed forces operate to be successful in achieving assigned objectives. Success should, therefore, be definable and measurable within the objectives. This is achieved by identifying the desired end state – defined as the political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-06). En route to the end state, progress can be measured by the commander by various tools. These may include his assessment of individual formation mission success or by more complex tools involving other agencies. Further details are described in ATP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.

0205. There are degrees of success in conflict which should be weighed against both the physical and human cost of operations. Media, legal constraints, public opinion and economic factors are some influences that impact the military. This is particularly true in those operations which the Alliance chooses to participate. A conflict may be resolved either when one side subjugates the other to its will, or when terms are found that are acceptable to all parties. Therefore the term ‘victory’ may not always be appropriate to describe the desired outcome of an operation.

0206. Success may have to be defined in other terms such as reconciliation, stabilization or the acceptance of a peace plan. Where such acceptance is reluctant, or has to be imposed, protracted involvement is distinctly possible. A notion of graduated success has a direct bearing on the two ends to which military operations are commonly directed: the tangible effects on an enemy’s physical means of fighting, and the often intangible effects on their understanding, will, and cohesion. Physically destroying elements of an enemy’s capacity to fight is but one of a number of ways to defeat him. Defeat can be considered in terms of diminishing the effectiveness of a combatant to the extent that the combatant is unable to prevent the enemy achieving an end state. Thus defeat is not an absolute condition, but rather a matter of degree.

0207. Land combat is a fundamentally human endeavour, and human beings decide, rationally or irrationally, when they are beaten. Historically, the defeat of an enemy force has almost never come at the point of one hundred percent loss to the loser. It normally occurs at some earlier point, based on the losers’ will and cohesion. On an individual or small unit level, emotions such as fear, panic, shock and surprise are significant. These emotions adversely affect a commander’s decision-making. When an adversary feels he is beaten, he withdraws from the battle or engagement. Such withdrawal may not be total. A partial retreat or surrender, may create a fleeting opportunity. If exploited, that opportunity may lead to defeat at a higher level and eventually bring about the successful conclusion of a campaign. The collective withdrawal of an enemy’s participation in battle is primarily a mental rather than physical issue, and may not be rational. Conversely, it may be an explicit and rational decision – the loser can see that unless he stops he will lose not only his objectives, but his forces as well.

0208. Given the likelihood of determined resistance amongst potential adversaries, allied land forces should be prepared for protracted, and possibly costly, close combat at the tactical level, which may be the only option available to achieve operational level success.
Section 2 – Mission command

0209. NATO embraces Mission Command (for full details see ATP-3.2.2). This command philosophy is based on the principle of centralized planning and decentralized execution that promotes maximum freedom of action and initiative. It grants subordinate commanders freedom in the way they execute their missions. The degree of freedom of action will depend on mission types. When control measures are imposed (necessary for conducting specific tasks), they should not restrict freedom of thought in how to approach them. Mission command philosophy is a key aspect of the manoeuvrist approach. It allows subordinate commanders the flexibility and authority to exploit vulnerability in enemy strengths as they are discovered.

0210. Mission command is thus the command method that is best suited to the complexity and uncertainty of the land environment. Like any military skill it requires to be learned, properly applied and practised.

0211. Historically, commanders have employed variations of two basic command and control concepts: mission command and detailed command. Some armies have favoured detailed command, but an understanding of the nature of war with its friction, chaos and uncertainty, points to the advantages of mission command.

0212. Detailed command stems from the belief that success in battle comes from imposing order and certainty on the battlefield. Detailed command techniques may actually result in a high degree of coordination during planning. However, during execution, these techniques leave little room for independent adjustments by subordinates. Instead, subordinates must consult with the higher commander before deviating from the plan. Detailed command is ill-suited for taking advantage of rapidly changing situations. It does not work well when the communications and information flow is disrupted. It inhibits the judgment, creativity and initiative required for successful military operations. In practice, no commander relies solely on either detailed or mission command techniques. The degree to which he incorporates some detailed command techniques depends on various factors such as:

- the nature of the action or task;
- the qualities of staff or subordinate commanders; and
- the nature and capabilities of the enemy.

In any case, a commander must have good cause to impose constraints on subordinates and thus limit their freedom of action and initiative.

0213. Mission command offers a philosophy of command that advocates centralised planning that includes provision of clear guidance and intent with decentralised execution based on mission-type orders; a style that describes the ‘what,’ without necessarily prescribing the ‘how.’ The doctrine of mission command stresses the importance of understanding what
effects are to be created rather than specifying the ways in which it should be done. It has the following key elements:

a. A commander gives orders in a manner that ensures that subordinates understand the commander’s intentions (intent), their own missions and the context of those missions.

b. Subordinates are told what they should achieve and the reason why it is required (the immediate effect and the purpose).

c. Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.

d. A commander uses the minimum level of control possible so as not to unnecessarily constrain subordinates’ freedom of action. Mission command relies on the subordinates’ ability and willingness to use his initiative.

e. While subordinates have a fundamental responsibility to act in line with their commander’s intent, they decide how best to achieve their missions.

Mission command relies on mutual trust. It requires the commander to delegate responsibility and authority appropriate to the capabilities of the subordinate to accomplish the mission. The subordinate should feel confident to accept the responsibility of the delegated task. This trust should engender both commanders and subordinates to take prudent risk.

'Diverse are the situations under which an officer has to act on the basis of his own view of the situation. It would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can be given. But most productive are his actions when he acts within the framework of his senior commander’s intent.’

Generalfeldmarschall Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder)

Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1857 bis 1871, (Berlin: 1900)
Section 3 – The manoeuvrist approach

0214. The manoeuvrist approach is one in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his forces and equipment, is paramount. It is an indirect approach which emphasises targeting the enemy’s moral component of his fighting power rather than the physical. Central to the concept is the need to seize, retain and exploit the initiative. This approach is most effective when it is used in conjunction with mission command. This approach involves a combination of lethal and non-lethal means to attack the enemy’s understanding, will, and cohesion to shape his understanding, undermine his will, and shatter his cohesion. The manoeuvrist approach aims to apply strength against identified vulnerabilities to induce shock, through surprise, shock action, and destruction, leading to an enemy’s collapse, which is followed by friendly force exploitation. These effects are generated by ways and means of attack, governed by simplicity and flexibility. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative, and seeking originality is combined with a relentless determination to succeed. We can apply it to all types of military operations across the spectrum of conflict. It emphasizes defeat and disruption of the enemy rather than, for example, taking ground for its own sake, and depends on precisely applying force against identified points of weakness. It also aims to defeat the enemy’s will and desire to continue by seizing the initiative and applying constant and unexpected pressure at times and places which the enemy least expects it.

0215. Land combat is complex, dynamic and unpredictable. It is conducted by opposing, and not necessarily symmetric, forces that are themselves highly complex. An enemy’s perception of the situation affects its will; if it thinks that it is being beaten, it tends to be demoralized. A tactical action which demoralizes an enemy commander reduces his effectiveness, thereby lowering cohesion of the enemy force overall. Similarly, an attack on the physical cohesion of the force, perhaps by destroying key elements, also demoralizes. A prioritized and integrated approach to attacking an enemy’s understanding, will, and cohesion is required, since they are intimately linked.

0216. In combat, the manoeuvrist approach invariably includes elements of movement, firepower, and positional defence. There will almost always be a need to fix the enemy, deny him access to routes and objectives, and secure vital ground and key points. However, any such defensive measures should only be seen as part of the means to the
end, which is the enemy’s defeat. The forces employed in applying the manoeuvrist approach should normally be combined arms, possibly joint. When facing irregular threats, the commander should expand his analysis of the enemy’s weaknesses and consider the moral and physical support upon which he relies.

0217. Manoeuvrist thinking places a premium on understanding and manipulating human nature, pitting strengths against weaknesses, adopting indirect and original courses of action, and minimising losses. Such an approach offers the prospect of rapid results, or results disproportionately greater than the resources applied. The manoeuvrist approach is attractive to a numerically inferior side or to a side that wishes to minimise the resources committed. War is all about people and is only won when the opponent has lost the will or capacity to fight. Thus war is rarely about physical destruction alone; shattering will and cohesion is all in the mind. For this reason, Allied operations should always recognise the centrality of influence – that change in the opponent’s perception or behaviour – to achieve success.

0218. **Seizing, retaining and regaining the initiative.** The initiative can be described as the ability to dictate the course of tactical events. It may only be local, is usually gained through pre-emption, and is easily lost. In combat, if one side acts first and commits or threatens violence on the other, the latter usually reacts to protect itself. This constrains its ability to act offensively. Gaining the initiative is important to success and, once gained, should be retained as a matter of priority. Gaining the initiative requires a high tempo of operations to continuously force an opponent to react, making it difficult for him to initiate actions. In an Allied force there is, therefore, an additional need for thorough integration (and training) to ensure high tempo of operations. Once it appears that the initiative is lost, or soon will be lost, a commander should plan to regain it. This can be done by withdrawing from combat so that an opponent cannot dictate events, enduring the enemy’s attack until he exhausts or overextends himself, or counterattacking. Counterattacking has several benefits, it:

- halts the enemy’s momentum, since he is compelled to protect himself;
- may cause surprise and shock in the mind of the attacking commander; and
- may also present opportunities for exploitation.

0219. **Understanding.** Understanding has two major aspects. The first is understanding the nature of conflict and the current situation. The second is understanding the adversary, and how they perceive the situation. The aim is to invest in our understanding, particularly in relation to how to identify the adversary’s weakness. We must then seek to interfere with the adversary’s understanding – to exploit such weaknesses and break his will and cohesion.

0220. **Will.** Will can be regarded as the determination to persist in the face of adversity. Commanders and staffs must be able to persevere in the face of difficulties, not allowing their fears to overcome them. This perseverance has two aspects: intent and resolve. Both can be attacked and undermined. A commander must ensure that his/her intent is achievable and clearly stated, and it should evolve as circumstances change. The commander’s resolve must be strong enough to carry the entire command through in the
face of setbacks and losses, if the end is still achievable, within acceptable losses. It is all about resolve and strength of will. However, there is a fine line between perseverance in the face of adversity and sticking to a plan that is failing. Determining where on this scale an operation falls is part of the art of command.

0221. Cohesion. Cohesion, directly links to fighting power and relates to the moral, conceptual, and physical components. Moral cohesion is an essentially human condition, it relies upon a belief in a legitimate cause and a justification to act. Troops who have moral cohesion, stick together; they continue to fight despite adversity and temporary setbacks. It results from a combination of several factors, including high morale, good leadership, esprit de corps, belief in the cause at stake, and mutual trust, both up and down the chain of command. Realistic training and combat experience contribute to it, as does a commander’s personal determination and force of character. Applying common doctrine through training and education provides perceptual cohesion. It also supports developing a sense of perspective: the first setback does not mean that the battle is lost. Physical cohesion largely results from good tactics and balanced organizations. At the tactical level, it results from measures such as establishing air and artillery support, mutual support between formations and units, and interlocking arcs of fire within units and sub-units.

Attacking the enemy’s understanding, will, and cohesion.

0222. Friendly forces should seek to attack the enemy’s understanding, will and cohesion. We must understand our adversary; his doctrine, training, equipment, organization, and motivation to direct attacks effectively. Whenever possible, a commander should attack the enemy on all fronts. Doing so should leave the enemy unable to respond effectively as the situation develops. One powerful way of achieving this is through inducing shock – with the classic symptoms of numbness and irrational behaviour. An enemy commander’s intent is thwarted when he realises that it is no longer relevant or achievable, and so gives up from that course of action. An enemy commander’s resolve is overcome when he is demoralised. Intent and resolve are not necessarily related.
A force may be in a state of shock if it displays any or all of the following symptoms:

- reduced participation in combat;
- flight;
- panic or surrender of significant numbers; or
- inappropriate responses to the opponent's actions.

These are known as shock effects. Shock effects are transient and may be local, but represent opportunities which should be exploited vigorously and may lead to success at higher levels. The tactical effects of shock may be perceived as local panic or collapse. If exploited, they may lead to a more general collapse followed by paralysis at the operational or strategic levels.

Induce shock. There are, broadly, three main ways to induce shock: surprise, shock action and destruction. Although these can be described separately, they tend to overlap in the complex environment of the battlefield. The greatest shock effect results from a combination of all three causes, and often results in collapse. Surprise and shock action closely correlate with tactical success, and success at the operational level, if exploited vigorously. Although surprise, shock action, and destruction contribute to shock effect, their actual effectiveness remains unpredictable and will vary with the enemy's cohesion. Additionally, the aspects of all three causes normally occur together, but they are not necessarily mutually dependent. Shock effect is transient and, when detected, should always result in immediate exploitation.

Surprise. Surprise is a principle of allied joint and multinational operations and is one of the most significant contributors to military success at all levels. It can have an effect out of proportion to force ratios. It is difficult to stress sufficiently the importance of achieving surprise. Surprise is always associated with an event that is unexpected in one of four ways, or, in combination. They are unexpected timing, direction, means or methods of attack. Unexpected timing is especially effective if it is early. Surprise through unexpectedly early arrival can occur at any point, not just at the start of a battle or engagement. Surprise through unexpected direction is particularly effective if the resulting attack is from the enemy’s flanks or rear. This may be a consequence of the original plan of attack, or result from infiltration, deep penetration and bypassing, which produce unprotected flanks and rears which can be exploited. While unexpected means of attack

Shock

It was one of the main elements of the tactical and operational effectiveness of the German Army in the opening phases of World War II, and of the Red Army from December 1941 until its close. The Allied landings in 1942-44 in North-West Africa, Sicily, mainland Italy, and Normandy all achieved some degree of tactical and operational surprise. Later, American General Douglas MacArthur's bold amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950 restored the initiative to UN forces in the Korean War. More recently, coalition forces achieved significant operational and tactical surprise against Iraqi forces in the two Gulf Wars.
usually result from new weapons or novel means of applying existing weapons, unexpected methods of attack typically result from novel tactics. Surprise may be generated in defence through unexpected tactical depth, through concealing and employing reserves, or by suddenly withdrawing to defensive positions in the rear. All four aspects, but particularly unexpected timing and direction, may result from deception. Commanders at all levels should create and exploit every available opportunity to surprise an enemy. Surprise does not need to be total, but merely sufficient to prevent the enemy from reacting effectively, such as causing the enemy to delay a decision or to fail to act until it is too late. Surprise can be used to generate a high tempo of advance, which in turn, contributes to further shock effect by enabling advancing forces to arrive unexpectedly early and from unexpected directions. However, surprise is fleeting – therefore, its effect should be exploited rapidly.

**0227. Shock action.** Shock action is the sudden, concentrated application of violence. Shock action numbs, deters and frightens. At a collective level, it is characterized by concentrations of direct and indirect fire, effective information operations that degrade enemy command and control systems and impair the morale of enemy forces, and a high tempo of advance employing closely-coordinated fire and manoeuvre. Key aspects are the concentration of violence, its sudden application, a high rate of manoeuvre and effective cyber operations that degrade and deceive enemy command and control elements. The mental perception of shock is reinforced by the rapid approach and impact of aircraft or heavy armour, by the employing seemingly invulnerable weapon platforms (or particularly frightening weapons), and effective attacks on command and control systems (including cyber) that prevent the enemy from understanding and reacting effectively to friendly actions. Shock action can be particularly effective if it can be achieved at night, unfavourable weather conditions, at short range or in close country.

**0228. Destruction.** Unsupported or unfocused destruction is not normally a major contributor to shock, except when massively applied. Then it can become indistinguishable from shock action. Selective destruction can amplify the effects of surprise and shock action. The careful selection and destruction of discrete capabilities or force elements tends to enhance shock effect. Considerable impact will be achieved when destruction is carefully coordinated with the effects of shock action and surprise. In particular, destruction of the ability to synchronise the combined arms team (such as destroying command and control links and nodes) renders enemy response both slow and ineffective, especially for an enemy ill equipped for autonomous operations.

**0229. Collapse.** Shock effects can at times be observed as collapse. Collapse may be either progressive or catastrophic. Progressive collapse occurs when the defending force surrenders or retreats gradually, a little at a time. Catastrophic collapse occurs when all or a large part of the defence gives way almost simultaneously. Although the two cases may not be clearly distinguished, catastrophic collapse is more effective. Panic is a major indicator of catastrophic collapse. It is infectious and is transmitted as much by rumour as by fact. Effective psychological operations can contribute significantly to spreading panic.
and a sense of hopelessness. Since bad news travels quickly, perception of failure is the best mechanism to promote actual failure.

0230. **Exploitation.** The effects of shock are likely to be local, temporary, and unpredictable. Localized shock effects should be expanded through exploitation to encourage collapse and paralysis at higher levels and over wider areas. Exploitation may be planned or opportunistic. Planned exploitation is designed beforehand to follow anticipated success, and may require fresh, echeloned forces. Opportunistic exploitation is a key mechanism for seizing and retaining the initiative and building cumulative success at successively higher levels. Opportunistic exploitation should be carried out with all available forces and initiated as soon as an opportunity is recognized, particularly at low tactical levels. Exploitation is a core function – described further in Section 4. At the campaign level, if the opportunity to exploit is lost, then the decisive edge won in battle may be blunted.

0231. In combat operations, aggressively exploiting success, supported by prepared intelligence, is a major contributor to achieving shock and surprise. It has two main elements. The first is identifying gaps, weaknesses and opportunities by joint intelligence procedures. Knowing your adversary is not present is often as important as knowledge of his location. The second element is applying timely manoeuvre and firepower to exploit opportunities. This does not mean fighting for information, but does require task-organizing forces to create and exploit opportunities. For example, exploitation may require forward detachments or guard forces based on combined arms groupings or an opportunity task for a reserve force. These should include indirect fire controllers and allocating aviation or airmobile forces. Aviation forces can provide an effective method of exploiting success aggressively. Successful exploitation depends on rapid response. This is best achieved by decentralisation, to reduce the time taken both for decision-making and translating decisions into action. Further details are in ATP-3.2.1.

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**Exploitation**

British Field Marshal Archibald Wavell observed that, ‘while coolness in disaster is the supreme proof of a commander’s courage, energy in pursuit is the surest test of his strength of will.’ Commanders should guard against the natural tendency of troops to relax after achieving initial success or in stopping at the first sign of significant resistance.
Section 4 – Fighting power and the combat functions

0232. Fighting power organized across the combat functions yields combat power, the potential for effective action. To achieve their mission, commanders harness this potential through the estimate and planning processes to assign tasks that accomplish core functions and produce effective action.

Fighting power

0233. Fighting power is the combination conceptual, moral and physical aspects of a force. Fighting power reflects the actual state of a force at a given time. It results from the entire process of force generation – the equipping, training, doctrine, morale and other factors that deliver a force to a commander, ready and capable of action. Fighting power is a state of being at the start of an operation (and nurtured during the course of an operation) which must be understood in terms of what is possible and accounted for the assignment of specific tactical tasks.

0234. **The conceptual component.** This component focuses on the observation and perception of the operating environment by an individual, commander, or organization. It is built up over years, being based on experience, education and knowledge. Decisions made on wrong or manipulated information, on another perception of reality, or on incorrect information on friendly capabilities will lead to misdirected use of the other components of fighting power. Therefore, even if the will and the ability to fight are well developed, deficits in this component will lead to ineffective or counterproductive use of fighting power. Doctrine forms part of the conceptual component. Theories of warfare always influence how information is perceived and processed.

0235. **The moral component.** Ultimately, it is humans that generate fighting power. Alliance forces require time, effort, and resources if they are to be developed, maintained, and employed to the Alliance's advantage. The moral component of fighting power concerns persuading Alliance forces to fight. It is measurable by good morale and depends on the convincing all that the Alliance's purpose is morally and ethically sound, thus promoting an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the aim. Coalitions benefit from cultural sensitivity, tolerance and a unity of effort. Maximising the moral component requires motivation, leadership, management and a confidence based on an optimal preparation,
cohesion, and welfare. The moral component also includes belief in the justness of the cause being fought for and the ability to maintain the support of a nation’s population. Finally, it includes conducting operations according to the laws of armed conflict. Violating these laws weakens the moral component of the force, alienates the population of the country being fought in, and erodes support for the effort among the populations of allied nations.

0236. **The physical component.** The physical component of fighting power is the means to fight. It has five elements: manpower, equipment, collective performance, readiness, and sustainability. It is the combination of people and training, both as individuals and teams, with the vehicles, aircraft, associated weapons, sensors, and other equipment, and their effective deployment, sustainment, and recovery.

**Combat functions – the land functional framework**

0237. In Chapter One we introduced the framework of the Joint Functions: Command and Control, Intelligence, Fires, Manoeuvre, Protection, Sustainment, Information Activities and CIMIC. At the Land tactical level these are refined and simplified to seven combat functions. They harmonise with the joint functions but differ slightly to describe the sphere of what happens across the land environment.

0238. While fighting power delivers a force to a commander, combat functions represent functional categories of capabilities used to generate specific effects during land operations. Combinations of units that fall under these functional categories carry out combat functions. Combat functions represent the major activities that constitute the building blocks for a course of action (a concept of the operation). The functions support each other with command being at the decision-making hub. They are mutual supporting, interconnected and complementary. By developing how each function will contribute to achieving the end state (a scheme of manoeuvre, concept of fires, concept of sustainment, etc.), the commander provides a coherent concept of operation.

0239. We explain the functional framework (the combat functions) as:

- an analytical tool for commanders and staff that provides a complete description of everything that military organizations do prior to, during and after operations, as a list of functions;

or more simply,

- a conceptual tool to provide a list of the component activities at the land tactical level that contribute to operations success.
0240. The combat functions as a conceptual tool can be used at every level. They will contribute to the land component commander’s planning considerations for major operations, but can also be applied as a useful check list at platoon level before a patrol.

0241. Command is the hub of decision-making and achieving objectives. The relative importance of the other combat functions will vary according to the purpose of an operation, but together they form a coherent whole – the basis of a balanced force’s combined capabilities. When the components of fighting power are combined with the combat functions, the result is combat power. The combat functions are described in more detail in ATP-3.2.1, *Allied Land Tactics*.

**Command**

0242. Command is *the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces*. It is the combat function that integrates all the others in a single concept to create desired effects that support selected objectives. The art of command lies in consciously and skilfully exercising command authority through decision-making, planning and leadership. Using judgment and intuition acquired from

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experience, training, study, and creative thinking, commanders visualize the situation and make sound and timely decisions. In a complex environment where military and non-military factors intermingle continuously, command ensures that our military forces and other elements are fully integrated, thus exploiting the full range of capabilities available to a commander.

0243. Command encompasses the authority and responsibility for deploying forces to fulfil the mission. Commanders impress their will and intentions on their subordinates. Strictly connected to the effective use of command authority is control, which is the process through which commanders, assisted by their staff, organize, direct and coordinate the activities of the forces, allocated to them. To achieve this commanders and staff use standardized procedures in conjunction with the equipment communications and information systems available. Together, these two processes form a command and control (C2) system that commanders, their staff and subordinates use to plan, direct, coordinate and control operations.

0244. The importance of formulating and communicating the commander’s intent exists at all levels. A thorough understanding of the intent guides decision-making, encourages both initiative and speed of action. It provides for a unity of purpose and effort and promotes understanding between the military and other agencies.

0245. The elements of command are authority, decision-making, leadership, and control. They are described more fully in ATP-3.2.2.

### Information activities

#### Historical importance of messaging

In 1688, William of Orange invaded England to overthrow King James II. He arrived with hundreds of ships, thousands of troops and a printing press. The printing press was to be used to convey messages advertising the legitimacy of the glorious revolution and campaign.

0246. Information activities are defined as actions designed to affect information and or information systems and can be performed by any actor and include protective measures. They affect the character or behaviour of a person or a group as a first order effect by providing information to help influence perceptions and understanding. They cover a very broad spectrum of activities to affect target audiences.

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35 See AJP 3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.
a. **Capabilities.** Information activities seek to attack to disrupt, destroy or otherwise negatively affect the information related capabilities of an enemy. This could be an information node (headquarters), a communications link, or some other part of an information system.

b. **Understanding.** Information activities seek to affect the enemy’s understanding of a situation through protecting our own information and information systems. It may do this through protective measures, operations security and deception. Much of it overlaps with, and is conducted through the ‘protection’ combat function.

c. **Will.** Information activities are used to affect the will of an approved target audience. They may apply to a wide array of target audiences, including enemy forces, friendly and neutral populations. In this aspect, information activities use information to form messages that will affect the perceptions, will and, ideally, the target audience behaviour. They use means such as psychological operations (PSYOPS) to influence the will of target audiences. For example, PSYOPS leaflets dropped on an enemy defensive position may seek to encourage enemy commanders to surrender. Or, PSYOPS radio messages targeting indigenous populations to explain aspects of the campaign, build the coalition’s perceived legitimacy and ensure public support. The messages created in information activities may be nested within the themes and narratives of strategic communication and must be harmonized with the messages of public affairs. Much of this will also seek to counter the propaganda of adversaries.

0247. The first two aspects of this combat function uses information and information systems as a target. It refers to a military force’s ability and activities to attack enemy information capabilities and to affect enemy understanding by protecting our own information capabilities.

0248. The third aspect uses information as a tool to influence an approved audience and requires careful consideration to support the larger narratives and themes of strategic communication, CIMIC and military public affairs. Such activities seek to provide information that will shape the target audiences’ perceptions and will in a desired manner. In this instance, information is selected and crafted into messages appropriate for the cultural and societal filters of the target audience. Such direct influence is particularly important for land forces as it operates amongst civil populations and may be achieved in a number of ways. These include: CIMIC tasks, establishing liaison between the military and civilian populations in support of the operation and in support of civilian needs; PSYOPS, the influence through key leader engagement, the messages sent by the profile, posture and presence of forces and the support given to civil authorities and populations. All must be coordinated closely by the information operations staff to match the commander’s intent and the strategic communications narrative.

0249. Information activities do not sit in isolation in either planning or execution. They are planned, targeted and executed as part of the overall operational plan. A specific coordination board may exist within headquarters to ensure messages are complementary and supportive of other tactical activities and the larger objectives of the commander.
Intelligence

0250. Through analysing raw information or data, we create intelligence. This develops knowledge to inform a commander’s understanding of the battlefield and the people on it. It is that understanding that is critical to effective decision making. This applies to planning and fighting the battle. The staff, particularly the G2 staff, must be capable of assessing the information available and providing the intelligence and advice that is relevant to the commander’s requirements by using the intelligence cycle (see Figure 2.2). However, it remains a command responsibility to direct the intelligence staff. Historically, intelligence has focused on two overlapping and complementary subjects, the adversary (their characteristics, culture, capabilities, locations, intentions, relationships and objectives) and the operational environment within which they operate.

![Figure 2.2 – The intelligence cycle](image)

Caption: ‘Don’t wait for me.’ Reverse carried the message that Yugoslav army personnel should abandon their equipment and flee the battlefield or face destruction by NATO.
Therefore as a combat function, we describe a family of interconnected intelligence activities. Useful definitions are listed in Figure 2.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)</td>
<td>ISR is an integrated set of capabilities which synchronizes and integrates the planning and operations of all collection capabilities with processing, exploitation, and dissemination of the resulting information in direct support of planning, preparation, and execution of operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. Surveillance is conducted against known and potential adversaries and threat as well as in support of operations in current and potential future crisis areas. It can be passive or active, covert or overt. It can be coarse grained to provide early warning of activity over a wide area, or fine grained to cover a particular location or facility. Surveillance over extended periods enables patterns of life and habits to be identified which leads to deeper understanding of other potentially threatening activities or behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It is a focused method of collecting information about specific locations, facilities or people. Reconnaissance tasks are not confined by specific reconnaissance units, but may be undertaken by other force elements in the course of their duties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence requirements</td>
<td>The commander identifies his intelligence requirements to provide the rationale and priority for any intelligence activity as well as providing the detail to allow the intelligence staff to answer the requirement in the most effective manner.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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Figure 2.3 – Terms and definitions

Manoeuvre

0252. Manoeuvre is defined as employing forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Manoeuvre is the means of concentrating land forces at the decisive point to pre-empt, dislocate or disrupt enemy cohesion through surprise, psychological and/or physical momentum and dominance. While mainly physical, manoeuvre can also have moral effects such as creating uncertainty, confusion and paralysis. It involves trade offs: speed against security; breadth against depth; and concentration against dispersion. In this regard, a degree of risk taking and audacity is implicit.

0253. As described in other NATO publications, the present strategic environment is characterized by an increasingly high level of dynamicity and complexity. NATO forces will have to simultaneously face a variety of situations and threats in the same operating area, with a significant presence of non-military actors. Manoeuvring to maintain the initiative and that position of advantage will be complex and challenging – but vital.

Fires

0254. Fires are defined as the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. As a combat function, fires provide the targeting, integration and delivery of those weapon effects. Fires may be used to deliver physical effects (such as destruction or attrition) or psychological effects (such as lowering morale) either directly or indirectly. Fires can also generate negative influence – for example, by causing collateral damage to civilian property and infrastructure. We must therefore use them judiciously.

0255. Fires are often delivered by joint assets. They may include direct fires, indirect fires (field artillery and mortars), close air support, naval fire support and electronic attack and cyber capabilities.

0256. Using fires will be central to the commander’s plan. Fires provide him with the ability to reach the enemy to deliver both physical and morale effects but also, with movement, to support manoeuvre giving that position of advantage.

0257. Some useful terms associated with Fires are as follows:

   a. Firepower is defined as the amount of fire that may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapon system. Firepower is a powerful tool in defeating an enemy’s ability and will to fight and has broad utility in shaping, protecting and decisive acts. Firepower is used to destroy, neutralize and suppress. The effect required, along with volume,
duration, lethality, precision, and ranges of the available weapons should be considered when applying firepower. Fires broaden the definition of firepower to include techniques which are not necessarily physically destructive.

b. Firepower is usually treated as:

(1) **Firepower in isolation.** Firepower may be used in isolation from manoeuvre to cause attrition, delay or disrupt an enemy. For firepower to be effective, weapons should be linked to sensors to acquire targets and assess effects. There are limits on firepower in isolation; not least it can lead to failures to capitalize on the temporary effects achieved.

(2) **Firepower and movement.** Firepower and movement enhance each other to achieve manoeuvre (as described above). Manoeuvre commanders should direct how fires will form part of their plan. This requires flexible command and control arrangements, which allow the effects of firepower to be allocated between manoeuvre elements. Firepower is likely to be a joint function, particularly in shaping tasks, but needs to be integrated within a commander’s overall scheme of manoeuvre.

c. **Fire support.** Fire support is defined as *the application of fire, coordinated with the manoeuvre of forces, to destroy, neutralise or suppress the enemy.*\(^{40}\) Notwithstanding this definition, fire support may be applied as a means to create additional effects other than destruction or neutralization. Fire support may be used as an information activity such as the non-lethal demonstration of capability to persuade or dissuade a target audience from taking a particular course of action.

d. **Joint fire support.** Joint fire support (JFS) is defined as *is the coordinated and integrated employment of all weapon platforms delivering fires.*\(^{41}\) It includes land, air and naval delivered indirect fires to achieve the required effects on ground targets to support land operations in the full spectrum of conflict. It encompasses integrating indirect fires and effects to influence the enemy forces, installations or functions. Details are to be found in A Arty P-5 (STANAG 2484) *NATO Indirect Fire Systems Tactical Doctrine.*

e. **Targeting** of firepower is central to its effect and legitimacy. It is subject to detailed processes at every level of alliance operations. Details of process are to be found in AJP-3.9.

### Protection

0258. Protection is the function that traditionally considers Allied troops under threat – force protection. **Force protection** is defined as: *all measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all*

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\(^{40}\) AAP-39

\(^{41}\) AAP-6
situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. It is essential for maintaining combat power and freedom of action. As well as protecting our own forces against attack and the environment, we have a moral and legal duty to protect non-combatants. Most obviously, we need to protect other agencies with whom we operate in the comprehensive approach.

Protecting non-combatants will be a generic responsibility of Alliance forces and individuals. This responsibility is included within the combat functions as it is likely to require specific force employment. Whether avoiding collateral damage or assigning forces to manage refugee issues, we will need to protect all those operating in our area.

Force protection covers all measures to minimize the effects of possible threats to the components of own forces' fighting power. It prevents forces from being surprised, fixed or getting engaged in untimely decisive battles. Generic examples include armour, camouflage, alarm procedures and alert states, air defence, dispersal of forces, counter-IED, CBRN defence and electronic counter measures. Threats can appear from a variety of sources – the enemy, the insider threat or the environment.

To remain able to achieve force objectives, force protection measures should aim to avoid hampering our freedom of movement and operational effectiveness. This is particularly true when considering the initiative. A force that becomes dominated by force protection issues will lose offensive spirit and be unable to seize the initiative. Commanders must constantly balance the needs of force protection and initiative in their decisions.

Air defence. Enemies may use their air component to gain enough air advantage to launch air attacks against NATO forces. Air defence should be considered for the defence of point and area targets. When unit or object oriented, the goal is to protect functionality. When area oriented, the goal is to maintain own freedom of movement by denying the opponent air presence above that area. Commanders and staffs should keep in mind that the air defence capacity is not limitless and, once positioned, moving even one element could disturb the layered and overlapping protection that was built.

Military engineering. Engineers are responsible for designing, resourcing and constructing appropriate protective infrastructure including camps and facilities that require specialist skills and know-how. Main tasks are related to field fortifications, including collective protection against CBRN attacks and assisting in camouflage, concealment and deception. Engineers are also required to perform mobility tasks to support friendly forces and counter mobility of enemy forces, including explosive ordnance disposal, military search, route clearance and supporting counter-IED activities. Engineers also provide advice on appropriate physical protective measures, including obstacles, observation points, warning/detection systems, and camouflage. They are also required to protect against effects caused by natural catastrophes.

Source.

Defined in AAP-39 as an individual, in an area of combat operations, who is not armed and is not participating in any activity in support of any of the factions or forces involved in combat.
0264. **Locations.** Allied locations and installations use passive protection measures, with active systems rarely available. Dispersal, using existing facilities, camouflage and electronic emission control are some of the possible actions. By applying these considerations, forces will increase their ability to perform core functional tasks and reduce the necessity of appointing combat units for security duties.

0265. **Electronic protection.** Electronic protective measures (EPM) are designed to make effective and efficient use of the electromagnetic-spectrum, whilst maintaining protection by using the EM-energy safely. An emission control plan will visualize all included measures.

0266. **CBRN defence.** Protection operations undertaken against an opponent that possesses, or is thought to possess, CBRN-capacity poses an additional force protection challenge. Forces will be compelled to take appropriate measures to protect personnel (physically and mentally), facilities, equipment and materiel. These are highly necessary, due to the nature of the threat, but will hamper the capacity of those troops. Speed and agility will be lower, endurance will be reduced. Based on intelligence and the results of specific CBRN-reconnaissance, preparation measures should be imposed by commanders.

0267. **Medical.** Preventive medical measures and environmental health information are an important part of force protection. Forces should receive proper vaccinations in time and deploy after dental and fitness checks. Deployed troops should be educated on the health dangers of local flora and fauna as part of their pre-deployment training. Cultural awareness lectures should also be included.

**Sustainment**

0268. **Sustainment** is the combat function that provides for personnel, logistics and other support required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment (derived from AJP-3). It integrates all aspects of service support to help generate and sustain military capacity. It encompasses not only the obvious logistical items such as supply, maintenance and medical support, but also broader issues like deployment from the home base, relief, redeployment and recuperation, and the support roles provided by military engineers such as infrastructure and water supply. Furthermore, this function includes supporting the moral well-being of troops. Sustainment influences the tempo, duration and intensity of all operations. It is therefore an integral function, influencing the planning and execution at every stage of operations, battles and engagements.

Throughout history, successful commanders have recognized the importance of logistics and administration. British General Smith, as General Officer Commanding 1st (UK) Armoured Division during the 1991 Iraq War, stated ‘…a commander can only fight the battle he can sustain…’, emphasising that commanders should be fully aware of constraints imposed by sustainability.

0269. The operational environment described in Chapter 1, poses many challenges for sustainment. Expeditionary operations face a wide range of threats in a potentially
dispersed area of operations. Sustaining such operations is challenging. Dispersion may lead to sustainment assets having to move along non-secure lines of communication through unoccupied areas. Combat may be required to enable such movement. Adversaries are likely to attack logistic and administrative elements in preference to combat forces, and their security should be planned from the outset. Better situational awareness may allow some threats to be avoided, but logistic assets should have comparable levels of mobility and physical protection as those force elements they are supporting. Combat service support soldiers must have weapons, sensors, communications and combat skills to protect themselves and their resources.

0270. **Joint, inter-agency and multinational sustainment.** At the theatre level, there may be a joint organization responsible to the joint force commander for planning, coordinating and executing theatre logistic support using assigned national, host nation or commercial resources. As such, it would be the means by which NATO delivers multinational sustainment support for operations and reception, staging and onward movement (RSOM). Thus the land component will not be working alone because operations will almost certainly be joint and multinational, and coordinating sustainment assets across the force will be important. Rationalising sustainment assets maximises the availability of resources and optimises sustainment activities. Common joint, inter-agency and multinational doctrine improves interoperability and increases operational effectiveness. The goal is joint, inter-agency and multinational synergy, where overall support is greater than that of individual elements in isolation. Multinational logistics are explained in AJP-4(B) *Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine*. Detailed Land Logistic doctrine is provided in ALP-4.2.

0271. **Sustainment planning.** Since many sustainment operations have long lead times, it is imperative that sustainment planning is integrated into operational planning. It should also be versatile, support the mission and be conducted jointly and multinational where appropriate. Integrating strategic, operational and tactical effort to support a mission may require commanders to influence administrative and logistic functions outside their own organizations.

**Core functions**

0272. To put the manoeuvrist approach into practice at the tactical level, understanding the fundamental elements of operations, or the four core functions (find the enemy, fix the enemy, strike the enemy, and exploit), is important. While finding and fixing enable, striking and exploiting have the potential to be decisive. Defensive or offensive activities designed to fix the enemy may set the conditions for offensive action to strike him. Where circumstances permit, operations designed primarily to find, fix, or strike the enemy should be exploited. Operational experience indicates that finding, fixing, striking and exploiting should be conducted concurrently, or at least achieve seamless transition from one to another.

In the 5th Century BC, Sun Tzu coined the terms ‘ordinary force’ for the function of fixing the enemy or denying him the freedom to achieve his purpose; and the ‘extraordinary force’ for the function of manoeuvring into a position of decisive advantage from which he can be struck.
0273. The core functions have wide utility across all campaign themes. In a counter-insurgency campaign, non-military and paramilitary forces are found by the information gathering activities of intelligence services, covert and overt elements of armed forces, and other government agencies. The uniformed military forces and the police, combined with diplomatic efforts and information activities and information operations advice, fix the insurgents. Locally-raised forces can also help to find and fix opponents, and have been employed in numerous campaigns to good effect. Special Forces, military and police units, and the legal system contribute to striking. Exploitation in both combat and non-combat operations involves taking advantage of a developing situation in accordance with the superior commander’s intent. For example, local tactical successes against insurgents may enable freedom of movement for military forces, civilian police, government officials, and humanitarian workers, and should be immediately and aggressively exploited by pre-planned information activities. This process, if exploited, may assist in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population and allow economic and political development to take place.

0274. **Finding the enemy.** Finding the enemy is a basic function which endures throughout an operation. It includes intelligence, locating, identifying, tracking, and assessing the enemy. Forces may be directed specifically to fight the battle for information, particularly in the opening stages of an operation. Whatever its source, information is rarely completely reliable. It may need checking or corroborating with other sources. Too much information is a form of friction that can impede decision-making.

0275. To be successful, finding the enemy demands far more physical and intellectual effort than simply locating the enemy. A commander is far more likely to succeed if he knows the organization and strength of an enemy force, what its intentions are, how it fights, and how it may react to friendly actions, than if he is merely aware of the enemy’s position. It is equally important to establish where the enemy is not located, and to determine what he is unlikely to do within a given time, as this may provide opportunities for surprise and exploitation. Finding also involves assessing the physical, ethnic, and political environment. This enables the commander to understand the context and rationale of the enemy’s actions. Receiving information from a wide variety of sources contributes to the quality of the intelligence picture that helps a commander formulate a plan.

0276. **Fixing the enemy.** To fix is to deny the enemy his goals, to distract him and thus deprive him of his freedom of action. Doing so gains freedom of action for oneself. Combat is adversarial and lethal; an enemy will avoid being struck and defeated unless his freedom of action is constrained. It is difficult to strike an enemy effectively if he is not fixed. Furthermore, an enemy who has no freedom of action cannot dictate the course of tactical events because he has lost the initiative. Deprivation of an enemy’s freedom of action has both physical and mental aspects. Physically, his force can be blocked, or pinned against an obstacle. Mentally, he is fixed if he believes he has no freedom of action. Deception or distraction can play a major role. Often the easiest way to fix an enemy is to attack something that he has to protect. This includes his forces. Deception may fix him until the deception is exposed, which may be too late for him to regain the initiative.
The air campaign which preceded the ground attack of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, significantly contributed to fix the Iraqi operational reserves (the élite Republican Guard Divisions) but a major deception operation was also mounted. An amphibious task force was deployed close to the coastline of Kuwait, threatening an amphibious assault which diverted the attention of the Iraqi commanders from their right flank, where the coalition would strike enveloping the bulk of the enemy forces deployed in Kuwait. This example highlights the value of fixing the enemy by several different means.

0277. Striking the enemy. To *strike* is to manoeuvre and then take offensive action to achieve the purpose of the mission.

   a. **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre gains a positional advantage with respect to the enemy from which our force can be applied or threatened to be applied. Manoeuvre means more than movement in combination with fire. It allows fighting power to be focused for greatest effect. It avoids enemy strengths and exploits weaknesses. The concept of water flowing over surfaces and gaps is useful to understand the concept. Water runs off surfaces – enemy strengths – and pours through gaps – enemy weaknesses. Forms of manoeuvre will be described in more detail in ATP-3.2.1. and as a combat function in Section 4.

   b. **Offensive action.** Offensive action in combat includes seizing objectives, destroying enemy forces. Firepower and movement are focused through simultaneity and tempo, to achieve shock and surprise and break the enemy’s will and cohesion. Such coordination makes the most of the complementary characteristics of tactical capabilities, concentrating force at the selected point to ensure a favourable outcome.

0278. **Exploitation.** As a core function, exploitation is the seizure of opportunity to achieve a higher commander’s objective, or fulfil some part of the intent, directly. Opportunistic exploitation requires action beyond the given mission. It may therefore replace the task stated in orders. Opportunities can occur at any time while finding, fixing, or striking. A commander should constantly search for such opportunities and, when they occur, vigorously pursue them. Exploitation should be expected from subordinates. They should not have to be told to exploit, and only told how far they may exploit if absolutely necessary.

As British Admiral Horatio Nelson said to his captains before the Battle of the Nile in 1798, “first gain the victory and then make the best use of it you can.”

German General von Moltke the Elder’s prescription for success at the operational level was ‘reconnaissance, victory, and exploitation’, which could be described today as aggressively handling reconnaissance, tactical success and exploitation.
Tactical activities

0279. Forces are constructed, equipped and trained to provide all the capabilities required of the functions in combat. They are divided into offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities, that include a wide range of constituent activities as shown in the table below. The full range of these tactical activities and the doctrine supporting their employment are covered in ATP-3.2.1. This document provides a common understanding and approach to allied land tactical operations and should be read by all commanders and staff employed on land tactical level operations.

Operational obligations to civilians

0280. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the host-nation government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. When not possible, military forces provide minimum levels of civil security and restoration of essential services to the local populace until a civil authority or the host nation is able.

0281. All operations morally and legally require forces to conduct minimal, essential stability tasks to protect and provide well-being of the civilian populations. Every operation order implies forces or organizations conduct stability tasks. These tasks provide for minimum levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Commanders must make every effort to ensure that if no civilian or host-nation agency is present, capable or willing, then the forces or organizations conduct the tasks to their full abilities.

0282. Commanders resource these minimum-essential stability tasks. When demand for resources exceeds an organization’s capability, commanders provide additional resources. Sometimes commanders provide the chain of command with the necessary information to provide extra resources to meet the requirements. At other times, they request higher commanders provide others to expeditiously conduct the tasks. Commanders at all levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct these minimum-essential stability tasks and what risk they can accept.

Combat power

0283. Combat power is applying fighting power through the combat functions. Traditionally, combat power has been defined as the total means of destructive, and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.44 Today however, Allied land operations address a wider set of circumstances where forces have other tasks that may not be destructive and may not be targeted at an enemy. Thus we should see combat power as a measuring force capacity so we can apply it to a particular mission at a particular time. It needs to be continuously generated and often for extended periods. Combat power is not solely the total means of destructive and/or disruptive power of a force, but also include the constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. Land forces generate combat power

44 AAP-6.
by converting generic military capability into focused effective potential directed at a specific task in time and space.

0284. Commanders ensure land forces have enough potential combat power to accomplish the mission. Every unit – regardless of type – either generates or maintains combat power. All contribute to operations. Ultimately, land forces use combat power to defeat the enemy and master situations.

0285. Commanders balance the ability to mass lethal and nonlethal actions with the need to deploy and sustain the units that produce those actions. They balance accomplishing the mission quickly with being able to project and sustain the force. Generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation is essential to success. Commanders tailor force packages to maximize the capability of the initial entry force. Follow-on units increase endurance and ability to operate in depth. Many factors contribute to generating combat power: employing reserves, focusing joint support, rotating committed forces, staging sustainment assets to preserve momentum and synchronization.

0286. Commanders achieve success by applying superior combat power. Combat power is not a numerical value. Planners can estimate it, but not quantify it. Combat power is always relative. It has meaning only in relation to conditions and enemy capabilities. It is relevant solely at the point in time and space where applied. How an enemy generates and applies combat power may also fundamentally differ from that of our own land forces. Planners take an inordinate risk when they assume that adversaries’ capabilities mirror those of friendly capabilities. Before an operation, combat power is unrealized potential. Through leadership, commanders transform this potential information to integrate and enhance action. Commanders also apply information through the combat functions to shape the operational environment and complement action. Combat power becomes decisive when applied by skilled commanders leading well-trained soldiers and units. Commanders apply combat power to achieve the core functions.
Chapter 3 – Doctrine for land operations

Chapter 3 provides a guide to Allied doctrine that will support the conduct of Allied land operations

Introduction

0301. In Chapter 1 we considered conflict and how NATO might become involved. We considered the nature of conflict on land and the particular challenges it presents. Then we looked at the role of land forces and their part in the wider joint operation.

0302. In Chapter 2 we looked at the fundamentals of land operations; how we approach problems, the use of conceptual frameworks, how we seek to impose our will on the enemy through combat or other means and how we organize our forces to do it.

0303. In Chapter 3, we seek to introduce the processes that pull together those theories into practical actions on the ground. It is the mechanism that supports the commander’s operational art, translating strategic goals into tactical actions.

0304. Our shared doctrine allows us to minimise the frictions of working in an alliance and maximise our output. We must understand the intent of these principles and philosophies and use them to guide our thinking. While philosophy and principles (AJP-3.2) provide guidance and a steer for our thinking, when considering detailed tactical doctrine (ATP-3.2.1/3.2.2), our language must be clear and unambiguous. For example, the meaning of tactical terms must be well understood by all to ensure we can interoperate without friction or misunderstanding.

Constructing Allied operations

0305. In response to a crisis, NATO may initiate a military response. The operational level commander and the staff plan, execute and sustain campaigns and major operations (also known as ‘campaigning’). Strategy (at the higher level) and tactics (at the lower level) are connected by determining operational objectives. The operational level of command then orchestrates tactical operations in place and time to achieve these operational objectives to achieve the end state.

0306. In a tactical operation, a unit fulfills its mission, by executing at least one, or several, of the tactical activities according to a concept of operations and using one or more types of manoeuvre. It is the orchestration of these tactical activities to create strategic success that we term the operational art (see AJP-5).

0307. Every tactical operation will use a number of offensive, defensive, stabilizing and enabling tactical activities. Commanders are basically free to pick and mix from these four groups of tactical activities, as long as they remain inside the parameters for the overall intent of the commander. This enables him to act appropriately within the reality of the current
situation in the campaign. The levels of violence encountered may well look more like a constantly changing mosaic than a single picture.

0308. In tactical operations, the proportion of effort between offensive and defensive tactical activities will shift according to their nature. The enabling activities will link those and stability activities will either be conducted in support of the main effort or will be a less prominent line within the operation. Success in these tactical operations is commonly directly linked to the defeat, neutralization or marginalization of an enemy. The capability to conduct these types of tactical operations is the core quality of land forces.

0309. In a stabilizing tactical operation, the focus will be assisting other organizations. Success is therefore linked to the success of these other organizations. The security situation may vary strongly and thus affect the importance and role of the military. The nature and aim of this type of tactical operation place an emphasis on the need for stabilizing tactical activities. Forces may even need to, temporarily, take over tasks that are normally the remit of other organizations. The possible need for offence and defence to provide the space for stabilizing activities should not be ignored.

0310. In conclusion, in any campaign, at any time or place, all types of tactical activities could be needed irrespective of the level of overall violence or the campaign theme. A tactical commander may pick and mix from all four types of tactical activities to design tactical operations. An operational commander may order and orchestrate multiple parallel and consecutive tactical operations to achieve the operational objectives within any campaign theme (Figure 3.1)

Figure 3.1 – Doctrine’s contribution to the command process
Doctrine’s contribution

0311. The detail of those processes is described in the array of Allied doctrinal publications which are organized in a doctrinal ‘architecture’. At the top are capstone and keystone publications providing information on the conduct of all joint operations. These cover operations, intelligence, logistics, planning and CIS. These documents remain central to the planning and conducting land operations but should be read with this publication to ensure the particular challenges of the land environment are fully understood.

0312. Land operations are described within this document (AJP-3.2) and its two closely associated subordinate publications. We describe these three as the allied land doctrine ‘trilogy’. AJP-3.2 provides the enduring principles and philosophies and the gateway into further doctrine, ATP-3.2.1 Land tactics provides details of how land forces conduct their tactical business and ATP-3.2.2 Command and control of land forces provides details of how land operations are orchestrated.

0313. Land operations will never exist in isolation; they will be part of a wider campaign. NATO categorises campaigns by theme. The themes available are peacetime military engagement, peace support, security and combat. For each of these themes additional doctrine may be available to complement the trilogy. This is called ‘thematic doctrine’.

0314. To support the detailed tasks of land forces, we have subordinate layers of ‘functional doctrine’. They provide standardization between allies’ specialist staff and operators.

0315. Guidance for conducting Allied land operations is provided by an array of NATO doctrine publications. AJP-3 introduces the theme of ‘operations are operations’. This seeks to explain that the Allied approach to all its missions should be treated as operations. Thus it presents generic operations doctrine that we can apply to all Allied operations. This is also true of AJP-3.2, but here we are able to concentrate on the nature of operations in the land environment.

0316. Functional doctrine which is contained in a wide variety of supporting Allied tactical publications described in Annex 3A.
## Annex 3A – How Allied doctrine is used in land operations

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| Before any operation, personal professional development requires studying fundamental aspects of Allied doctrine. These are described in AJP-01 at the higher level and for land operations in particular in Chapter 1 of this AJP. | AJP-01 Chapter 1  
AJP-3.2 Chapter 1  
(to be published)  
Oxford English Dictionary, AAP-6, AAP-39 |
| • Principles of Allied doctrine |                                                          |
| • Fundamentals of Allied land doctrine |                                                          |
| • NATO land doctrine aide-memoire |                                                          |
| • Definitions |                                                          |
| **Force generation** |                                                          |
| Once the NATO Crisis Response System is activated, SACEUR determines the size and shape of the force required for the operation. Either a joint or a single service headquarters will be appointed to command the operation. There may not be specific component commanders under the latest NATO model. | AJP-01(D) Chapter 6  
AJP-1 paras 0107-0109.  
AJP-3  
Chapter 2  
Chapter 3  
AJP 3.2 Ch 2 |
| • Alliance strategy – ‘how did we get to here’ |                                                          |
| • Beginning a joint operation |                                                          |
| • Forming the force |                                                          |
| • Preparation |                                                          |
| So we can build and check the effectiveness of a force, the commander will use the philosophical model of fighting power. This model measures the contributions of the physical, conceptual and moral components to ensure a balanced and stable structure. |                                                          |
### Joint planning

The joint force commander plans the operation guided by AJP-01 Chapter 5 and AJP-5 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning*. These provide guidance on operational art and operational design. Specific consideration will be given to the nature of operations in the land environment which can be found in AJP-3.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*.

### Land planning

The land component commander/operational commander will develop planning for the land forces contributed to the campaign. He will follow the planning guidance already described but will also need to consider the full range of land tactics and the particular challenges of command and control of land forces. This is provided in ATP-3.2.1, *Land Tactics* and ATP-3.2.2, *Command and Control of Land Forces*.

The commander has a very specific role in the planning process. There is an operational art in translating strategic objectives into a plan that will consist of tactical actions. The activity that supports this thought process is called visualization. It is essentially a 3-phase process.

- **Understanding** – the commander needs to understand the environment in which he will be operating. He needs to understand the enemy, his intent and his capabilities. He needs to understand his own forces and their relative strengths and weaknesses compared with the enemy.

- **Identifying the end state** – to meet the strategic goals that the commander has been given in the mission, he must visualize an end state which provides for those conditions.

- **Visualizing** the dynamics which take him from where he is now to where he wishes to be. It is visualizing the dynamic relationship between friendly forces, enemy forces, and the environment over time to get to the end state.

As described in *Command and Control of Land Operations*.

At the end of the visualization phase the commander will be able to provide his/her intent and give direction on further tasks for the staff and subordinates.
### Execution

Commanders direct the outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements by:
- assigning missions;
- prioritizing and allocating resources (forces and other types made available from nations);
- assessing and taking risks;
- deciding when and where to make adjustments;
- committing reserves;
- seeing, hearing, and understanding the needs of subordinates and superiors;
- guiding and motivating the organisation toward mission accomplishment; and
- giving orders through the use of mission task verbs.

### Themes

Depending on the campaign theme, further advice will be found in the thematic series of doctrine publications. These are:
- Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
- Counter Insurgency
- Peace Support Operations
- Non Combatant Evacuation (NEO) operations
- Support to the Civil Authorities
- Stability Activities
For the specialist staffs of headquarters and for the different arms and services there is allied doctrine to ensure interoperability. Much of this doctrine is authoritative to ensure clear understanding of terms and procedures between allies. These areas are:

- **Intelligence**
  - Intelligence Procedures
  - Counter Intelligence
  - HUMINT
  - Captured Persons
  - Recce and Surveillance

- **Fires**

- **Joint targeting**

- **MilEng**

- **Force protection**

- **CIMIC**

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### Joint activity

Where land forces interact with air or maritime forces there is always a need for clear shared procedures. Examples of such doctrine are:

- Helicopters in Land operations
- Special Operations Forces
- Amphibious operations
- Close air support
- Deployment of forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATP-49(F)</th>
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<tr>
<td>ATP-8(B)</td>
<td>AJP-3.3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP-3.13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Sustainment

Throughout a campaign – from inception to conclusion - the sustainment staffs will be continually occupied. The key factors for sustainment planning will always be:

- Destination
- Distance
- Demand
- Duration

Specialist doctrine for the different elements of J1/J4 staffs and support troops is provided in allied doctrine:

- Special Logistics (Land operations logistic doctrine is in ALP-4.2)
- Movement and transport
- Host nation support
- Multinational support
- Medical
- Joint Logistic Support Group
- POL

| AJP-4, ALP-4.2 |
| AJP-4.4 |
| AJP-4.5 |
| AJP-4.9 |
| AJP-4.10 |
| AJP-4.6 |
| AJP-4.7 |

### Terminology and symbology

The definition of words and phrases relies mostly on the Oxford English Dictionary (OED). Where NATO requires its own explanation, definitions are found in the lexicon of a particular

| OED |
| AAP-39 |
document or are agreed at a higher level. For land agreed terms see AAP-39 and for NATO wide agreed terms see AAP-6. Military symbols are in APP-6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AAP-6</th>
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# LEXICON

## PART 1 – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>air defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Allied Tactical Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>communications and information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Ops</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>land component command(er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>NATO standardization agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART 2 – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Administration
The internal management of units. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

amphibious operation
A military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

area of operations
An area defined by the joint force commander within a joint operations area for the conduct of specific military activities. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

asymmetric threat
A threat emanating from the potential use of dissimilar means or methods to circumvent or negate an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses to obtain a disproportionate result. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

attack
Take offensive action against a specified objective. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

attack helicopter
A helicopter specifically designed to employ various weapons to attack and destroy enemy targets. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

attrition
The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Battlespace
The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to apply combat power, protect a force or complete a mission successfully. It includes the land, maritime, air and space environments; the enemy and friendly forces present therein; facilities; terrestrial and space weather; health hazards; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment in the joint operations area and other areas of interest. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

close air support
Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)
**combat power**
The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**combat service support**
The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**combat support**
Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**combined / multinational**
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. Preferred term: combined (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**command**
1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit, group of units, organization or area under the authority of a single individual.
4. To dominate an area or situation.
5. To exercise command. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**commander’s intent**
A concise expression of the purpose of the campaign or operation, the desired results and how operations will progress towards achieving the desired end state. At the tactical level, the commander’s intent should be focused on the effect that he wishes to create to support achievement of objectives. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed).

**component command**
A functional component command or environmental component command responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**concept of operations**
A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his given mission. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**conflict**
A situation in which violence or military force is threatened or used. Generally it is a contest between two opposing sides, each seeking to impose its will on the other; however, intra-state conflict may involve several factions. (This term is a new term and definition, and will be processed for NATO-Agreed status)
control
That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

counter-insurgency
Comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Deception
Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

delay
To prevent an individual, group or organisation from arriving at a specified location either for a specified length of time or until a specified time or event; to trade space for time by slowing down an adversary, inflicting maximum damage without becoming decisively engaged. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

delegation of authority
An action by which a commander assigns to a subordinate commander a clearly stated part of his authority. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

demonstration
An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

deterrence
The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

disrupt
To break apart an enemy's formation and tempo, interrupt the enemy timetable, cause premature and/or piecemeal commitment of forces. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

doctrine
Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Electronic warfare
Military action that exploits electromagnetic energy to provide situational awareness and achieve offensive and defensive effects. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

end state
The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)
**engagement**
Action taken against a hostile force with intent to deter, damage or neutralize it. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**expeditionary operation**
The projection of military power over extended lines of communications into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific objective. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**exploit**
To take full advantage of success in an activity or opportunity and follow up initial gains. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**exploitation**
1. Taking full advantage of success in battle and following up initial gains.
2. Taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical or strategic purposes.
3. An offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**Fighting power**
The ability to fight, consisting of a perceptual component (encompassing the thought process involved in producing military effectiveness); a moral component (the ability to get people to fight) and a physical component (the means to fight), measured by assessment of operational capability. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

**firepower**
The amount of fire which may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapon system. Related term: functions in combat. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

**fires**
The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

**fix**
To prevent any part of a hostile force, population, group, or organization from moving from a specified location for a specified period of time. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**force protection**
All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**formation**
An ordered arrangement of troops and/or vehicles for a specific purpose proceeding together under a commander. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)
Infiltration
A technique and process in which a force moves as individuals or small groups over, through or around enemy positions without detection. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Information
Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Information operations
A military function to provide advice to and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives. (MC 422/3)

Infrastructure
The static buildings, facilities and other permanent installations required to support military capabilities. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Intelligence
The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Interoperability
The ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Joint fires
Fires applied during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Joint force
A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control. (Derived from ‘Joint’ NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Joint operations area
A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

Logistic support
The provision of all assets, services and procedures required by an organisation or a system to achieve its intended use. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)
logistics
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which deal with:

a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of materiel;
b. transport of personnel;
c. acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities;
d. acquisition, or furnishing of services; and
e. medical and health service support. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

manoeuvre
Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect of the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

manoeuvrist approach
An indirect and sophisticated approach to operations which emphasises both using and threatening force, in violent and non-violent ways, to achieve influence. It focuses on applying strength against vulnerability and recognises the importance of cohesion and will. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

mission
A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

mission command
A philosophy of command that advocates centralised, clear intent with decentralised execution; a style that describes the ‘what’, without necessarily prescribing the ‘how’. (See ATP-3.2.2)

mobility
A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

moral cohesion
Quality of ‘sticking together’ and preparedness to fight, based on social factors including morale, leadership, belief in the cause and shared experience. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

non-combatant evacuation operation
An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

operation
A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

operational command
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the
commander deems necessary. Note: It does not include responsibility for administration. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**operational environment**
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

**operational level**
The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**operation order**
A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**peace support operation**
An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**penetration**
In land operations, a form of offensive which seeks to break through the enemy’s defence and disrupt the defensive system. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**physical cohesion**
Tactical strength derived from the coordination of military operations up, down and across the chain of command, providing mutual support, depth and combined arms integration. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

**protection**
The means of preserving the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at a decisive time and place. Related term: functions in combat. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

**pursuit**
An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**reconnaissance**
A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Related term: surveillance. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

**rules of engagement**
Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)
shock action
The sudden, concentrated application of violence. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

simultaneity
An element of campaign and operational design that seeks to disrupt the decision-making process of the enemy commander by confronting the latter with a number of concurrent problems. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

special operations
Military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, selected, trained and equipped forces using unconventional techniques and modes of employment. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

spectrum of conflict
The full range of levels of violence from stable peace up to and including general war. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

stability activities
Activities that seek to stabilize the situation and reduce the level of violence. They impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies. Related term: land tactical activities. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

strategic level
The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

strike
An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

supported commander
A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

supporting commander
A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

surveillance
The systematic observation of the aerospace, surface and subsurface areas, places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

sustainability
The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)
Sustainment (logistic)
The process and mechanism by which sustainability is achieved and which consists of supplying a force with consumables and replacing combat losses and non-combat attrition of equipment in order to maintain the force’s combat power for the duration required to meet its objectives. Related term: sustainability. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

tactical level
The level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

tempo
The rate or rhythm of military activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. (AJP-3.2 – not NATO Agreed)

unity of effort
Coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognised objective. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)
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AJP-3.2(A)(1)