1. The enclosed Allied joint publication AJP-3.19, Edition A, Version 1, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION, which has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee Joint Standardization Board, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2509.

2. AJP-3.19, Edition A, Version 1, is effective upon receipt and supersedes AJP-3.4.9, Edition A, Version 1, which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedures for the destruction of documents.

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4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

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Brigadier General, HUNAF
Director, NATO Standardization Office
RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION
# RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION (AJP) 3.19

February 2018

- Reduces redundancies and improves continuity with NATO key and capstone doctrine.

- Reflects changes in the strategic environment from a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) perspective.

- Introduces civil-military interaction (CMI) and clarifies the distinct from CIMIC.

- Adds a section on the level of interaction.

- Updates fundamentals of CIMIC to reflect latest policy and doctrine.

- Introduces CIMIC effects in relation to the CIMIC core functions.

- Reinforces CIMIC relevance across all types of operations.

- Emphasizes the joint nature of the CIMIC function.

- Adds and update definitions for the terms “civil-military interaction, civil-military cooperation and liaison”.

- Adds new annex on non-military actors.

- Adds new annex on cross-cutting topics.

- Removes the chapter on CIMIC training and education.

- Updates terms and definitions to reflect latest status of NATO Term and ongoing terminology changes.
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Related documents

The North Atlantic Treaty

PO(2000)0030-REV 2 Role of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO
PO(2010)0143 Comprehensive Approach Report
PO(2015)0216 Guidelines for Engaging Local Actors
PO(2015)0292 The protection of Children in Armed Conflicts – Way Forward
PO(2016)0310 NATO Policy in Building Integrity
PO(2016)0407 NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians

MC 0064/10 NATO Electronic Warfare (EW) Policy
MC 0133/4 NATO’s Operations Planning
MC 0324/3 The NATO Military Command Structure
MC 0327/2 NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
MC 0334/2 NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support
MC 0343/1 NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations (IDRO)
MC 0376/3 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS)
MC 0400/3 MC Guidance on Military Implementation of NATO’s Strategic Concept
MC 0402/2 NATO Military Policy on Psychological Operations
MC 0411/2 NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)
MC 0422/5 NATO Military Policy for Information Operations
MC 0457/2 NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs
MC 0458/3 NATO Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (EETE) Policy
MC 0469/1 NATO Military Principles and Policies for Environmental Protection (EP)
MC 0560/2 MC Policy for Military Engineering
MC 0571/1 Military Concept on Cyber Defence
MC 0586/1 MC Policy for Allied Forces and their use for Operations
MC 0588 MC Concept for NATO Maritime Security Operations (MSO)
MC 0628 NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications
AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
AAP-15 NATO Glossary of Abbreviations used in NATO Documents and Publications
AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine
AJP-2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security
AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
AJP-3.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Maritime Operations
AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations
AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations
AJP-3.4.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support
AJP-3.4.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
AJP-3.4.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance
AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency (COIN)
AJP-3.4.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction
AJP-3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations
AJP-3.6 Allied Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare
AJP-3.8 Allied Joint Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear defence
AJP-3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting
AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
AJP-3.10.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations
AJP-3.12 Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering
AJP-3.14 Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection
AJP-3.15 Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED)
AJP-3.21 Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police
AJP-3.22 Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing
AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
AJP-4.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support
AJP-4.6 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Joint Logistic Support Group
AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support
AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations

AJEPP-2 Environmental Protection Best Practices and Standards for Military Camps in NATO Operations

AC/35-D/1040-REV6 Supporting Document on Information and Intelligence Sharing with Non-NATO Entities
COPD Interim V2.0

ACO Manual (AM) 86-1-1 - ACO CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
(July 2012)

Preface

Scope

1. Allied joint publication (AJP)-3.19, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation* is the NATO doctrine for the planning, execution and assessment of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in the context of Allied joint operations. It is subordinated and refers to AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*. AJP-3.19 is a part of Allied joint doctrine architecture.

Purpose

2. AJP-3.19 provides commanders and staff with the principles and general guidance necessary to plan and conduct CIMIC in joint operations. It does not restrict the authority of commanders; they will be expected to organize assigned forces and to plan and execute appropriate operations to accomplish the mission.

Application

3. AJP-3.19 is intended primarily as guidance for NATO commanders and staffs. However, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for, operations conducted by a coalition of NATO members, partners and non-NATO nations. It also provides a reference for NATO civilian and non-NATO actors.

Structure

4. This publication consists of five chapters and two supporting annexes. Chapter 1 gives the reader a context of the evolving environment in which operations including CIMIC are planned and executed. It also explains the relationships between NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach, civil-military interaction (CMI) and CIMIC. The two annexes, belonging to this chapter, summarize key aspects of non-military actors and a number of cross-cutting topics. Chapter 2 describes the fundamental aspects and principles of CIMIC. Chapter 3 details the effects and activities of CIMIC and the application in the different environments and types of operations. Chapter 4 explains the relationships and the requirements for CIMIC integration as a joint function. Chapter 5 clarifies the CIMIC contribution to planning.
5. CIMIC training and education are not addressed in AJP-3.19. Details on CIMIC education, training, exercise and evaluation are laid down in the NATO CIMIC and CMI strategic training plan.¹

**Linkages**

6. AJP-3.19 constitutes one step towards developing NATO documents covering CIMIC policy and doctrine as well as techniques, tactics and procedures. AJP-3.19 describes the principles of CIMIC and CMI and the organization and structure required to implement CIMIC effectively. It flows directly from the Military Committee (MC) policy MC 0411/2, which lays down NATO military policy for CIMIC and CMI and its application. It is supported by an Allied Command Operations manual (AM 86-1-1) which gives additional amplification, including details on tactics, techniques and procedures that would be inappropriate in an AJP. It is also supported by a CIMIC Functional Planning Guide which provides detailed information about CIMIC support to planning. AJP-3.19 is also harmonized with AJP-01 and other related Allied joint publications (see Figure 1).

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Chapter 1 – Context

Section 1 – Strategic context

1.1 Challenges to Alliance security will come from a wide variety of threats, both military and non-military, and will be difficult to predict. Such challenges may include ethnic, political and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, conflict over resources, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the violation of human rights and the weakening of states. This may, in turn lead to local and regional instability. The resulting tensions may require North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to respond by executing operations at different levels of effort and require the participation and contributions of both military and non-military actors. Threats could also affect Alliance security by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including those of NATO members, thereby causing regional instability.

1.2 There are a number of key strategic drivers of change including: ² globalization, political geometry, demographic and environmental variations, urbanization, and the impact of technology. The implications of these strategic drivers, and an examination of their potential military consequences, helps provide some military trends that add a better understanding of the complexity of the strategic environment.

Section 2 – Military trends

1.3 The balance of military power could be affected by several factors including:

- global defence spending;
- weapons of mass destruction;
- posture and alliances;
- terrorism;
- hybrid threats;
- cyberspace defence;
- different types of adversaries; and
- asymmetric threats.

² See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine for details.
NATO forces may be confronted, simultaneously, by groups or individuals operating in unpredictable and innovative ways, as well as employing tactics that have no regard for international law. Those engaging in this irregular or asymmetric activity may exploit non-military actors to promote their aims and maximize the impact of their actions. Conducting operations in close interaction with the civilian population has significant implications for NATO forces. Positive identification is difficult and engaging targets, particularly in urban areas, will heighten the risk of collateral damage, especially to vulnerable groups. NATO forces will need to understand the situation (its human context, the dynamics at play and the other actors that could help) in order to reach the desired outcome. Mission success will depend upon NATO’s ability to organize, manage and participate in these heterogeneous environments so that their collective capabilities and resources can be effectively and efficiently brought to bear in a timely manner.

Section 3 – Comprehensive approach

The contemporary operating environment involves a myriad of ethnic, religious, ideological and technological issues, which require sustainable solutions in societies disrupted by conflicts, disasters or humanitarian catastrophes. Solutions to these serious events are impossible to achieve by military means alone. They demand a comprehensive approach from the international community. A successful resolution of these challenges will depend on cooperation and coordination based on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual understanding, collaboration and appropriate resourcing.

From a military perspective, a comprehensive approach is founded on a shared situational awareness, understanding and recognition that sometimes non-military actors may support the military and *vice versa*. NATO contributes to a comprehensive approach through four key areas: military planning and conduct of operations, lessons learned, training, education and exercises, interaction with non-military actors, and strategic communications. In the area of planning, the military contribution to the end state is expressed as military strategic objectives. These include objectives to which other actors may be required to provide support and also military support required by other actors to enable them to achieve their allocated (non-military) objectives. The important requirement is to cooperate with other non-military actors in the overall planning for operations in which a large degree of civil-military interaction will be a factor in delivering mission success. The role of the military force must be carefully considered since achieving military objectives alone will not necessarily lead to the end state.
Section 4 – Non-military actors

1.7 Experience has shown that the context of a mission can vary significantly. A feature common to many missions, however, is the complex assortment of non-military actors that will be engaged within the joint operations area and beyond. The commander will be required to work alongside these actors to reach the end state effectively and efficiently, and must therefore retain a high level of flexibility.

1.8 For the purpose of this publication non-military actors\(^3\) include international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,\(^4\) governments and governmental organizations, local actors/population and private sector actors. For more information about non-military actors see Annex A of this publication.

1.9 Each non-military actor will have their own motivation, legal status, mandate, mission, processes and policies. Due to their diversity, techniques that promote effective interaction with one type of actor will often be different from those that work with another. Some non-military actors may be reluctant to work closely with military actors. Some non-military actors may even avoid any interaction. Change will be constant and therefore this requires primarily NATO civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) capabilities to constantly adapt to their environment and to embrace a broad spectrum of interaction. CIMIC, and other relevant staff branches and capabilities, through civil-military interaction (CMI) will support conducting a military operation in concert with non-military actors in a comprehensive manner.

1.10 NATO is required to establish contacts with non-military actors prior to operations to be prepared for missions and operations. The goal is to establish networks and create mutual understanding between organizations to foster cooperation during a mission or operation. Ideally, military and non-military actors should develop mutual understanding and good working relationships prior to any crisis through training, education and other initiatives.

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\(^3\) Other existing NATO terms describing non-NATO counterparts, such as non-NATO actors and non-NATO entities, are not sufficient enough to describe the wide group of possible actors involved in civil-military interaction.

\(^4\) The Movement is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and 190 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
Section 5 – Civil-military interaction

General

1.11 NATO policy defines CMI as: ‘a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, thereby mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises’.

1.12 CMI is the primary means for military forces to both expand their knowledge networks and develop shared situational understanding of the civil environment with other relevant actors in the joint operations area. CMI enables the necessary engagement and coordination process required to create, build and maintain relationships between relevant non-military and military actors.

1.13 Interactions help to attain the desired end state by facilitating cooperation in areas of common interest and avoiding unintended negative consequences when working in the same space as non-military actors. Interactions can facilitate unity of effort, help achieve common objectives, optimize the use of available resources and provide for common understanding. Because of the huge diversity of non-military actors involved, unity of effort may be elusive and only harmonization of efforts may be achieved.

1.14 Adopting an open approach to working with non-military actors is more appropriate than taking a more rigid approach. An authoritative military approach, may be counterproductive to building effective relationships and may in turn impede unity of effort and subsequent success for the mission. Gaining unity of effort is never settled, it takes constant effort to build and maintain relationships. NATO sustains those relationships through permanent and intensive CMI with CIMIC as the main facilitator.

Level of interaction

1.15 Relationships between military and non-military actors cannot be equated to military command authorities (for example, operational control) but instead may be defined by a specified level of interaction. There is no common agreement on these terms, and other stakeholders may use them interchangeably or with different definitions. However, these descriptions are provided as a baseline for common understanding. Depending on the type of

5 See Military Committee (MC) 0411/2, NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI), dated 12 May 2014 for details.
interaction, certain responsibilities will be expected by the counterpart. The levels of interaction range from cooperation to coexistence.

a. **Cooperation.** This can be described as the process of acting together for mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side and implies an association between actors. Cooperation is a concept of interaction in which planning and activities are carried out jointly and/or in support of each other. Cooperation with other actors does not mean giving up authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the direction of others.

b. **Coordination.** This can be described as the process of bringing together different elements of a complex activity or organization into an efficient relationship. Clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction among the participants. Coordination activities include exchanging information, agreeing on joint policies and actions and harmonizing individual activities.

c. **De-confliction.** This can be described as the process of avoiding undesirable interference among actors, especially where they perform the same function or occupy the same physical space.

d. **Consultation.** It can be described as seeking the opinion or advice of other actors, which may include discussion.

e. **Coexistence.** The state or condition of existing at the same time or in the same place. This will generally mean that two or more actors will be aware of each other’s presence but will not directly interact.

**Civil-military interaction principles**

1.16 The following CMI principles will help govern the military direction of CIMIC and other military functions as well as informing non-military actors, in line with NATO’s overarching communication strategy, about the CMI approach.

a. Understand non-military actors and respect their autonomy in decision-making and so encouraging them to do the same.

b. Engage proactively with all non-military actors involved in the operation. Commanders in particular must maintain continuous and effective communication with their correspondent counterparts at local, regional, national and international levels.

c. Facilitate interactions based upon mutual respect, knowledge of respective roles, trust and transparency. Institutional familiarity, credibility and reliability are key.
d. Be able to adapt to evolving and specialized non-military expert advice and factors.

e. Promote local ownership and build local capacity, ensuring timely and smooth transition to local ownership as soon as practical.

f. Ensure internal NATO military coherence and consistent NATO messaging in interacting with non-military actors.

g. Develop and implement a transition plan from the outset to ensure transition to civilian ownership as early as possible when taking on non-military tasks.\(^6\)

h. Promote cooperation, reciprocal information sharing and unity of purpose as a desired method to achieve overall strategic aims, end state and objectives.

i. Operate within the framework of the NATO mission, responsibilities, authorities and legal obligations.

Considerations

1.17 The following considerations need to be taken into account when interacting with non-military actors:

a. **Cultural awareness.** Understanding and being sensitive to local customs, beliefs, convictions and heritage is crucial to mission success. A violation of local laws, traditions or customs may inadvertently create a highly unfavourable situation and seriously undermine the mission.

b. **Common goals.** The ethos, structure and standard operating procedures/working practices of non-military actors working with NATO-led forces are extremely diverse. Identifying common goals can help avoid misunderstandings and assist in defining respective roles and responsibilities.

c. **Transparency.** Transparency helps instil trust, increases confidence and encourages mutual understanding. There is a need to demonstrate openness, integrity, competence, capability and resolve to gain respect, trust and confidence between all actors involved and thus create successful civil-military relationships.

\(^6\) A non-military task is to be understood in alignment with the *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive COPD interim V2.0* and its description on complementary non-military activity in support of military action.
d. **Communication.** Effective communication with non-military actors is vital for successful missions. Each participant, in any interaction, has their own goals. Some may even take the view that cooperating with the military and accomplishing their mission are mutually exclusive. The key to minimizing these difficulties is to maintain open and consistent communication.

**Application**

1.18 NATO CMI activities within a comprehensive approach to crisis management are focused on three levels - the strategic, operational and tactical level.

a. At the strategic level, NATO concentrates on building confidence and mutual understanding between international actors before, during and after evolving crises. It also facilitates the interaction at lower command levels.

b. At the operational level, the priority is to interact with non-military actors before and during the planning and conduct of operations.

c. At the tactical level, NATO force commanders must be empowered to conduct cooperative planning with those local authorities and non-military actors who are willing to do so and to seek coordination of the execution of their operations with these essential stakeholders.

1.19 Depending on the nature of the operation, a wide range of personnel from across different functional staff branches will be involved in CMI together with non-military actors. These interactions will take place at the respective functional level, but their conduct will need proper internal planning and coordination. Therefore, suitable procedures must be established for conducting CMI as part of the overall headquarters effort, with CIMIC personnel being trained to enable and facilitate it.

1.20 CIMIC personnel and assets support, facilitate or directly conduct CMI through activities including civil-military liaison and assessments, as well as planning, coordination with other capabilities/functions involved in CMI and enabling local legitimized authorities working to resolve the crisis. These specialists also enable or facilitate interaction by the entire command, helping bring together the appropriate military and non-military actors for any given activity.

**Section 6 – Operating environment**

1.21 NATO will examine a number of interconnected systems to understand the operating environment. These systems are political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII). As conflict-related effects are likely
to impact the situation outside joint operations area, a firm understanding of these domains in a wider geographical context is required. It also includes the context of the overall operation, its aims and objectives, and the civil environment, especially the multinational and inter-agencies complexities, the host nation sovereignty and the role of the host nation government in conflict resolution.

1.22 **The civil environment** can affect the mission or operation significantly and requires a deep understanding. This deep understanding will range from how institutions function, including the interaction between the institutions, plus technological requirements and physical factors. With the required understanding, actions using all available capabilities directed against PMESII systems will create effects to achieve objectives in order to attain the end state.

1.23 For the purpose of this publication the civil environment is described as: ‘the political, economic, social ethnographic, cultural, infrastructure and information elements of the people with whom a military force or a government agency operates’. The role of the military force in achieving the assigned objective must be carefully considered since achieving military objectives will not necessarily lead to a desired political outcome. Military operations in this civil environment affect the people and must, therefore, be factored into military planning.

**Legal Framework**

1.24 NATO forces always operate within the applicable legal framework. This will include international law, in particular the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and international human rights as well as domestic law of the sending and the receiving state. The legal framework is made more complex by the fact that NATO member states are subject to different international law instruments, as states have signed and ratified different treaties. Even when subject to the same international law instruments, states interpret their content differently. All of this affects the legal environment in which NATO forces operate. Commanders should consult with their legal advisors and integrate them into military planning and operations in order to achieve proper legal advice.

1.25 **International law.** NATO forces' activities are mainly governed by the following parts of international law:

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7 The capabilities of states, non-governmental organizations and international or regional organizations can have wide utility in operations. These capabilities include areas such as the judiciary, constabulary, civilian administration, contractors and commercial partners. It also includes the infrastructure that enables medical care, food distribution, power generation and water and sanitation services.
a. LOAC, is that part of international law which seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict both of international as well as of non-international character. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. It applies only during armed conflicts and is based on the core ideas and principles of humanity, military necessity, distinction and proportionality. Still, the minimum protection standards of LOAC, in particular with regard to the protection of the civilian population and of civilian objects, should be observed during all military operations regardless of the nature of the conflict/military engagement. The two primary sources of LOAC are treaties and customary international law. Examples of such treaties include the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and The Hague Convention.


c. Other areas of international law, such as the International Law of the Sea, International Air Law, International Criminal Law, International Environmental Law and the International Institutional Law.

1.26 Domestic law. NATO forces can be present in a state pursuant to a United Nations mandate or other international law basis, to the extent that their presence is predicated on host nation consent. In such instances, respect for domestic law and customs of the receiving state becomes even more important. Usually there is a status of forces agreement set up between the receiving state and the sending state(s). The status of forces agreement regulates the rights, duties, immunities and privileges of the foreign forces in order to determine the legal status with regard to the domestic law of the receiving state.

Cross-cutting topics

1.27 Cross-cutting topics (CCTs) are a range of different topics which could affect the mission in a number of ways, but which fall outside of the military’s primary responsibilities. Different military disciplines, branches and command levels may have to consider and deal with a variety of CCTs. CCTs have a significant impact on all missions. To date the following CCTs have been identified:

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8 See Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions I-IV for details.
• protection of civilians (persons, objects and services);
• children and armed conflict;
• women, peace and security;
• cultural property protection (CPP); and
• building integrity.

For more information on CCTs see Annex B of this publication.

1.28 NATO’s approach to CCTs is based on legal and political imperatives. The common denominator of all CCTs is that they overlap each other and have far reaching effects in different areas of (civil) society. They are strongly influenced by culture and require military and non-military stakeholders to work together. CCTs need to be considered throughout an operation. To do so, characteristics of CCTs need to be identified and analyzed within the context of the civil environment/operating environment.

1.29 Staff responsibilities. As well as the overlap with other areas, there is also an overlap in responsibilities and contributions within the military functions. For example, cultural property protection is of importance for CIMIC but also involves legal advisor, military engineering, military police, as well as other headquarters staff personnel as illustrated in Figure 2.

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9 See AJP-3.21, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police for details.
Figure 2 – Example of military staff contributions and involvement of non-military actors in CPP

Gender

1.30 Gender\(^{10}\) is not a separate cross-cutting topic, rather something that is an integral part of the CCTs listed above. Gender refers to the social attributes associated with being male and female learned through socialization and determines a person’s position and value in a given context. This also means the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the

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\(^{10}\) The department head for delivering gender advisors training is designated as the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations, a branch of the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre.
relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes.

1.31 Integration of gender perspective is a way of assessing gender-based differences of women and men reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources. The aim of this is to take into consideration the particular situation and needs for men and women, as well as how military activities have different effects on them.

1.32 During NATO operations, it is important to obtain a clear understanding of the local culture, society and environment (i.e. context) which are fundamentally influenced by the culture-specific notions of gender. It is also essential to take measures to promote gender equality relevant to the operation. When understanding the local context, it is of highest importance to listen to, and take advice and recommendations from both women and men. The forces must understand the cultural context within which they are operating and not simply apply their own norms, laws and behaviour. However, the distinction between international and local law, human rights and culture must be analyzed and addressed. Lessons learned indicate that a mixed gender force enhances the sharing of information and is instrumental in garnering trust and credibility.

1.33 Gender advisors and gender focal points\[11\] are responsible for the overall implementation of a gender perspective into planning, execution and evaluation processes of military operations. Deploying gender advisory teams could support local women, encourage women to participate in the peace process, protect them from sexual violence, promote women’s inclusion in electoral systems and engage their voices in legal and judicial procedures.

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\[11\] Gender focal points are dual-hatted personnel nominated by each headquarters division, who have received specialized training on the integration of gender perspectives for the primary purpose of supporting the integration of gender perspectives into the daily work of personnel in their areas.
Chapter 2 – Fundamentals of civil-military cooperation

Section 1 – Definition and application

2.1 Definition. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors.

2.2 The aim of CIMIC is to support the mission objectives by establishing and maintaining cooperation with non-military actors within the area of operations. Ideally all actors will work to a common goal, but where this is not possible interaction will ensure that activities to support each plan are harmonized as far as possible, to avoid negative impacts on own operations as well as on non-military operations and the civil environment. This will minimize interference or unintended conflict between different actors.

2.3 Application. CIMIC is applicable to all types of NATO operations. Commanders are required to assess and analyze the civil environment and apply the cross-cutting topics perspectives in all scenarios when planning and conducting military operations. These considerations include the appreciation of large numbers of non-military actors present in the area of operations. The application and profile of CIMIC depends on the type of operation, the civil environment, and the relationship with non-military actors.

Section 2 – Civil-military cooperation principles

2.4 CIMIC principles are fundamentals that guide commanders, staff and forces in the planning and conduct of operations. These principles contribute to a successful implementation of a comprehensive approach with CIMIC as the facilitator of civil-military interaction (CMI).

Understand the civil environment

2.5 Understanding the civil environment is crucial for mission success and conflict resolution. The commander requires a comprehensive picture of the civil environment for mission planning and execution because, for example even an unintended violation of the (local) traditions and customs can lead to a loss of support of the population and the trust of non-military actors. In turn this can lead to the military forces losing their legitimacy, which would seriously undermine the mission.
Understand the aims and objectives of all non-military actors

2.6 Commanders and staff must fully understand the mandate, aims and objectives, role, structure, methods and principles of non-military actors. Establishing and maintaining strong relationships prior to and during operations ensures mutual understanding. Non-military actors can also use these relationships to develop an understanding of how liaison with the military can benefit their objectives.

Respect civilian primacy

2.7 Governments, and in some cases non-military actors, are and should remain responsible for the provision of basic needs and services. Military support to non-military actors and to the civil environment should only be conducted if it is required to create the conditions that support the accomplishment of the military mission. This should be done for the shortest time possible, to prevent any dependency on the military force.

Act with integrity

2.8 When interacting with non-military actors it is crucial to demonstrate openness, competence, capability and resolve to gain respect, trust and confidence between all actors and so engender successful relationships. A high degree of transparency, balanced by the needs of operations security, avoids misunderstanding and mitigates the risk of the military force losing legitimacy. The joint task force should manage expectations and communicate in advance what realistically can be achieved.

Integrate planning with non-military actors

2.9 By engaging non-military actors, commanders are able to encourage collaborative analysis, integrated planning and interaction in the joint operations area, thereby supporting unity of purpose and effort. CIMIC will enhance integrated civil-military planning and the development of a process and structure for effective coordination and cooperation with non-military actors.

Establish effective relationships and communication with non-military actors

2.10 Commanders and their staffs should develop personal relationships with non-military actors, using civil-military liaison, and make mindful decisions on the degree of reliance on those actors for critical tasks. Establishing relationships must be planned, quickly built through words, images and actions and
continually reinforced. The relationship can be used to ensure that all communication is conducted in line with the communication strategy.

2.11 When sharing information (see Figure 3) it is important not to compromise the position or impartiality of specific non-military actors and to avoid the perception that their organizations are part of an intelligence gathering mechanism. Communication and information systems should be as interoperable as possible. This requires an interface to enable the transfer of information between the military and civilian networks.

Information sharing is largely based on the willingness and ability to exchange information between those actors involved and both are required for this to work. The **Willingness to share** generally revolves around a cultural openness to pursue relationships based on respect, trust and common goals, while the **Ability to share** is dependent on the established organisational policies and procedures of those involved.

**Figure 3 - Effective information sharing with non-military actors**

## Section 3 – Responsibilities

### General

2.12 Within NATO Crisis Response Process responsibilities for initiation, development, endorsement, approval, execution, revision and cancellation of operation plans are clearly divided between the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Military Committee (MC), the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and subordinate NATO Commands. Through CMI and CIMIC, NATO seeks to ensure that plans and the effects of joint operations on all levels reflect political guidance and are aligned with non-NATO actors. CIMIC
personnel on all levels need to constantly advice commanders on CMI, translate their CMI guidance into action and exchange information on CMI through CIMIC functional channels.

**Military Committee and the strategic level**

2.13 The MC is the authority for NATO CIMIC and CMI policy. It exercises its responsibility through the International Military Staff, Operations Division. The MC advises the NAC on military issues, which in turn, provides the overall strategic direction, including CIMIC. The specific responsibilities of the MC and the strategic commands in relation to CIMIC and CMI are laid down in MC-0411/2. In principle, NATO headquarters determines with which non-military actors NATO should liaise. SACEUR’s terms of reference provide Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) with standing authority to conduct liaison with non-military actors with whom there has been a long-standing partnership. SHAPE in turn provides direction and guidance on liaison with non-military actors to the operational and tactical level.

**Operational level**

2.14 The commander will be advised by the assistant chief of staff (ACOS) J9 (CIMIC) on CIMIC issues relating to planning and execution of operational responsibilities. Priorities for CIMIC activities and associated allocation of resources will be determined in the operational level planning process. The ACOS J9 acts as the coordinating authority over CIMIC assets across all components. The following responsibilities are not exhaustive as other responsibilities may arise as a result of consultation between NATO and the appropriate non-military actors. These responsibilities include actions to:

- ensure NATO CIMIC doctrine is used and develop theatre specific CIMIC procedures;
- maintain appropriately trained specific CIMIC staff within the headquarters;
- develop training and exercising CIMIC during mission preparation;
- integrate CIMIC into all plans and orders to support all operations;
- coordinate subordinate headquarters CIMIC activities;
- conduct CIMIC analysis and planning within the operating area;
- ensure coherence of all CIMIC activities in the operating area; and
facilitate CMI related activities and responsibilities within the operating area.

**Tactical level**

2.15 At the tactical level the main CIMIC responsibilities are focused on facilitating effective and efficient interaction with local non-military actors, as outlined in the operation plan and assessing and reporting on CIMIC aspects of the civil environment.

**Section 4 – Core functions of civil-military cooperation**

2.16 CIMIC has the following core-functions:

- civil-military liaison;
- support to the force; and
- support to non-military actors and the civil environment.

Each require the Alliance and its members to have capabilities of sufficient quality and quantity to be able to conduct CIMIC.

**Civil-military liaison**

2.17 Under the concept of comprehensive approach, NATO has instituted broader coordination with non-military actors. NATO liaison therefore includes military-military as well as civil-military interactions, with CIMIC focusing on the latter.

2.18 The aim of civil-military liaison is to establish and maintain liaison with non-military actors at appropriate levels. It is facilitating interaction, harmonization, information sharing and supporting concerted or integrated planning and conduct of operations. Early liaison will be a fundamental part of the planning and development process of both of the other core CIMIC functions.

2.19 Civil-military liaison includes:

- timely identification of relevant non-military actors;
- developing a liaison structure including a notification mechanism; and
- internal and external CIMIC information management.
Support to the force

2.20 Commanders will require non-military support from within their joint operations area as well as coordination of efforts to minimize disruption to military operations. The force may be partially dependent on civilian resources and information from civilian sources. For that reason, CIMIC plays a proactive role by contributing to planning and conduct of operations. This includes, in cooperation with other military functions actions to:

- gather, assess and report information regarding the civil environment;
- identify and assess civil key indicators and sensitive factors having a critical impact on the planning and conduct of operations;
- identify and assess the impact of the military operation on the civil environment;
- recommend how to mitigate the negative consequences or exploit the opportunities of military operations in respect to cross-cutting topics and legal obligations;
- identify and assess the impact of non-military activities influencing own operations;
- promote force acceptance and transparency;
- contribute to informing the civil society in the mission area in line with the communication effort led by strategic communications; and
- facilitate access to non-military resources, when needed.

Support to non-military actors and the civil environment

2.21 Within a comprehensive approach, military support to non-military actors and the civil environment will generally only be conducted if it is required to create conditions that support the accomplishment of the military mission. It may include a wide spectrum of resources such as information, personnel, materiel, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. Facilitating this military support towards non-military actors is a task of CIMIC. The support itself can be provided by all elements of the military. A staggered approach should:

- support by means of capacity and information sharing;
• enable support by means of capacity building; and
• support by military means only (as a last resort).

Section 5 – Capability components

2.22 To carry out the CIMIC core functions and its responsibilities, NATO maintains a dedicated capability. This CIMIC capability exists when the following four components are in place:

• policy, doctrine and concepts;
• the understanding and will to use doctrine and concepts;
• physical resources in the form of selected, trained and competent CIMIC personnel and joint CIMIC assets that are present in the joint operations area; and
• appropriate logistic support of infrastructures to ensure operability.
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Chapter 3 – Effects, activities and operational application

Section 1 – General

3.1 Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) enables a commander to achieve mission objectives across the range of NATO operations through defined activities such as interaction with appropriate non-military actors. The goal of CIMIC is to contribute to the success of the mission, by supporting effects that influence and/or sustain favourable conditions in the civil environment.

3.2 NATO uses an estimate-based planning approach which articulates the commander’s mission and objectives to achieve. Objectives are achieved by effects that bring about changes in the physical or behavioural state of a system, for example maintaining the support of a particular set of non-military actors for a particular course of action, or establishing freedom of action for a set of non-military actors in a joint operations area. Critical to CIMIC being effective is the need for commanders and staff to understand what CIMIC effects can be generated, and that by integration of CIMIC activities they will achieve a desired outcome (to create a favourable and enduring situation). Planners should seek to combine CIMIC effects with other physical and psychological effects as part of an integrated planning process. These will contribute to effective operations design and assist in generating the necessary decisive conditions and lines of operation in a commander’s operation plan.

Section 2 – Effects

3.3 The effects, to which CIMIC contributes, should be measurable, integrated with other capabilities and staff functions, and support the commander’s mission and objectives. Depending on the type and phase of an operation the applicability of effects will vary. The following list is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive, but can assist commanders and staff to exploit the CIMIC core functions and effects to achieve their objectives.

a. Civil-military liaison.
   - relationships with non-military actors established; and
   - information exchange with non-military actors enhanced.

b. Support to the force.
commander’s decision making process enhanced;
common situational awareness of civil environment established;
NATO common operational picture enhanced;
consent in support of military objectives and effective use of military assets achieved;
freedom of action and freedom of movement for military forces established;
acknowledgement of non-military objectives achieved;
force protection enhanced;
integrated planning with non-military actors achieved;
cooperation with non-military actors achieved;
access to civilian resources in joint operations area facilitated; and
negative impact of non-military action on own operations minimized.

c. Support to non-military actors and the civil environment.

- freedom of action for non-military actors established;
- acknowledgement of military objectives by non-military actors achieved;
- safe and secure environment created and sustained;
- negative impact of military actions on civil environment minimized;
- non-military actors actively cooperating; and
- critical shortfalls in civil environment in the joint operations area assessed.

It is important that CIMIC staff give careful consideration to ensure that activities designed to create these effects can be accurately and effectively measured. Failure to do so may result in inaccurate assessments and may mean that less effective direction is given to subordinates and could impact the use of CIMIC capabilities.
Section 3 – Activities

3.4 CIMIC activities will contribute to the creation of the desired effects. These activities include communication, planning, coordination, facilitating civil-military interaction (CMI) and assessments.

a. **Communication.** Effective cooperation is only possible if there is successful communication at all levels. This may prove difficult due to the absence of effective communications infrastructure. Based on strategic level guidance the commander will be in contact with non-military actors. Equally, civil-military liaison officers are likely to be deployed to the non-military actors. It is important that CIMIC staff retain a proactive relationship with their counterparts in these organizations. Stable relationships enable CIMIC staff to explain military objectives/operation to non-military actors and gain in-depth knowledge of the role and responsibilities of the non-military actors. Additionally non-military actors are an essential source of information on various aspects of the civil environment (for example historical perspective, political structures, host nation capabilities and local culture).

b. Effective communication is an enabler for information sharing. Making information widely available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces duplication of effort, but also enhances coordination and collaboration and provides a common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analyzed and validated. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be designed to facilitate sharing of information among non-military and military organizations. A collaborative information environment facilitates information sharing, while operations security measures will be considered at each step of the process.

c. **Planning.** It is critical that CIMIC staff are represented in the commander’s planning groups. Factors relating to the civil environment are likely to impact upon all aspects of operations and related staff work. Therefore, the CIMIC staff should work in close cooperation with all military staff branches, and be part of all cross headquarters processes and bodies, to ensure that civil-related factors are fully integrated into all operation plans. To be effective, CIMIC staff must be included on ground reconnaissance missions and should maintain close contact with relevant civil organizations and government officials in the run-up to an operation. Whenever possible CIMIC staff should participate in civilian planning and assessment groups. CIMIC support covers the political mandate, governance, non-military actors and the civilian population and results in
the CIMIC contribution to the comprehensive preparation of the operational environment. At the same time CIMIC assets provide information, requests and assessments for the staff. Details of the CIMIC contribution to planning are laid down in the CIMIC Functional Planning Guide.

d. **Coordination.** Different mandates, cultures and perspectives require coordination of activities between the military and non-military actors to ensure that objectives are not compromised. Internal coordination is needed with all staff branches and functions to mutually increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions.

e. **Facilitating civil-military interaction.** CIMIC interacts with non-military actors and thereby enables and facilitates CMI for other headquarters staff. CIMIC personnel are trained in bringing together the appropriate military and non-military actors. Facilitating CMI will differ at each level of command due to the focus, responsibilities and scope of coordination.

f. **Assessments.** CIMIC personnel will be involved in two different types of assessment: the CIMIC estimate and the operations assessment. The purpose of the first one is to provide a picture of the civil environment to enable all command levels in NATO to understand the situation and better inform future decisions and coherent planning. A common operational picture including the civil dimension will support this understanding. The purpose of the second is to contribute to the assessments on the progress of the mission during the conduct of operations. CIMIC will contribute to this phase by providing the commander with CIMIC assessments.

**Section 4 – Operational application**

3.5 CIMIC and associated doctrine has traditionally focused on the land domain. However as a joint function, CIMIC has wider applicability across all domains and environments.

**CIMIC support in the maritime environment**

3.6 The oceans connect nations through an interdependent network of economic, financial, social and political relationships. Maritime trade is of fundamental strategic importance to nations; indeed, societies’ welfare and economic wealth depends on the ability to trade which in turn depends on freedom of navigation. The maintenance of the freedom of navigation, sea-based trade routes, critical infrastructure, energy flow, protection of marine resources and environmental safety are all in the interests of national security. Maritime
forces contribute to maintain freedom of navigation and provide a scalable, sustained military presence with a limited or no footprint ashore to demonstrate finely measured political intent.

3.7 Maritime security operations\textsuperscript{12} are those operations conducted in cooperation with national authorities and international organizations (IOs) as appropriate, or by the Alliance alone when directed, to counter the threats, and mitigate the risks, of illegal or threatening activities, in order to help safeguard Allies' strategic interests, security and stability by contributing to mitigating gaps in current national civilian and/or military law enforcement capacity. Maritime forces have seven main tasks\textsuperscript{13} in maritime security operations. Maritime forces may conduct operations to counter maritime crime if this is regarded as a de-stabilizing factor for the nation/region or funding terrorist organizations. This necessitates close coordination among governments, law enforcement, the private sector, IOs and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Conducting maritime security operations requires authority to exchange information and the ability to communicate, plan and coordinate with a variety of relevant non-military actors. Cooperation with the countries’ navies/coast guard forces, maritime authorities; flag state, port state, national shipping authorities, jurisdiction and other departments responsible for the coastal areas and adjacent sea areas is fundamental for the commander.

3.8 In the maritime environment, one of the most significant factors are merchant ships, which are likely to be present in the area of operations and wish to continue their passage with minimal interference. Merchant shipping aims, methods and perspectives may have to be reconciled with those of NATO so that the operational commander’s mission can be fulfilled. The joint task force will interface effectively with merchant shipping through naval cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS)\textsuperscript{14} and Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System (AWNIS).\textsuperscript{15}

3.9 NCAGS and AWNIS have certain unique characteristics and are global concepts being implemented by NATO nations, partner nations, non-NATO nations and other regional shipping organizations. NCAGS is the provision of NATO military cooperation, guidance, advice and assistance and supervision

\textsuperscript{12} See AJP-3.1, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for Maritime Operations} for details.

\textsuperscript{13} The seven main tasks are: uphold freedom of navigation, maritime interdiction, fight weapons of mass destruction proliferation, protect critical infrastructure, support maritime counterterrorism, contribute to maritime security capacity building and support maritime situational awareness (AJP-3.1).

\textsuperscript{14} See Military Committee (MC) 0376/3, \textit{Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS)} and Allied tactical publication (ATP)-02, \textit{Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping manual} for details.

\textsuperscript{15} See Allied hydrograph publication (AHP)-01, \textit{Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System} for details.
to merchant shipping in support of the commander’s mission and to enhance the safety of participating merchant ships and to support military operations. The aim of AWNIS is to contribute to freedom of navigation by the provision of safety and security of navigation information for military and merchant ships in support of maritime operations. NATO joint efforts in this regard are supported by NCAGS and AWNIS through:

- support to commercial shipping contributing to free flow of trade, improved safety and security, advice and guidance on maritime security risks; and
- contributing to the commander's freedom of manoeuvre, efficient use of military resources by de-conflicting military and commercial maritime operations.

3.10 NCAGS and AWNIS are contributing to a comprehensive approach in close cooperation with CIMIC on all levels of command. NCAGS and AWNIS inherent relationships with the merchant shipping industry facilitate the de-confliction of military and commercial shipping operations. Within the CMI context, NCAGS and AWNIS coordinates with military and non-military stakeholders; including military maritime security agencies, government departments and agencies, law enforcement agencies and international and non-governmental organizations in support of the commander’s mission.

3.11 The NATO Shipping Centre (NSC)\(^{16}\) is an integral and permanent element of the NATO maritime command headquarters and provides the primary point of contact between NATO and the merchant shipping industry. The NSC provides fused information and operational support for all national and multinational operations worldwide as directed. NSC is implementing NCAGS and AWNIS on a daily basis through interfaces with the maritime industry and provides and maintains global situational awareness to them in support of NATO operations.

**CIMIC support in the land environment**

3.12 People are the source of all conflict and conflict resolution. Competition for territory and resources and issues such as injustice and lack of representation are often at the root of conflict. Because of its significance, the physical capture and occupation of territory, or the credible threat to do so, has often been regarded as decisive. The land environment\(^{17}\) is also shaped by information, principally its exchange between groups and individuals and through physical aspects, determining constraints and freedoms, varying

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\(^{16}\) See NSC website [www.shipping.nato.int](http://www.shipping.nato.int) for details.

\(^{17}\) See AJP-3.2, *Allied Doctrine for Land Operations* for details.
demands on people and equipment that operate within and incorporating human activity, such as urbanization. Land power is the ability to exert control within the land environment and to influence the behaviour of actors and the course of events. Land forces provide an important and usually necessary contribution to achieving political outcomes.

3.13 Land operations have to deal with the complexity of an environment characterized by the presence of people and infrastructure. It is a particular challenge in land operations to interface with the wide range of actors - working towards, across or against Alliance aims. CIMIC planners must focus on the critical factors within the civilian environment which are likely to have an impact on the military mission, and these are directly related to the basic needs of the local population including water, sanitation, power, health, food, shelter and a secure environment.

**CIMIC support in the air environment**

3.14 The air environment\(^\text{18}\) overlays the land and sea. Air power has decisive impact when orchestrated along with land, maritime, space and cyberspace forces. Air power exploits the nature of the third dimension via the three core air power attributes: speed, reach and height. An additional characteristic of air power is the required support footprint (air bases and their surroundings). For CIMIC, the reach attribute and the support footprint are relevant.

a. Reach. All of the earth’s surface is covered by air, providing aircraft with unique reach. Reach requires understanding of the civil environment over a large area without maintaining a physical presence. Therefore, CIMIC is incorporated in air plans, to assure coordinated action with all non-military actors, in line with the joint CIMIC plans and guidance.

b. Support footprint. Setting up and maintaining air bases and theirs surroundings substantially relies on coordination with national and international agencies and other non-military actors. The impact caused by the presence (safety, posture, mobility, access, pollution, etc.) to the civil environment have to be considered. CIMIC provides the situational understanding to minimize negative consequences.

3.15 Air attack creates tactical, operational and strategic effects through the threat, and use of force. Attack may cause significant effects on the civil environment. Consequently CIMIC participates in the targeting process in order to support the effects to be created and to prevent undesired effects from happening. Where air power presents NATO with a military advantage,

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adversaries may attempt to undermine this advantage by characterizing the use of air power as indiscriminate. This may undermine Alliance unity. In order to protect cohesion it is crucial that strategic communications objectives are considered and are understood across the staff, including CIMIC.

3.16 The joint force air and missile defence commander is the commander with overall responsibility to integrate and coordinate the air and missile defence assets of each force component into a coherent joint air defence plan. This includes timely air and missile warnings to Allies and civil authorities, as appropriate.

a. Passive air defence measures are taken for the physical defence and protection of personnel, essential installations and equipment in order to minimize the effectiveness of air and/or missile attack. Passive air defence within a joint operations area will also apply to non-military assets and therefore requires coordination with government departments and agencies, civil emergency planning and international and non-governmental organizations.

b. Other air defence measures include point defence for the protection of a limited area normally in defence of vital elements or installations including critical civilian infrastructure.

3.17 Airspace control in joint air operations is often complicated with the use of airspace by civilian aircraft, national and international agencies, Allied and coalition forces. All users of the airspace within the joint operations area must adhere to the guidance provided by the airspace control order to ensure the safe passage of friendly, civilian or neutral aircraft.

**CIMIC support in the space environment**

3.18 Space support to operations includes all activities that provide capabilities through space to support NATO operations. Space based capabilities include services such as positioning, navigation and timing, imagery, communications, and environmental monitoring satellites. Military, civil and commercial sectors are increasingly dependent on these capabilities. Commanders should be aware that some space based capabilities supporting NATO operations may be under military, governmental, and even commercial control.

3.19 Space based capabilities are vulnerable to both man-made threats and natural hazards influences. Adversaries may seek to exploit this dependence on space capabilities. Therefore, attacks on space systems become increasingly likely. Commanders must anticipate adversary or third party attempts to interfere with, disrupt or deny friendly force or partner’s access to space based
capabilities. Effective relationships are needed to coordinate between NATO and non-military actors in order to mitigate related threats and risks. CIMIC can support in building these relationships by facilitating civil-military interaction.

**CIMIC support in the cyberspace environment**

3.20 Cyberspace is the virtual, non-physical domain formed by all information technology systems interconnected on a global scale. There are a broad spectrum of users and usage of cyberspace: Military (friendly, adversary), governmental, non-governmental (commercial and non-commercial). It is therefore crucial to establish an early operational situational awareness of the relevant portions of cyberspace and maintain a strategic view of cyberspace, as part of preparation of the battlespace. Cyberspace is part of the civilian and military critical infrastructure. There is therefore a requirement to manage and coordinate joint task force activities in cyberspace with various actors, including host nation, NGO and non-NATO nations to avoid or minimize undesired effects.

3.21 **Cyberspace defence.** State and non-state actors can use cyberspace attacks in the context of military operations. NATO engages with relevant countries and organizations to enhance international security. It also foresees boosting NATO’s cooperation with industry, which will include information sharing and exchanging best practices. Therefore, enhancing information sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyberspace attacks is important. This requires CMI which can be facilitated by CIMIC.

**Section 5 – Civil-military cooperation and the types of military operations**

3.22 CIMIC is applied across all types of operations. The principles remain the same but the emphasis between the core functions may change.

3.23 **Combat.** Combat operations may be required to directly defend NATO against an aggressor. Combat operations are characterized by a series of battles and major engagements, and therefore involve intense activity and high logistic consumption. The tempo of activities is usually high, with a need to prioritize resources, generate additional fighting power and involves large-scale manoeuvre by complex and multi-faceted joint forces.

a. Within many NATO nations the relationship between the NATO force and the host nation is governed by long standing bilateral- and/or multi-lateral
agreements, most notably the NATO status of forces agreements. Many NATO nations have their own structures and procedures in place to deal with most aspects of CIMIC in the event of armed conflict. Moreover, a joint task force deployed in a NATO nation can expect that some CIMIC functions will be undertaken by the host nation. In collective defence it is important that Alliance member states focus on civil preparedness during peacetime in order to strengthen their overall resilience. Support to the civil environment will be a national responsibility and memoranda of understanding may cover many aspects of support to the force. Even where a NATO nation has been subjected to significant destruction, it is assumed that the national government will retain both the will and ability to organize and carry out civil reconstruction of the country, supported by international organizations other than NATO.

b. All types of NATO operations could be confronted with large-scale refugees and internally displaced person, as well as large numbers of evacuees. However within an Article 5 situation these persons may be in particular danger and this could interfere with Allied forces’ operations. NATO can play a supporting role through its CIMIC element.

c. In areas of high-intensity conflict, there are likely to be fewer international aid organizations present. During the early stages of combat, transportation into the area of operations will often be strictly limited to combat formations. In the meantime, commanders may be requested to meet civilian needs. Consequently, planning must be initiated in the early stages including clarifying responsibilities between the national government and the commander of a deployed force.

d. As the operational situation stabilizes, CIMIC staff would likely cooperate with the host nation to integrate the influx of humanitarian aid and development organizations. Basic civil infrastructure and life sustaining systems (such as water supply or power) may have been destroyed during the operation or exist in such poor condition that a rapid reaction will be needed. Coordinating with any non-military actor already in theatre, as well as those incoming, will require CIMIC staff to rapidly develop and establish interfaces with lead agencies. Coordinating the arrival, storage and proper distribution of large quantities of humanitarian aid may also be required.

3.24 Crisis response. Crisis response operations include multifunctional operations, which contribute to conflict prevention and resolution, humanitarian purposes or crisis management in pursuit of declared Alliance objectives.
Crisis response operations may be as demanding and intense as combat operations.

a. **Military contribution to peace support.**" operations contributing to peace support efforts use diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations (UN) Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. As with other crisis response operations, peace support may take place in the context of both inter-state and intra-state conflict. This places additional responsibilities on certain types of military deployments in peace support because security activity cannot be considered in isolation and the military, police and civilian actors will be required to work together to address the causes of conflict in an attempt to secure a sustainable peace.

b. **Non-combatant evacuation operations.** Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are national diplomatic initiatives, with NATO forces participating in a supporting role. NEOs are conducted to relocate (to a place of safety) non-combatants threatened in a foreign country. Normally, NATO forces would only support a NEO in the framework of a NATO-led operation and that support would not include the evacuation of nationals, which remains a national responsibility.

c. In preparation for and during the execution of a NEO, the commander should consider establishing a mission-tailored CIMIC liaison element to facilitate interaction with non-military actors. De-confliction is essential to avoid numerous civilian organizations competing for resources and evacuation routes and duplicating efforts with Alliance plans. Collaboration is highly desirable to achieve mutual benefit from pooling and sharing resources and plans. CIMIC will inform the planners of any political, cultural, professional and commercial sensitivities that need to be resolved to avoid international or inter-organization friction. To achieve this, CIMIC liaison must be established as soon as possible, initially as part of an operational liaison and reconnaissance team.

d. **Military contribution to humanitarian assistance.** Military contribution to humanitarian assistance is intended to support the efforts of the host nation civil authorities, who have the primary responsibility to provide assistance in these cases. IOs and NGOs provide assistance. The host nation will normally be the disaster management authority although in

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19 See AJP-3.4.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support for details.
20 See AJP-3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations for details.
21 See AJP-3.4.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance for details.
special situations this role may be accomplished by an IO. Coordination of humanitarian relief efforts is the responsibility of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). A key pillar of the OCHA mandate is to coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors. OCHA’s UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination facilitates dialogue and interaction between civilian and military organizations essential to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals.

e. **Counter irregular activities.** Irregular activities refer to the use or threat to use force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to affect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. These activities can include acts of military, political, social, informational or economic nature, be they physical or psychological. The increasing convergence of terrorists, insurgents and transnational criminals result in a network that is difficult to identify and disrupt. Countering irregular activities requires NATO forces to have an understanding of the particular character and root causes of the conflict, its context and its participants. Counter-irregular activities fall into three categories (counter-insurgency, counterterrorism and counter-criminality) of which the categories with the most relevance for CIMIC is counter-insurgency (COIN).

(1) **Counter-insurgency.**\(^{22}\) COIN must be carried out in a comprehensive manner by civilian and military entities to defeat an insurgency and facilitate a return to legitimate political processes by establishing a stable and secure environment. It is therefore ultimately a political struggle that includes a wide range of activities in partnership with the contested authorities – of which security is just one, although it is a fundamental one. Unity of effort between the contested authorities and its multinational partners is required to gain success in a COIN operation.

(2) Long-term development and successful COIN depends on the joint task force creating an environment in which civilian organizations can effectively operate, especially with respect to economic and social efforts. A successful counter-insurgency strategy must address: the basic economic needs and essential services (such as sewage, water, electricity, education, sanitation and healthcare); sustaining key social

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\(^{22}\) See AJP-3.4.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency (COIN)* for details.
and cultural institutions; and other aspects that contribute to a society’s essential quality of life. Integrating political, security and economic activities in COIN frequently requires military forces to carry out a wider range of civil-dimension skills and capabilities than they typically train for or inherently possess. As a result, coordination and collaboration become more important as the commander seeks to gain unity of effort. COIN planning at all levels should include representatives from the contested government and other participants. Military participants should support civilian efforts.

f. **Military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction.**

Stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) attempts to mitigate complex problems in unstable states during and after crises. S&R should be part of a comprehensive and integrated international response. S&R activities should be, and normally are, civilian led and ideally implemented by legitimate local authorities. However, when civilian actors or local governments cannot operate because of an insecure environment, the joint task force may be tasked to provide security to facilitate the activities of other actors.

g. Because S&R is primarily a civilian-led process, military forces planning for and conducting S&R must seek to build strong relationships through coordination and cooperation with the various organizations and agencies involved. Whilst establishing agreement among these different actors can be difficult to achieve, proactive interaction by NATO with international actors prior to a crisis can contribute to a broadly-shared vision or unity of purpose. This requires an extensive information exchange with non-military actors starting at the earliest possible stage. Because S&R is primarily the responsibility of non-military actors, the military contribution will generally enable or support other groups’ objectives. Leadership, cohesion and coherence are required to ensure NATO-led forces communicate and act in concert with other actors. Therefore, any form of military support to S&R will require close communication between military and non-military actors, both within the joint task force and outside.

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Chapter 4 – Relationships and integration

Section 1 – Civil-military cooperation as a joint function

4.1 The joint functions are part of the framework that provides the commander and staff means to visualize the activities of the force and to ensure all aspects of the operation are addressed. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is one of the joint functions. The commander needs to consider the joint functions, both when determining the capabilities required for a joint task force and when conducting the operation. Key to the effective integration and synchronization of capabilities, efforts and effects is the coordination between the respective staff functions and CIMIC.

4.2 The joint task force headquarters decision cycle is a methodology that depicts how command and staff elements determine required actions, codify them in directives, execute them and monitor their results. The battle rhythm\(^\text{24}\) is a routine cycle of command and staff activities intended to synchronize planning for operations in accordance with the headquarters decision cycle. The battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings, report requirements, and other activities. The J9 branch of a joint task force headquarters contributes to the decision-making process (see Figure 4).

4.3 J9 personnel participate in most boards and working groups of a headquarters battle rhythm. Beside the processes launched by these boards and working groups (like targeting, information activities or resources), the results all feed into the joint coordination board working group. J9 branch has the lead for the CIMIC coordination meeting.

\(^{24}\) See AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* for details.
Figure 4 – Simplified joint task force headquarters decision-making process

Section 2 – Related capabilities and staff functions

4.4 **Special operations.** Special operations forces (SOF) offer the commander an additional and unique capability to achieve objectives and perform tasks to create strategic- and/or operational-level effects. While a crisis is developing, SOF may be deployed to establish an early forward presence and initiate military and civilian liaison, conduct area assessments, provide an early command and control capability, or advice friendly forces. SOF and CIMIC can mutually support each other in their efforts including, e.g. military assistance, special reconnaissance (environmental reconnaissance), especially in a hostile or uncertain environment and information exchange with
respect to the civil environment. This is essential in order to enhance the common operational picture.

4.5 **Strategic communications.** All NATO actions, engagement and messaging associated with CIMIC will contribute to influencing the perceptions and decision-making of key audiences and leaders, thereby assisting mission accomplishment. Accordingly, creating strategic communications (StratCom)\(^{25}\) effects must also be central to, and integrated with, the planning and execution of CIMIC activities at all levels. StratCom activities should be directed by the overarching operational strategy and political-military guidance from NATO Headquarters. Where possible and appropriate, NATO should seek to align StratCom messaging with key partners and interlocutors; this includes host nation(s), Allies and civilian partners.

4.6 Given the potential variance in role, responsibilities and strategic priorities, management of these relationships will be challenging; consistent and clear messaging, through words and deeds, from the outset of the operation will assist in building trust and openness. Within the bounds of operations security, NATO should seek to share information and coordinate their activities with partners. Means and methods of communication will vary depending upon the operational circumstances but NATO should seek to be agile and adopt a range of information channels to convey its messaging. The messaging, and its ability to resonate with the intended audience(s) is more important than ownership or control of transmission; therefore, there may be occasions when NATO occupies a supporting role rather than taking the lead. To ensure coordination and appropriate coherence of messaging, CIMIC staff should participate in the communication planning cycle including the StratCom working group and the information activities coordination board, alongside more routine public affairs and StratCom coordination meetings.

4.7 **Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence.** The aim of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence is to: prevent CBRN incidents, and protect populations, territories and forces against, and assist in recovering from, such incidents and their effects. Consequently, the commander will have to plan, coordinate, and execute operations within a comprehensive approach using increased civil-military interaction (CMI). This will improve coordination and cooperation, ensuring a more holistic approach in responding to a CBRN incident. Local civilian authorities have prime

\(^{25}\) See Military Committee (MC) 0628 *NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications* for details.
responsibility for dealing with CBRN incidents within their jurisdiction but, if their resources are inadequate, they may request assistance. For NATO, the Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC) will be involved. CIMIC should facilitate the coordination between the joint task force and the CEPC. Similarly, the joint task force may request support from civilian authorities before, during, and after a CBRN incident.

4.8 Military engineering. Military engineering (MILENG) is a function in support of operations to shape the physical operating environment. MILENG is an inherent aspect of each joint function. It achieves the desired objectives by enabling or preventing manoeuvre or mobility, and developing, maintaining, and improving infrastructure. MILENG incorporates areas of expertise such as engineering, explosives ordnance disposal, environmental protection, military search, and management of infrastructure including contracted civil engineering. CIMIC staff should facilitate the interaction between MILENG and other relevant non-military actors. The commander must balance the requirements for MILENG efforts in support of operations and assistance to non-military actors.

4.9 Countering improvised explosive devices. Countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED) activities are necessary to prevent and protect the population and friendly forces against the improvised explosive devices threat. The C-IED approach must be embedded throughout the preparation, planning and execution of operations. C-IED involves multiple military functional areas and therefore relies upon an integrated and comprehensive approach. This should be accomplished through permanent and intensive civil-military interaction. Commanders at all levels must be proactive in interacting with the civil environment to harmonize efforts and promote information exchange arrangements with the host nation, NATO nations, international law enforcement agencies and other partners to facilitate successful operations against adversarial networks that employ improvised explosive devices.

4.10 Logistics. The conduct of operations may also involve non-NATO nations, regional governments and a wide variety of organizations. Therefore the commander and their staff must interact with these organizations over the use of local resources and logistic support to their operations. An important requirement is to limit the negative effects of competition and there may be a requirement to de-conflict support lines of communications. It is therefore essential that the logistics staff establish appropriate CMI through the CIMIC staff. CIMIC staff can establish relationships with a variety of civilian
authorities and agencies, thereby creating a valuable source of information to assist logistic planning. This includes planning and decision support on marking and policing of routes for military or civilian use, host-nation support and civil-military resource management.

4.11 **Joint logistic support group.** The joint logistic support group (JLSG) role is to contribute to conducting joint operational logistic support including: establishing logistic command and control structures for enabling reception, staging, onward movement; supporting Integration; supporting disengagement and establishing command and control for enabling rearward movement, staging and dispatch. Logistic support can be provided through: national provision; host-nation support (HNS); contractor support to operations; and/or multinational cooperative logistics. The purpose of a JLSG headquarters is to optimize those elements.

4.12 The CIMIC branch, in close coordination with HNS, is responsible for establishing and maintaining cooperation between the JLSG and logistic-related non-military actors to fulfil the JLSG mission. The joint task force headquarters is the principal provider of CIMIC capabilities to the commander JLSG. If the JLSG headquarters has dedicated CIMIC staff, it will be the primary advisor to the commander on all JLSG CIMIC-related tasks and issues.

4.13 **Medical.** A close relationship between the medical staff,26 CIMIC and non-military actors involved in medical and health issues may become useful in supporting medical cooperation and coordination. In accordance with established humanitarian support concepts, the commander might be requested to provide non-emergency medical assistance to the local population for a limited duration of time. Depending on the mandate, laws and regulations, commanders may support this request. This must be planned in close cooperation with the medical staff and must be balanced against the capability and capacity constraints of delivering emergency assistance to both own forces and local population. Another area of interaction between medical staffs and CIMIC staff is advice on the coordination, implementation and prioritization of different medical projects to avoid a duplication of efforts, and adverse second order effects, in the area of health care to the civil community.

4.14 **Intelligence.** CIMIC personnel gather information on the civil environment. Due care must always be taken to avoid CIMIC activities being perceived as

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26 See AJP-4.10, **Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support** for details.
military intelligence gathering. In principle, non-military actors are opposed to contributing to military intelligence gathering; any attempt to use non-military actors for this purpose will result in lasting discord and tension thereby reducing cooperation and movement towards the desired end state. The military should use the lowest classification possible. This enhances the overall information sharing process that will allow relevant information to be provided to non-military actors.

4.15 Information operations. Information operations (Info Ops)\textsuperscript{27} is a staff function to analyze, plan, assess and integrate information activities to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved audiences in support of Alliance mission objectives. Several capabilities and techniques are integrated through Info Ops. Each capability will be integrated into the overall plan during the planning process with coordination conducted by the Info Ops staff through the information activities coordination board. CIMIC capabilities make significant contributions to information operations and must always be synchronized. CIMIC activities assist the commander in shaping the information environment and perceptions.

4.16 In addition to civil-military liaison, CIMIC staff will establish relationships with a variety of non-military actors and thereby establish a valuable source of information to support Info Ops planning. To secure the desired influence, planned and regular key leader engagement will be essential. The Info Ops staff will coordinate the commander’s key leader engagement plan. At the same time staff members must engage with their counterpart appropriately, coordinated through the enhanced liaison matrix. The CIMIC staff will lead and facilitate civil-military liaison.

4.17 Psychological operations. Psychological operations are planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. Psychological operations, along with other capabilities, will be coordinated through Info Ops guided by the information strategy and within NATO’s StratCom approach. Psychological operations and CIMIC can be mutually supporting. CIMIC interaction with civil agencies and populations will aid wider knowledge development and assist with understanding the information environment and

\textsuperscript{27} See AJP-3.10, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations} for details.
the audiences within it. Psychological operations may affect the attitudes of population groups and so help make an area more permissive for CIMIC. Similarly, effects of CIMIC activities may improve audiences’ attitudes to NATO.

4.18 **Electronic warfare.** Electronic warfare is the conduct and management of warfare in the electromagnetic environment (EME)\(^\text{28}\) and includes activities to create offensive and defensive effects. Because of the broad and increasing usage of the EME by different types of actors, the EME often affects critical infrastructure. The ever increasing use of the EME by a variety of non-military actors, often result in interference and decreasing manoeuvre space in the EME for military operations. Therefore it is critical to control and coordinate joint task force activities with various actors, friendly or neutral, to avoid or minimize undesired effects.

4.19 **Force protection.** Force protection\(^\text{29}\) is vital to the survivability of the force and the success of its mission. Force protection should be fully integrated and coordinated in the operations planning process from the outset. External threats and insider threats may also exist in environments considered to be safe. CIMIC activities have the potential for promoting acceptance of NATO operations, thereby helping to reduce incidents against the NATO-led force and contributing to the overall force protection effort. This can be achieved through trust and confidence that can be developed by unbiased liaison with all relevant actors and equally balanced support to different recipients. Further, CIMIC may receive information through its liaison that can be useful for improving force protection, such as information on the overall acceptance of the joint task force amongst the population or certain groups or warnings on current threats.

4.20 **Staff advisory group.** The function of the staff advisory group (SAG) is to assist and advise the commander and the staff on issues that relate to their respective speciality. All advisors have direct access to the commander. All members are an integral part of the planning, assessment and decision making cycle. All members of the SAG contribute to a comprehensive approach, conducting civil-military interaction routinely and have direct or indirect links, relationships and need for coordination with CIMIC staff. Members of a SAG can include but are not limited to:

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\(^{28}\) The electromagnetic environment is defined as the totality of electromagnetic phenomena existing at a given location.

• political advisor;
• legal advisor;
• gender advisor;
• medical advisor;
• provost marshal;\(^{30}\)
• special operations forces advisor;
• StratCom advisor; and
• public affairs advisor.

Section 3 – Integration

4.21 Planning for and conducting missions and operations requires consideration of diverse actors across the range of political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems. Final decisions are made at the highest political level based on strategic advice, but processes are interdependent and will require integration across the levels of command.

4.22 Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre. At strategic level, the comprehensive approach concept is established through the Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC). The Crisis Identification Group (CIG) is an integral part of the CCOMC and consists of two core branches: J2 Intelligence and the Civil Military Analysis (CMA) Branch. The CIG role is to identify key indicators of crisis, or potential crisis, which is reported though reports, briefs and a monthly CIG plenary. The CMA branch provides a research and analytical capability within specific regional and thematic aspects. It also provides multidimensional contextualized understanding of the political framework, social characteristics and social economic drivers of potential crisis. The CMA branch regularly conducts development and analysis testing through interaction with key international actors.

\(^{30}\) See AJP-3.21, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police for details.
4.23 **Civil emergency planning.** The focus of civil emergency planning\(^{31}\) (CEP) is the protection of vulnerable societies against the effects of emergency situations (crisis, armed conflict or peacetime emergencies). CEP is a national responsibility and civil assets remain under national control at all times. The aim of CEP in NATO is to share information on national planning activities to ensure the most effective use of civil resources for use during emergency situations. NATO concentrates on those planning activities which cannot be executed at a national level. It enables Allies and partner nations to assist each other in preparing for and dealing with the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict.

4.24 Resilience is a society’s ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from these situations, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors. Resilience is a broad concept focusing upon continuation of basic governmental functions. Resilience is the combination of civil preparedness and military capacity.

4.25 During a crisis management process, CIMIC facilitates, within security constraints, coordination of military plans with existing CEP plans (national, United Nations, European Union and International Atomic Energy Agency). CEP might affect the freedom of movement and actions therefore military plans must take this into account. Additionally there might arise a need for the joint task force to support the host nation government in protecting the population, as well as to maintain vital functions of the society. CIMIC staff of a deployed joint task force will liaise with respective national authorities including the relevant CEP agencies to establish the needed contact and to determine how planned and implemented CEP measures will affect operations. Furthermore CIMIC should support the military planning cycle in gaining and integrating non-military expertise during preparation and execution of an operation.

4.26 NATO Civil Emergency Planning Committee is the top NATO advisory body for the protection of civilian populations and the use of civil resources in support of NATO's objectives based on the seven baseline requirements\(^{32}\) for

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\(^{31}\) See *International CEP Handbook 2009 Civil Emergency Planning in the NATO/EAPC Countries* for details.

\(^{32}\) The seven baseline requirements are: assured continuity of government and critical government services, resilient energy supplies, ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people, resilient food and water resources, ability to deal with mass casualties, resilient communications systems, and resilient transportation systems.
NATO member states. The NAC has agreed to five roles for civil emergency planning in NATO:

- civil support for Alliance military operations under Article 5;
- support for non-Article 5 crises response operations;
- support for national authorities in civil emergencies (via Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre);
- support for national authorities in the protection of populations against terrorism and the effects of weapons of mass destruction; and
- cooperation with NATO partners.

4.27 While the CEPC provides guidance and coordination, four subordinate planning groups (civil protection, transport, public health and food, industry and communication) carry out the actual planning. These planning boards and committees bring together national government and industry experts and military representatives to coordinate planning in several areas of civil activity.

4.28 **Host-nation support.** HNS\(^{33}\) seeks to provide the commander and the sending nations with support in the form of materiel, facilities and services and includes area security and administrative support in accordance with negotiated arrangements between the sending nations and/or NATO and the host government. As such, HNS facilitates the introduction of forces into the joint operations area by providing essential reception, staging and onward movement support. HNS may also reduce the amount of logistic forces and materiel required to sustain and re-deploy forces that would otherwise have to have been provided by sending nations.

4.29 CIMIC’s role in the logistic field is complementary to those involved with providing HNS. Due to their contacts and network, CIMIC personnel contribute to the military planning on the use of HNS by assessing the implications of military involvement on the local economy and help establish interaction with civil actors in cases where de-confliction and harmonization between military and civil needs are required. CIMIC staff can also assist with arranging access to local civil resources and ensure that such access does not compromise the needs of the local population or other non-military actors.

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\(^{33}\) See AJP-4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support* for details.
involved. CMI within HNS, should always be managed in full consultation with the appropriate military and non-military authorities of the host nation.

Section 4 – Assets and command and control relationships

4.30 In every mission there will be a requirement for CIMIC assets,\(^{34}\) to enable the commander to plan, conduct and assess CIMIC activities in support of the mission. CIMIC contribution to NATO operations will be achieved through CIMIC staff operating at all levels of command, CIMIC units at operational and tactical level and CIMIC functional specialists. However CIMIC staff composition as well as CIMIC forces’ size and organization will be tailored to the mission\(^{35}\) and will have to be adaptable as the overall situation evolves.

4.31 CIMIC functional specialists normally provide expertise in civil functional areas such as administration; humanitarian assistance; civil infrastructure; economy; commerce and cultural affairs. Functional specialists can support a CIMIC staff or a CIMIC unit as required. Functional specialist pools can be found in NATO Headquarters or provided by nations (often using reserve officers).

4.32 The Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG) is a NATO affirmed force.\(^{36}\) It can provide multiple CIMIC capabilities to:

- augment CIMIC staff elements at different levels;
- form one or more CIMIC units at the tactical level;
- form the defined CIMIC elements at operational level; and
- augment CIMIC units at the tactical and operational level with functional specialists or support them from the MNCG peacetime location headquarters.

4.33 CIMIC assets must be fully integrated into the formations they will operate with. The commander should be granted operational control of the respective CIMIC units to make best use of them. A CIMIC taskforce can be formed by task organizing CIMIC units from NATO nations under a centralized headquarters for the purpose of carrying out specific CIMIC tasks. In this

\(^{34}\) See Allied Command Operations (ACO) manual (AM) 86-1-1, ACO CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Chapter 2 for details.

\(^{35}\) See the Bi-Strategic Command Capability Codes and Statements for details.

\(^{36}\) In accordance with the memorandum of understanding concerning the establishment, financing, administration, manning and status of Multinational CIMIC Group headquarters, dated Feb. 2014.
phase appropriate command and control structures and reporting chains need to be in place.
Chapter 5 – Planning and lessons learned

Section 1 – General

5.1 Operations planning describes specific activities associated with the deployment, employment, sustainment and redeployment of a joint task force and provides a unifying purpose on individually applied actions (ways) and resources (means) based on operational objectives (ends). Planning is based on understanding the problem and framing conditions.

5.2 The overall planning for complex operations requires good communication and detailed planning and coordination with other actors. The majority of such civil-military interaction (CMI) are to be conducted by all NATO military disciplines and functions. However, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) personnel as enablers and facilitators of the CMI are trained for this task.

5.3 Through the sequence of planning activities, CIMIC staff need to effectively translate the commander’s planning guidance related to the civil environment into CIMIC related effects, and feasible contributions to a course of action, concept of operations and operation plan. This will be facilitated by the CIMIC estimate process that includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- identify non-military actors that could influence the crisis and the mission;
- provide input to the comprehensive preparation of the operational environment including actions to identify and analyze the root causes of the crisis;
- support all sub teams as part of a Joint Operations Planning Group;
- advise on implications of military operations, including CIMIC activities, on the civil environment and vice versa;
- consider relevant cross-cutting topics;
- consider the objectives and plans of relevant non-military actors;
- facilitate coordinated planning with non-military actors;

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37 See AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations for details.
- share information of planning related information with non-military actors, within the limits of operations security; and
- develop the CIMIC effects and their corresponding measures of effectiveness, as well as the CIMIC activities to produce these effects and their corresponding measures of performance.

5.4 The Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) is the basic reference document for planning staffs within the NATO Command Structure. It addresses all aspects of an operation plan, provides guidance on the conduct and methods of planning, as well as identifying the factors to be taken into consideration during the development of a plan.

5.5 Functional planning guides provide planning guidance in specific functional areas. The intent of these guides is to supplement the planning information available in the NATO Crisis Response System Manual, Military Committee documents, approved NATO joint doctrine and the COPD. Specific tactics, techniques and procedures, and headquarters standing operating procedures and standing operating instructions explain how to implement CIMIC and naval cooperation and guidance for shipping related procedures into planning. The associations of the different publications that can be used for planning and CIMIC are depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5 – NATO publications on planning and CIMIC
Section 2 – Analyze

5.6 The comprehensive crisis and operations management process is nested within the NATO Crisis Response Process. The process will scan the horizon and identify potential crises, develop situational awareness, conduct estimates and develop options and, when tasked by NATO Headquarters, conduct strategic planning. CIMIC staff will provide input to situational understanding when tasked to do so.

5.7 Commanders must develop a comprehensive understanding of the civil environment. Understanding the influence and importance of the different non-military actors and the dynamic nature of the relationships between them is necessary for effective crisis management. This understanding will help identify where coordination and cooperation is likely to be achieved and where relationships should be developed. A detailed analysis of the key actors should be conducted to determine how the force should interact with other actors in pursuit of a comprehensive approach to resolve conflict.

5.8 CIMIC will support the commander by initiating and developing the CIMIC estimate. CIMIC focuses on the civil conditions in the respective area of interest as they might affect a military engagement. A comprehensive analysis of the civil environment, all its components and actors and their relationships (including an integrating gender perspective) is the starting point of the planning process based on data made available in Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area Service. The analysis is structured into the following areas: political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure. CIMIC staff have to determine which CIMIC factors have to be considered for planning purposes.

Section 3 – Plan

5.9 During the planning of an operation, potential effects to the civil environment, as a result of military actions, as well as potential effects of non-military activities on the military operations need to be considered. The CIMIC Functional Planning Guide describes the process through which CIMIC supports the planning process for all types of NATO operations. It explicitly includes the CIMIC support to planning in the strategic, operational, and (higher) tactical commands.
Specific aspects in CIMIC planning

5.10 **Targeting.** In support of the operations planning process all staff functions will conduct their own planning activities. CIMIC is therefore required to support these activities with expertise in order to implement a comprehensive perspective. A special emphasis is to be put on joint targeting process.\(^{38}\)

5.11 The joint targeting process links strategic-level direction and guidance with tactical targeting activities through the operational-level targeting cycle. This is conducted in a focused and systemic manner in order to create specific effects and to achieve military objectives and thereby attain the desired end state. NATO uses the joint targeting process and the information operations processes\(^{39}\) to identify targets and decide on applicable effects. Targeting provides opportunities to engage and affect not only opponents, but additional target audiences, including neutrals and supporters as well as non-physical elements such as the mindset, thought processes, attitudes and behaviours.

5.12 CIMIC assessments as well as CIMIC liaison activities support the targeting process. CIMIC assists in identifying critical infrastructure and principal actors within the joint operations area, supports the development of the no-strike list and provides an overall assessment of the impact of any military activity on the civil environment (and non-military actors). It is essential to harmonize and synchronize all actions at all levels to prevent unintended detrimental effects. Actions can also lead to second- or third-order effects which need to be taken into consideration including risk management.\(^{40}\) Therefore the need to coordinate military and non-military activities becomes even more relevant.

5.13 **Funding.** There are two main types of funding for CIMIC fieldwork - national funding and grants to NATO operational-level command entities. National-level funding in theatre should be coordinated through the respective CIMIC staff to de-conflict and harmonize all CIMIC activities. Management of the funds and contracting is normally retained with the financial controller. Approval levels for varying funding programmes may be retained by each national contributor and through the headquarters allocated programme. Each funding programme may also have varying approval levels whereby the

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\(^{38}\) See AJP-3.9, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting* for details.

\(^{39}\) The larger part of the non-lethal aspect is taken into account through the information operations processes. When appropriate, the information activities coordination board could be subsumed into the joint targeting coordination board creating a single decision body for the planning and coordination of lethal and non-lethal targeting.

\(^{40}\) Reliable tools to calculate second- or third-order effects do not yet exist in NATO.
commander must retain or delegate approval authority to their subordinate commanders. Interoperability between CIMIC staff, the financial controller and subordinate commanders and staffs is imperative for seamless integration of all available funding for CIMIC.

a. National funding for CIMIC related fieldwork. It is recognized that national funding has associated caveats that must be adhered to. Nothing in this document will supersede or override these caveats. However, national CIMIC assets using national funding must coordinate their CIMIC activities with the appropriate NATO CIMIC staff branch.

b. Grants to NATO operational-level command entities. When funds are received from other parties (for example donors) such funds become the responsibility of the commander. CIMIC assets are tasked to develop and plan CIMIC fieldwork activities following the commander's intent. Subsequent CIMIC echelons shall apply for funds according to the standing operating procedures.

Section 4 – Plan review and transition

5.14 Plan review requires continuous operations assessment to measure the current status, the effectiveness, the performance and trends to provide feedback on the planning and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations in support of the decision-making process. CIMIC personnel will contribute to this phase by providing the commander with assessments. Assessment design and implementation should support a comprehensive approach, including organizations that have the best understanding of the operating environment. CIMIC will facilitate the input of these non-military actor's assessments into the operations assessments process.

5.15 Transition. From the start of operations planning the commander should plan for termination and transition. Interaction with multinational and inter-agency actors, as well as those within the host nation, provides an effective means for building shared ownership and understanding of transition activities. CIMIC staff will actively promote the transitional aspects in all planning. Transition activities comprise the progressive transfer of functions, supporting institutions, infrastructure and responsibilities between actors to reach an enduring level of capability for the host nation so that it is not dependent on a significant operational NATO military contribution. Transitions are negotiated processes with the host nation and other actors. This makes them non-linear.
and dependent on host nation political processes and interests, which may change over time. Transition activities are likely to take place in a multilateral, inter-agency setting, with NATO being one of several actors involved.

Section 5 – Lessons learned

5.16 The lessons learned (LL) process is a tool that assists commanders to achieve improvements, while recording and communicating best practice. LL, including best practices, have to be captured and implemented to improve all CMI and CIMIC related issues including education, training, procedures (including tactics, techniques and procedures/standing operating procedures) and doctrine development. The learning process is a dynamic concept. It creates the mindset to appreciate change and can prevent the repetition of failure. This results in the implementation of more capable structures and processes in organizations. This is especially valid for CIMIC where aligning applicable military and non-military procedures, to improve cooperation, is crucial for mission success.

5.17 During the planning of CIMIC the focus will be on reviewing previous LL from (non-military) partners that have recent experience in the area of operations. Understanding the role and view of related partners and non-military actors is necessary to draw the right conclusions and recommend effective remedial action.

5.18 Communicating with all actors is the most important factor to create best practices from LL on the military and the non-military side. This requires the sharing of the content of the LL process with non-military actors whenever cooperating with them. It is recommended to use the NATO lessons learned portal as the only tool to collect and share the content of the lessons learned process. Ultimately, sharing CIMIC LL can support the required adaptation and transformation of CIMIC capabilities.
Annex A – Non–military actors

General

A-1 The context of missions can vary markedly. A common feature, however, is the complex assortment of non-military actors engaged in the joint operations area and beyond. Each non-military actor will usually follow a set of mandates and principles governing their work and conduct. The commitments that non-military actors devote themselves to are not only found in the area of humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. They spread over a vast spectrum from immediate assistance to save lives to long-term economic development projects, infrastructural stabilization, educational aspects, conflict resolutions or society-developing issues in general. This variety of approaches results in different agendas, structures and procedures. All of these actors and their actions have an impact on the overall situation and therefore must be part of the military considerations.

A-2 A detailed analysis of the key non-military actors in the joint operations area should be conducted as part of a pre-deployment assessment to determine how the force should interact with these actors in pursuit of a comprehensive approach. Factors for consideration could include organizational roles, mandates, missions, aims, goals, resources, interests and capacity. Understanding these factors enables the commander to minimize friction when interacting with them.

A-3 The field of language, and terminology in particular, requires the attention of both military and non-military organizations. The different use of terms can cause misunderstanding and create loss of efficiency. Awareness and communications training provides civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) personnel with the tools needed to avoid many difficulties in this area and enables them to function as a force multiplier.

A-4 A large group of non-military actors consists of humanitarian and development actors, which are not mutually exclusive.

a. Humanitarian actors. Humanitarian actors are civilians, whether national or international, engaged in humanitarian action with a clear commitment to humanitarian principles.\textsuperscript{41} This commitment is usually laid down in their

\textsuperscript{41} See AJP-3.4.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance for details.
legal mandates, mission statements and statutes. Military forces that deliver humanitarian assistance are not considered humanitarian actors.

b. Humanitarian action comprises assistance, protection and advocacy activities undertaken on an impartial basis in response to humanitarian needs resulting from armed conflicts, complex emergencies and/or natural disasters. The primary objective of humanitarian action is to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity. It focuses on short-term emergency relief and is needs-based.

c. The humanitarian community is not a constituted system with a defined membership. It comprises a large number of humanitarian organizations that differ considerably depending on their individual role and raison d'être.

d. The humanitarian community does not consider all acts of charity or emergency relief as humanitarian assistance and not all providers of relief as humanitarian actors. 'Humanitarian' for the humanitarian community refers to organizations and action guided by humanitarian principles. These principles define how humanitarian assistance is delivered. The cornerstone lies with the upholding of the humanitarian imperative, and must be separate from any political considerations. Access for humanitarian actors to communities in need must therefore be granted.

e. The following four principles apply to most humanitarian actors:

(1) **Humanity.** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to alleviate human suffering, to protect life and dignity.

(2) **Impartiality.** Humanitarian assistance must be carried out impartially, on the basis of need alone, to all people regardless of their nationality, race, gender, religious beliefs, class, or political opinion.

(3) **Neutrality.** Humanitarian actors must act neutrally, to abstain to support a party to a conflict or engage in controversies, in order to continue to have the confidence of all.

(4) **Independence.** To ensure humanitarian actors’ ability to act in accordance with neutrality, the principle of independence was introduced.

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42 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) uses the term operational independence.
formulated, to highlight that humanitarian assistance must be delivered autonomously from military, political or economic objectives.

f. Adhering to humanitarian principles, in particular neutrality and impartiality, and being perceived as doing so, is critical for humanitarian actors to ensure access to affected people, in particular in times of armed conflict. It can also make a significant difference to the security both of humanitarian personnel and the people they assist. Humanitarian actors will have to try constantly to negotiate their legitimacy based on the perception of the local population. Humanitarian principles are crucial for humanitarian actors to avoid being instrumentalized by some and rejected by others. Most humanitarian actors will only interact with the military if humanitarian principles are not compromised.

g. Development actors. Development actors seek to respond to ongoing structural issues that may hinder economic, institutional and social development and therefore help to create the necessary capacity needed to provide sustainable solutions.

h. In the context of human development it usually encompasses foreign aid, governance, healthcare, education, poverty reduction, gender equality, disaster preparedness, infrastructure, economics, human rights, environment and issues associated with these but there is no common understanding, or rigid formula, of what a development organization is. They vary in size, scale and function.

i. Development aid is financial aid given by governments and other agencies to support economic, environmental, social, and political development of developing countries.

A-5 The non-military actors’ landscape is diverse and comprises a large number of different organizations and actors, for example (but not limited to):

- international organizations (IOs);
- International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement;
- non-governmental organizations;
- governmental organizations;
- law enforcement agencies;
• civil defence organizations;
• local actors[^43] and authorities; and
• private sector.

**International organizations**

A-6 The term international/intergovernmental organizations refers to intergovernmental organizations, or organizations whose membership is open to sovereign states. IOs are established by treaties, which provide their legal status. They are subject to international law and are capable of entering into agreements between member states and themselves.

A-7 The most prominent IOs are the United Nations (UN) and the European Union. Other examples include the African Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the World Trade Organization. Their missions are highly political by nature.

A-8 The UN is involved in peacekeeping and political missions and may therefore operate in similar theatres to NATO. The UN System[^44] comprises six principal organs, programmes and funds, specialized independent agencies, departments and offices.

A-9 The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA assists governments in mobilizing international assistance when the scale of the disaster exceeds the national capacity. It takes the lead in coordinating humanitarian action, although in response to specific disasters specialized agencies may take on this role.

A-10 The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)[^45] is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence

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[^43]: Local actors is not only referring to the community level but is also including national and subnational actors.


[^45]: See UN-CMCoord Field Handbook (v1.0) and UN-CMCoord Guide for the Military 2.0 for details.
to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

A-11 Interaction with the humanitarian actors should be made through OCHA, especially in instances where military action may cause humanitarian impact or is required to support humanitarian operations. Activity should be coordinated through established fora or clusters. Where OCHA has established a dedicated UN-CMCoord Officer or focal point function, this is the first point of contact.

A-12 The European Union has set up a number of Diplomatic Delegations across the World to promote political and economic reforms. It is also undertaking many activities in specific areas as part of its Common Security and Defence Policy.

**International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement**

A-13 The Movement\(^\text{46,47}\) is the largest humanitarian network. Its mission is to alleviate human suffering, protect life, health, and human dignity. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is not a single organization. It is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and of the 190 individual National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Each has its own legal identity and role, but they are all united by seven fundamental principles and specific channels of communication and coordination.

a. **International Committee of the Red Cross.** The ICRC defines its mission as: "the ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. The ICRC therefore deals directly with governments and armed forces, as well as armed opposition groups, to promote compliance with and respect for the law of armed conflict. During

\(^{46}\) See [www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/the-movement](http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/the-movement) for details.

\(^{47}\) The Red Crystal is an approved emblem that can be used by a National Society as a member of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The Red Crystal offers an alternative for states that are unable to use the other emblems.
conflicts, the ICRC directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement.

b. The ICRC is neither an International organization nor a non-governmental organization. It is a private association under Swiss law which was given an international mandate by the states party to the Geneva Conventions to help victims of armed conflict. The ICRC has a hybrid nature: its existence is not in itself mandated by governments and yet its functions and activities are mandated by the international community of states. It is worth mentioning four key characteristics of the ICRC:

(1) The ICRC seek and maintain a dialogue with all the parties to a conflict.

(2) The ICRC favours a confidential approach. The ICRC's practice of confidentiality is reinforced by the organization's immunity from the obligation to testify in a court of law.

(3) The ICRC is able to play the role of neutral intermediary and to offer its mediation and good offices whenever required.

(4) The ICRC action cannot be part of any integrated or comprehensive mechanism. The ICRC is limited by its fundamental principles which exclude close cooperation with military forces. The ICRC must maintain its independence of decision making and action while consulting closely with military actors.

c. **International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** The IFRC carries out relief operations to assist victims of natural and technological disasters, epidemic outbreak, etc. and combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member National Societies. The IFRC's work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care.

d. **National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** The 190 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies constitute a vital field presence of the Movement in nearly all countries. National Societies act as auxiliaries to their national authorities in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief, and health and social programmes. In times of armed conflict, they may assist the civilian population and support
the medical services of the armed forces. Their local knowledge and expertise, access to communities and existing infrastructure allow them to act fast and efficiently. This makes them important first responders in many countries and invaluable partners for international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Non-governmental organizations

A-14 NGOs, which can play a role in international affairs by virtue of their activities, are predominantly private (not established by intergovernmental agreement), self-governing, non-profit organizations dedicated to specific aspects of humanitarian and development activity. They are not supposed to be part or affiliated with any government.

A-15 NGOs exist at the local, national and international levels and pursue different missions and motivations. Some NGOs work in both humanitarian assistance and long-term development. They play a crucial role in the transition from short-term relief to long-term development. The work of international NGOs often strengthens the skills of local experts and trainers, reducing dependency on external assistance.

A-16 Many but not all NGOs coordinate with the international humanitarian community through the clusters and other coordination mechanisms. Several of the large NGOs and the NGO consortia have their own guidelines and policies on whether and how to engage with the military. However, a proportion of the NGO community will most likely avoid direct interaction with any military force, regardless of nationality, to pursue their own objectives and to preserve their impartiality and neutrality. Humanitarian NGOs, similar to the ICRC, will avoid the perception of being associated with any party to a conflict, but will have dialogue with all parties (including non-state armed actors) in order to gain security or access to all people in need. The force must understand and accept this premise.

A-17 In recent decades there has been a vast increase in the number and scale of NGOs. At one extreme a NGO may resemble a multinational corporation, with significant budgets, international presence and considerable diplomatic leverage. At the other end of the scale, NGOs may pursue a narrow agenda with a low budget and limited means. NGOs are often highly motivated, displaying a vocational drive and belief in the causes championed by their donors. Increasingly, they are willing to concede that coordination is necessary in pursuit of high-level aims. NGOs in general, and humanitarian
ones in particular, are cautious about interacting with the military in case it compromises their impartiality and neutrality.

A-18 NGOs are accountable to their trustees, donors and beneficiaries ensuring that the effects of their actions benefit those that they are trying to help and remain true to their organization’s values. Most NGOs will operate within a territory using a recognizable and flat command and control structure.

**Governmental organizations**

A-19 Governmental organizations are, depending on their specific area of expertise, dependent on their sponsoring nations to support their efforts in the joint operations area. They can have an expertise in good governance, health care services and support, economic development, infrastructural reconstruction and development, education and political capacity building. Their main focus varies from granting humanitarian assistance to long term development projects. Examples of governmental organizations are the United States’ Agency for International Development, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development or Germany’s Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH.

A-20 **Law enforcement agencies.** Law enforcement agencies are another kind of important non-military actor. Examples include: police,\(^48\) border police, customs, correction facilities and national law enforcement. Such law enforcement agencies are also important counterparts and specialists who contribute to security and governance. Police liaison is normally conducted by the provost marshal. CIMIC personnel must maintain a close relationship with the office of the provost marshal and should consider law enforcement agencies in assessments and planning.

**Civil defence organizations**

A-21 Civil defence is the name of a number of organizations dedicated to protecting civilians from military attacks, as well as to providing rescue services after natural and human-made disasters alike. In most countries civil defence is a government-managed, volunteer-staffed organization, separate from the fire brigade and the ambulance service.

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\(^{48}\) When considering (indigenous) police forces always note that they might have civil or military status, for example gendarmeries, which have a military status and are policing the population.
Local actors and authorities

A-22 This broad category of non-military actors includes the governing authorities of the nation(s) directly impacted by NATO operations. They may include authorities at the regional, national and local level, and will usually include civil society organizations, local media, informal leaders, or semi-official authorities and religious leaders respected by the local population.

A-23 Local actors are very diverse and cannot be regarded as a single entity. The commander should also be aware of the fact that local actors are not merely passive objects of transformation and recipients of international assistance. They have ownership and their own motivation to resolve or prolong the conflict. The effort of the international community is, or should be, aimed at helping to enhance their resilience.

Private sector

A-24 The private sector is what sits outside of direct state control. It describes any privately owned group or person involved in profitable activities. It is a huge group (including private military and security companies),\(^{49}\) and distinct from the other categories as organizations within the private sector are all for-profit. In many countries the private sector owns large parts of the national critical infrastructure. The private sector might only coordinate if it supports their business model or due to legal obligations. From a humanitarian point of view, the relevant question is not how a company is labelled but what specific services it provides in a particular instance. Any interaction of the joint task force and especially CIMIC staff must be based on relevant legal assessments and frameworks.

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\(^{49}\) Private military and security companies are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.
Annex B – Cross-cutting topics

General

B-1 This annex summarizes some of the key aspects of cross-cutting topics which could affect the mission. NATO has identified the following cross-cutting topics so far:

- protection of civilians (PoC);
- children and armed conflict (CAAC);
- women, peace and security;
- cultural property protection (CPP); and
- building integrity.

Protection of civilians

B-2 NATO is committed to the protection of civilians\(^50\) in the planning and conduct of operations, missions and other Council-mandated activities. PoC is a cross-cutting concept relevant to all three core tasks of NATO. The PoC policy complements existing efforts in areas such as children and armed conflict, women peace and security, and conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence.\(^51\) NATO recognizes that all feasible measures must be taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate harm to civilians. When planning and implementing such measures, NATO should give consideration to those groups most vulnerable to violence within the local context. NATO recognizes that, in general, men, women, boys and girls are affected differently by armed conflicts or crises and have different security needs which need to be identified and addressed. A sound approach to PoC is important for continued credibility and legitimacy, thereby applying the following conceptual framework.

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\(^{50}\) PO(2016)0407 NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians dated 10 June 2016.

\(^{51}\) Sexual and gender-based violence refers to any act that is perpetrated against a person’s will and is based on gender norms and unequal power relationships. It encompasses threats of violence and coercion. It can be physical, emotional, psychological, or sexual in nature, and can take the form of a denial of resources or access to services. It inflicts harm on women, girls, men and boys. (Source: [http://www.unhcr.org/sexual-and-gender-based-violence.html](http://www.unhcr.org/sexual-and-gender-based-violence.html)).
a. The PoC (persons, objects and services) includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations on the civilian population. When applicable, protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment.

b. Promoting long-term, self-sustained peace, security and stability is best achieved in cooperation with the local authorities, population and civil society, such as relevant organizations working for human rights, including gender equality.

c. The PoC encompasses a range of activities including the use of force, as appropriate, to prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to situations in which civilians suffer or are under the threat of physical violence. Use of force should be conducted with a degree of caution and restraint to minimize any negative effects on the civil population (non-combatants, cultural heritage and infrastructure for life support).

d. To be effective in integrating the PoC, NATO efforts need to take into account the roles and activities of other international actors. Interaction with other actors and understanding how they perform their mission can ensure complementarity and boost objectives in NATO and NATO-led operations, missions and other Council-mandated activities.

B-3 Planned solutions to protect civilians against violence should address the root causes that led to the violence. As such, protection is often achieved through a combination of:  

- political process;
- physical protection; and
- establishing institutions that can deliver long-term protection.

Children and armed conflict

B-4 NATO is committed to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612 and related resolutions on the protection of children

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52 See AJP-3.4.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support for details.
affected by armed conflict. NATO will integrate the subject into planning and
the conduct of its operations as well as training, monitoring and reporting.\textsuperscript{53}

B-5 The pattern of armed conflict has led to an increased risk for civilians and
especially children.\textsuperscript{54} The involvement of children in today’s conflicts has long-
term (destabilizing) implications for society; patterns of violence rooted in
communities are passed on to younger generations thereby threatening long-
term stability and increasing renewal of violence. Children, who have been
victims of warfare or former perpetrators of violence, show psychosocial
disturbances. Rehabilitation and reintegrating into society is a challenge and
a very complex endeavour. The protection of children in armed conflict is an
important aspect of a comprehensive strategy towards resolving conflict and
building a durable peace and as such a matter of peace and security.

B-6 NATO, in consultation with the United Nations (UN), has targeted four key
priorities where its actions can add value to the effort of the international
community. These actions are to:

- report violations and support monitoring;
- train Allies and Partner Nations forces;
- raise awareness of local security forces; and
- political dialogue.

B-7 The UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict has identified six categories of violations that
warrant priority attention; the so called “Six Grave Violations” against children
and armed conflict. Standard procedures for monitoring and reporting on the
six grave violations are developed in consultation with relevant non-
governmental organizations/international organizations in order to
operationalize UN Security Council Resolution 1612 and its related
resolutions. The identified Six Grave Violations are:

- the killing and maiming of children;
- attacks on schools or hospitals;

\textsuperscript{54} In UNSCR 1325 the UN Security Council expressed concern that civilians, particularly women and
children, increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements.
• abduction of children;
• sexual violence against children;
• recruitment or use of children as soldiers; and
• denial of humanitarian access.

B-8 The commander should ensure that objective, accurate and reliable information is collected and reported in a timely manner on violations committed against children in armed conflict. Therefore cooperation with the international community is key when considering CAAC. Military should make an effort into network creation and liaison which is vital to facilitate the exchange of information. When the mission ends, the military should ensure the efforts regarding CAAC have not been in vain and include them in the transition process.

Women, Peace and Security

B-9 NATO and its partners recognize the disproportionate impact conflict and post-conflict situations in many instances have on women and girls. They also recognize the importance of ensuring women’s active and meaningful participation in decision-making and in security institutions and remain committed to contribute to the full implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, as reflected in the UNSCR 1325 and all subsequent related resolutions.

B-10 The Women, Peace and Security agenda aims to increase female participation in decision-making, enhance women’s rights and protect women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations. Women often experience conflict differently from men and can thus offer valuable insights and input in conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict decision-making.

Cultural property protection

B-11 History has shown that cultural property (CP) is vulnerable in times of conflict. CP can be destroyed or damaged unintentionally by opposing forces as collateral damage or destroyed or damaged intentionally. Culture plays an

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essential role in modern day conflict as the identity of a group of people is often connected to symbols reflected in buildings, monuments and artefacts. Damaging, destroying or plundering cultural heritage undermines a community’s social, ethnic or religious identity, cohesion and resilience. In addition, in times of unrest or armed conflict, artefacts are a prime object to be looted and the trade in antiquities is a source of income for illegal armed groups and fuels criminal and terrorist activities. Because of the importance of CP, not only to the local community but to mankind in general, it needs protection.

B-12 Cultural property protection (CPP) has mission relevance and there is a role for the military as stipulated in international and national law. Ensuring the protection of CP can lead to goodwill from the local community and greater force acceptance. In comparison, a lack of action on the part of the international community and especially the armed forces, can lead to a decline in goodwill from the international community and can have a negative effect on the public opinion of the mission at home and worldwide. CPP prevents armed groups from illegally financing their activities through looted antiquities. CPP preserves national, ethnic and religious identity.

B-13 Effective CPP activities must start before an actual outbreak of an armed conflict. This is normally a responsibility of the host nation government. After the outbreak of an armed conflict, the military might be the first to arrive and be capable of assisting in the protection of CP. The military have an essential task and responsibility to protect cultural heritage in times of armed conflict when others cannot take on this task to protect the remains of previous generations. The integration of cultural property protection into a military mission requires identifying cultural property within engagement parameters, but also looking at the significance of cultural property for the identity and culture of the population. The fundamental key to effective CPP is solid liaison between the military and the cultural heritage sector.

Building integrity

B-14 Building integrity\textsuperscript{56,57} is a key element of Alliance activities. The importance of implementing measures to improve integrity building, anti-corruption and good governance applies to NATO, Allies and partners alike. The building integrity

\textsuperscript{56} PO(2016)0310 NATO Policy on Building Integrity, dated 18 May 2016.
\textsuperscript{57} For Building Integrity the Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector under Norway’s Ministry of Defence serves as the curricular Department Head.
programme addresses the adverse effects of corruption on military operations. Dealing with this requires inter-agency cooperation and coordination as part of the military contribution to a comprehensive approach. Corruption is a common foe for all actors and offers an opportunity for developing a common agreed approach among the international community.

B-15 Within this framework of its building integrity programme, NATO works to support Allies and partner countries to promote and implement the principles of integrity, transparency and accountability in accordance with international norms and practices established for the defence and related security sector. The NATO-led capacity building programme provides practical tools to help nations strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector.

B-16 Corruption is a security risk, it undermines public trust and confidence, wastes resources and limits the commanders’ ability to achieve operational objectives. Corruption affects the whole society and the needs and interest of an entire population. It is therefore essential that both men and women are included in anticorruption decision-making and that gender is taken into account in assessing risks and in developing strategies to reduce corruption and promote good governance in the defence and security sector.

B-17 Education and training are key to making and sustaining change, which will produce long-term benefits. Courses are organized to assist and train nations in building capacities and enhance institutions in the spirit of cooperative security. Education and training aims to raise awareness, sharing best practices, processes and methodologies, as well as at increasing interoperability and promoting international cooperation, all of which are important tools in achieving a more secure environment.
## Lexicon

### Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

Part I of the Lexicon contains abbreviations/acronyms used in AJP-3.19

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations</td>
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<td>ACOS</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff</td>
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<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied joint publication</td>
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<td>AWNIS</td>
<td>Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System</td>
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<td>CAAC</td>
<td>children and armed conflict</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear</td>
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<td>CCOMC</td>
<td>Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre</td>
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<td>CCT</td>
<td>cross-cutting topic</td>
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<td>CEP</td>
<td>civil emergency planning</td>
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<td>CEPC</td>
<td>Civil Emergency Planning Committee</td>
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<td>C-IED</td>
<td>countering improvised explosive devices</td>
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<td>CIG</td>
<td>crisis identification group</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
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<td>civil-military interaction</td>
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<td>cultural property</td>
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<td>EME</td>
<td>electromagnetic environment</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>Info Ops</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>international organization</td>
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<td>JLSG</td>
<td>joint logistic support group</td>
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<td>LL</td>
<td>lessons learned</td>
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<td>LOAC</td>
<td>law of armed conflict</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
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<td>MILENG</td>
<td>military engineering</td>
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<td>MNCG</td>
<td>Multinational CIMIC Group</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCAGS</td>
<td>naval cooperation and guidance for shipping</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>non-combatant evacuation operation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>NATO Shipping Centre</td>
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<td>NSO</td>
<td>NATO Standardization Office</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure</td>
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<td>PoC</td>
<td>protection of civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>SAG</td>
<td>staff advisory group</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>StratCom</td>
<td>strategic communications</td>
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<td>S&amp;R</td>
<td>stabilization and reconstruction</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-CMCoord</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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Part 2 – Terms and definitions

civil-military cooperation
A joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors. (NATO Agreed)

civil-military interaction
A group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, thereby mutually increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises. (NATO Agreed)

collateral damage
Inadvertent casualties and destruction in civilian areas caused by military operations. (NATO Agreed)

doctrine
Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (NATO Agreed)

electronic warfare
Military action that exploits electromagnetic energy to provide situational awareness and achieve offensive and defensive effects. (NATO Agreed)

evacuee
A person who has been ordered or authorized to move from a place of danger by competent authorities, and whose movements and accommodation are planned, organized and controlled by such authorities. (NATO Agreed)

gender
The social differences and relations between women and men, which are learned through socialization and determine a person’s position and value in a given context. (NATO Agreed)

host nation
A nation which, by agreement:
a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or
c. provides support for these purposes. (NATO Agreed)

host-nation support
Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organizations that are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory. (NATO Agreed)

**humanitarian aid**
The resources needed to directly alleviate human suffering. (NATO Agreed)

**Internally displaced person**
A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognized State border. (NATO Agreed)

**international organization**
An intergovernmental, regional or global organization governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterized, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims.

**Note:** Exceptionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross, although a non-governmental organization formed under the Swiss Civil Code, is mandated by the international community of states and is founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions, has an international legal personality or status on its own, and enjoys some immunities and privileges for the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate. (NATO Agreed)

**joint**
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate. (NATO Agreed)

**joint operations area**
A temporary area within a theatre of operations defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint force commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level. (NATO Agreed)

**liaison**
The contact, intercommunication and coordination maintained between elements of the military and/or other non-military actors to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (NATO Agreed)

**mission**
A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. (NATO Agreed)

**multinational**
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. (NATO Agreed)
non-governmental organization
A private, not for profit, voluntary organization with no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities, in particular development-related projects or the promotion of a specific cause, and organized at local, national, regional or international level.

Notes:
1. A non-governmental organization does not necessarily have an official status or mandate for its existence or activities.
2. NATO may or may not support or cooperate with a given non-governmental organization. (NATO Agreed)

operation
A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose.
Notes: 1. NATO operations are military.
2. NATO operations contribute to a wider approach including non-military actions. (NATO Agreed)

operation plan
A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation ‘plan’ is usually used instead of ‘order’ in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (NATO Agreed)

refugee
Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (NATO Agreed)

strategic communications
In the NATO military context, the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the information environment, in support of NATO strategic aims and objectives. (NATO Agreed)

unity of effort
In military operations, coordination and cooperation among all actors in order to achieve a common objective. (NATO Agreed)
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